【作者】 张红艳；

【导师】 马忠；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 本文以2003—2007年中国上市公司为研究样本,检验了公司治理与盈余质量的相关关系。与现有研究不同的是：本文从代理冲突程度和业绩表现两个维度来表征治理效率,考察了治理效率差异条件下公司治理对盈余质量的影响。本文研究发现当考察代理冲突程度差异时,代理冲突程度差异会影响公司治理与盈余质量的相关关系。在高代理冲突下,公司治理对盈余质量有着显著的影响,而在低代理冲突下,公司治理对盈余质量的影响则不再明显。当考察业绩表现差异时,业绩表现差异会影响公司治理与盈余质量的相关关系。在低业绩水平下,公司治理对盈余质量有着显著的影响,而在高业绩水平下,公司治理对盈余质量的影响则不再明显。当同时考察代理冲突程度、业绩表现差异时,代理冲突程度和业绩表现共同影响公司治理治理与盈余质量的相关关系,其中业绩表现起主导作用。在低业绩水平的情况下,无论代理冲突程度高低,公司治理均对盈余质量有着显著的影响。而在高业绩水平的情况下,公司治理与盈余质量的相关关系则并不明显。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper explores the inherent connections between corporate govemance and earnings quality of A-share listed companies in China from 2003 to 2007. Different from the existing research,this paper under the conditions of two dimensions of governance efficiency (agency conflicts and performance) to investigate the association between of corporate governance and earnings quality. This study found the level of the agency conflicts would affect the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality.In the group of high-agency conflicts, corporate governance has the remarkable influence to the earnings quality, while in the group of low-agency conflicts, the affect is not obvious; the level of the performance would affect the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality, in the group of low-performance, corporate governance has the remarkable influence to the earnings quality, while in the group of high performance, the affect is not obvious; When investigate the level of the agency conflicts and the level of the performance at the same time, the level of agency conflicts and level of the performance will effect the relationship of corporate governance and earnings quality together, the performance will plays a leading role. In the case of low-performance, regardless of the degree of agency conflicts, the corporate governance has a significant impact on the earnings quality. In the case of the high-performance, the relationship of corporate governance and earnings quality is not obvious.更多还原