对我国私营煤矿事故多发的博弈分析

【作者】 解微微；

【导师】 肖兴志；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 产业经济学， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 近年，我国矿难事故频繁发生。虽然截至2007年5月底，国家安全监管总局、国家煤矿安监局共公告9104处关闭矿井名单，全国已累计关闭8884处私营非法煤矿，但据今年3月份的资料显示，部分省市已经出现反弹，发生一次死亡30人以上的特别重大事故2起、死亡61人，形势依然严峻。从统计数据来看，发生矿难的煤矿90％以上都是私营煤矿，与国有煤矿相比，大部分私营煤矿都是非法经营，没有安全生产许可证或是安全生产不到位。然而在国家的严厉打击下，为什么这些私营煤矿仍然屡禁不止呢?本文运用博弈论将国有煤矿与私营煤矿之间的关系进行了动态博弈分析，试图找出影响私营煤矿生产投入的行为要素，并且发现寻租行为是私营煤矿屡禁不止的主要原因之一，并从寻租成本、工人工资、政府监管及安全投入方面提出治理私营煤矿的对策建议。本文共分为四章。第一章为绪论。在提出了我国矿难频繁发生，私营煤矿大量存在这一问题后，对众多学者在此领域的学术著作进行了分类研究，以此作为本文立论的参考，然后确立了本文的研究方法，最后对本文结构进行了一下梳理和总结。第二章分为两个小节，第一节对中国私营煤矿的存在状况和特点进行了分析，最终将现状概括为私营煤矿问题在减少，但有反弹现象，私营煤矿屡禁不止，接着对我国私营煤矿的特点进行了总结。第二节对私营煤矿事故多发的原因进行了初步分析，从开采暴利、“官煤勾结”、执法角度、农民工的贫困等五个方面进行了论证。第三章引入了博弈理论知识，对国有煤矿与私营煤矿之间的博弈关系进行了重点分析与探讨，这是本文的重点亦是本文的创新之处。本章共分为两小节，第一小节，对博弈论的基本原理进行介绍之后，结合本文论证的需要，将国有煤矿与私营煤矿之间的博弈关系归类为非合作完全信息的动态博弈类型。第二节，在一系列的假设之后，引入了斯坦克尔伯格模型，探讨了寻租成本、工人工资、政府监管及安全投入等因素对私营煤矿行为主体的影响，从而为找到解决问题的办法提供了方向。第四章在对国有煤矿与私营煤矿两大利益主体进行博弈分析的基础上，结合了国内外在治理煤矿安全方面的先进经验，提出一系列相应的解决措施与建议。具体从寻租、政府监管、安全投入、工人安全意识等四大方面对治理非法煤矿的对策进行了思考与探索。本文是在总结前人关于煤矿安全研究成果的基础上，进行的深入研究与认证。本文的创新之处在于能够从博弈论的角度进行论证，并引入了相关的研究工具，如斯坦克尔伯格模型来分析国有煤矿与私营煤矿之间的动态博弈关系，由此使论证更加客观可信。此外，由于个人能力及篇幅有限，本文也存在着不足之处，比如在研究中没有分析到其他利益主体的博弈关系，如工人与政府、煤矿企业之间的博弈关系，还请有关专家、老师及业内人士加以谅解。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, coal mine accidents occur frequently in China. Although at the end of May 2007, the state safety supervision Office and the National Coal Mine Safety Control noticed 9104 as a total closure of the shaft list, the closure of illegal private coal mines has accumulated to 8,884, according to the data in March this year showed that some provinces and municipalities have rebounded to 30 people died in more than a special two major accidents, 61 people died, the situation remains grim. From statistical data, the coal mining accidents occurred more than 90% of all private coal mines, compared with the state-owned coal mines, most of the private mines are illegal and have no security or safety production license production is not in place. However, in the country’s stringent enforcement, why do these private coal mines still continue despite being banned? In this paper, game theory is introduced to analyze the relationship between state-owned coal mine with the private coal mine, in an attempt to identify the private coal mine production inputs affect the essential acts, and found that rent-seeking behavior of private coal mines despite repeated prohibition is one of the main reasons, and giving proposals from the leasing, government regulation, safety input and safety awareness aspects etc. for the private coal mine management.This paper is divided into four chapters.The first chapter is introduction. After putting forward a frequent occurrence in China coal mine accidents, the private coal mine after this issue and there are a lot of scholars in the field of academic research works are classified as a reference for this argument, and then established the paper’s methodology, the final structure of this chapter was to sort out and concluded.The second chapter is divided into two sections. The first quarter analyzes the existence of China’s private coal mine conditions and characteristics, summed up the status quo in reducing the problem of the private coal mine, but rebound phenomenon, the private coal mines despite repeated prohibition. Then the characteristics of China’s private coal mines were summarized. The other section of the private coal accident followed multiple reasons for a preliminary analysis of profits from mining, "officials colluded with coal," a law enforcement perspective, the poverty of peasant workers carried out a five demonstration.The third chapter introduces game theory knowledge to analyze the game relations between the state-owned coal mine and the private coal mine. It is the focus and innovation of this paper. This chapter is divided into two sections; the first section is about the basic principles of game theory. Following the introduction, this paper induced the Game relations between the private and state-owned coal mine to be complete information dynamic game types. Section two, in a series of assumptions, the model introduced Stackelberg model to discuss leasing costs, wages, the government regulatory and safety factors such as input of the private actors of mine, so as to find a solution to provide the right direction.The fourth chapter is on the basis of analyzing two main game objects state-owned coal mine and the private coal mine with a combination of domestic and international coal mine safety experiences in the treatment of advanced, the solution proposed a series of measures and corresponding recommendations. Concrete from the leasing, government regulation, safety input and safety awareness to be taken in the thinking and exploration.At the conclusion of this paper is on the basis of mine safety predecessors research results, further research and authentication is conducted. The innovation in this paper lies in the perspective of game theory to conduct feasibility studies and introducing the relevant research tools, such as Stackelberg model to analyze the dynamic game relations between state-owned coal mines and private coal mine, so the result is more objective and proof credible. In addition, because of the personal abilities and paper scope is limited, this paper might be deficiencies, for example, analysis of the other main game objects is not included, such as relations between workers, the government and coal enterprises etc., thus inviting experts, teachers and industry for understanding.更多还原