【作者】 宋丹；

【导师】 潘彬；

【作者基本信息】 湘潭大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 盈余管理是20世纪80年代以来在国际经济学界和会计学界兴起的一个前沿研究课题。国外学者对盈余管理问题研究较早,盈余管理被称为“市场参与者的游戏”。近年来,随着我国证券市场的逐步发展和市场经济的日趋成熟,上市公司对外提供的财务报告成为投资者等利益相关者做出决策的重要依据,而作为证券市场最重要的代表公司业绩的会计盈余信息就备受人们关注,成为评价企业和管理者的最基本标准。盈余管理不是一种单纯的会计行为,它是不同利益相关者之间利益冲突的产物。目前,盈余管理现象非常普遍,加强对盈余管理的研究对提高会计信息质量和改善证券市场资源优化配置的功能有着十分重要的意义。Watts和Zimmerman根据经济学的契约理论,提出西方实证会计理论的三大假设:报酬契约假设、债务契约假设、政治成本假设。本文试图从现代契约理论的角度出发,借鉴国内外学者的研究成果,采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法探讨我国上市公司的盈余管理行为。论文共分四章。第一章绪论,简要介绍了论文研究的背景、目的意义、国内外研究动态、研究思路、研究方法和可能创新之处,并对国内外研究动态进行了简要的评述。第二章介绍了盈余管理的有关理论,包括对盈余管理概念的界定、盈余管理的特征、盈余管理产生的背景和条件、盈余管理的经济学解释以及盈余管理的动机,是整篇论文的理论基础。第三章实证部分。论文选取2007年沪深两市的全部A股上市公司为研究对象,剔除ST、*ST、新上市及数据不全的公司后,共得到1135家公司作为样本。研究方法上,本文在对现有盈余管理测度模型进行评价的基础上,选取横截面的再修正琼斯模型计算可操控性应计利润,以此衡量上市公司的盈余管理程度。然后通过构建多元回归模型,采用参数检验的方法,对我国上市公司盈余管理的契约动因进行实证研究。最后,结合论文实证研究的结果,从限制盈余管理动机的产生和减少盈余管理发生的可能性角度提出约束盈余管理行为的对策。并对论文的研究进行了评述和展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 80s of 20th century, earnings management became a hot research subject in the international economics and accounting educational circles. Overseas financial researchers presented theories explaining the earnings management policy of listed companies, earnings management is called”a game of market participants”, which has a long history in western countries. With the development of security market and the market economy, the financial reports, which are offered by the listed companies, have been considered as the most important basis by which people make dicisions. Concerned by people extremely as corporate performance, the accounting earnings information is paid more attention and becomes the basic standard of estimating enterprises and managers. Earnings management is not just a kind of accounting behavior. It roots from the conflict of different stakeholders. At present, the phenomenon of earnings management is very widespread, more and more the case of the listed companies’earnings management continuously been seen in the report, strengthen the research of the earnings management to raise the quality of the accounting information and improve the stock market’s function of the optimization disposition have the very important meaning. Watts and Zimmerman give us the three hypotheses of economic incentives:Compensation Contract Hypothesis, Debt Contract Hypothesis and Political Cost Hypothesis. Based on the contract theory and the fruits of scholars abroad and inside for reference, this thesis using the methods both of theoretic analysis and empirical testing made on earnings management of Chinese listed companies.The thesis is divided into four chapters.Chapter one: Introduction. This chapter mainly explains the title selection background, researching purpose; defines the research ranges; brief surveys the domestic and international research dynamic status; states the research thought, methods and possible innovations.Chapter two: Correlative theory about earnings management. In this chapter we introduces the nation of earnings management; the character of earnings management; economical explanation of it; procreant background, condition and motivation of it. Therefore this part is the academic basis of the whole paper.Chapter three: This thesis chooses 1135 companies from Chinese listed companies, and collects 2007 years’financial data of these companies as the research sample, deleting ST,*ST, new listed and data missing companies. Methodically, after comparing and evaluating the methods of measuring earnings management abroad, this thesis uses Cross-Sectional Re-Modified Jones Model to calculate the Discretionary Accruals, which is uesd to represent the earnings management. The purpose of the thesis is testing the relationship between the degree of the earnings management and contractual incentive factors. The testing method is regression analysis and comparing analysis.Chapter four discusses the ways of earnings management to figure out how to manage earnings and proposes some suggestions to limit earnings management. At last, pointed out the limitation of this research and the direction of the future research.更多还原