节点文献

中国土地征收问题研究

Studies on Chinese Farmland Expropriation

【作者】 占兰英

【导师】 刘俊生;

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 , 行政管理, 2010, 硕士

【摘要】 土地征收是国家由于公共利益的需要,强制征收土地并根据相关法律规定给予一定补偿的一种行政行为。土地征收过程涉及中央政府、地方政府、用地单位、农民和农民集体等多个主体的权利和义务,其本质就是土地权利在不同主体之间的交接,它是土地产权在经济上的一种特殊表现形式。在征地过程中产生的违法征地、收益分配不均、侵害农民权益等问题,已经在一定程度上影响了社会的稳定与和谐,因此研究这个问题具有重要的经济、社会和法律意义。本文以经济学的“理性经济人”为基本假设,并依据公共选择理论,认为政府行为实际上就是一群理性经济人在一定规则约束下的行为表现。在此基础上,全文综合运用调查法、文献研究法、跨学科研究法和描述性研究法等研究方法,通过产权理论、博弈理论和委托代理模型等理论剖析了我国现行征地制度存在的弊端及原因,同时提出一些对策和建议。首先,本文运用产权理论分析了我国现行土地产权制度的缺陷,主要表现为土地集体产权主体模糊,农民集体产权利益不完备。由于我国农民的土地所有权是由国家直接分配给予的,而不是通过完全市场交易获得的,因此其作为土地所有权人所享有的所有权权利也是有限的,这是征地制度各种问题的根源所在。接下来,通过运用博弈理论分析了主要征地参与者:中央政府、地方政府、农民集体的利益驱动以及他们之间的利益博弈关系。通过分析发现中央政府和地方政府之间、各地地方政府之间、上下届地方政府之间、地方政府和农民集体之间都存在着利益博弈关系。利益决定了中央政府和地方政府之间的三七开土地收益分配比例;巨大的利益也强烈驱动着各地地方政府、各届地方政府大规模征地;而农民为了获得更多的征地收益则会尽量拖延征地谈判时间。最后,根据我国相关法律规定和其他学者的调查数据,分析探讨了我国征地补偿中存在的问题,其中最为突出的问题是土地收益分配严重不合理。通过分析委托—代理模型发现:只有赋予农民独立选举权,才能产生真正的村民利益代理人,从而切实保障农民利益不受损。我国现行的土地交易制度是先由政府从农民手中低价征地,再由政府高价卖出给用地单位,那么这样形成的交易价格是不是市场价格?如果不是,这种交易定价方式会不会使社会福利产生损失?会产生多少损失?这些问题都需要进一步研究。另外,由于法学和经济学知识的缺乏,本文对征地程序的分析也显得过于简单,这些都是本文的不足之处。

【Abstract】 Farmland expropriation refers to the needs of countries, because of the public interest, compulsory land acquisition and in accordance with relevant laws and regulations provides some compensation. Land acquisition process involves the central government, local governments, land users, farmers and peasants and many other subjects of collective rights and duties of land rights, by its very nature is the handover between the different subjects, which is the land property in a special economic manifestation. Generated in the course of the illegal land requisition land requisition and uneven income distribution, against the rights and interests of the farmers have been affected to some extent, social stability and harmony, so studying this issue has important economic, social and legal implications.In this paper, the economics of "rational economic man" as the basic assumptions, and based on public choice theory, that the Government is actually a group of rational economic behavior of people under a certain rule-bound behavior. On this basis, the full text of the integrated use of survey method, literature research methods, interdisciplinary research method and descriptive research methods such as research methods, through property rights theory, game theory and theories of principal-agent model analyzes China’s current land acquisition system has drawbacks and reasons, the same time, put forward some countermeasures and suggestions.First of all, this article analyzes the use of property rights theory, China’s current land ownership system defects, mainly as vague collective land property rights, farmers’collective property interests do not complete. Because China’s farmers from the land ownership is allocated directly given by the state, rather than through market transactions to obtain complete, so as to land ownership rights of ownership enjoyed by people is also limited, this is the land requisition system, the root cause of problems.Next, through the use of game theory analysis of the main participants in land:the central government, local governments, farmers, and their collective interests drive the relationship between the interests of the game. The analysis revealed between the central and local governments, local governments throughout the last the next local governments, local governments and farmers are the existence of the collective interests of the game between the relationships. Interests of the central and local governments decided to open land 37 between the distributions of income ratio; huge benefits also strongly driven around the local government, local governments, and large-scale land acquisition sessions; while the farmers in order to obtain more land yields will try to the delay time for land acquisition negotiations.Finally, the paper focuses on analysis of China’s land requisition compensation for the problems, of which the most prominent issue is the land of serious irrational distribution of income. By analyzing the principal-agent model was found:only give farmers the right to vote independently in order to have a real interests of the villagers agent, in order effectively to protect the interests of farmers are not impaired.China’s current system of land transactions by the Government for low-cost land from farmers and then sold at high prices by the government to the land units, and then the formation of such a transaction price is not the market price? If not, pricing of such transactions will generate social welfare losses? Will produce the number of losses? These questions need further study. In addition, due to lack of knowledge of law and economics, this paper analysis of the land acquisition process seems too simple; these are the inadequacies of this article.

  • 【分类号】F301
  • 【被引频次】6
  • 【下载频次】305
节点文献中: