【作者】 郑凌云；

【导师】 辜胜阻；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 本文首先从激励理论的一般文献分析入手，通过简要回顾经济学和管理学中关于激励理论的一些研究成果，认为股权激励是激励理论的创新表现。所谓股权激励指的是公司与部分员工或全部员工之间进行某种股权安排，其理论渊源于西方人力资本产权理论、委托代理理论、风险理论与技术创新理论。股权激励最早产生于美国，其股权激励机制与美国公司治理结构的特点紧密相连。 民营科技企业的治理结构特点在于对物质资本和人力资本具有十分明显的双重依赖性，但是人力资本在企业治理中居于主导地位。现代高技术企业的生产经营风险分布日益多极化。因此，其内部治理结构创新的基本方向是在进一步强化物质资本投入者权益的基础上相应提高人力资本投入者的利益份额，根据人力资本在高技术企业中的相对地位和风险状况给予人力资本投入者相应的剩余索取权和剩余控制权。基于上述分析，本文认为股权激励机制能够完善民营科技企业内部治理结构、强化人力资本激励、促进企业技术创新、保障企业持续发展。 股权激励的实践内容具体包括以下几点：激励对象，购股规定，售股规定，权利义务，股权管理。根据实践内容的区别，企业激励实践模式有以下九种：经营者持股、员工持股、股票奖励、延期支付、业绩股票、股票期权、期股、股票增值权、虚拟股票等。根据不同标准，股权激励模式分为两大类别五个系列，两个类别：基于历史贡献和基于未来业绩；五个系别：持股系、业绩系、增值系、期权系和延期系。本文比较分析了各个系别股权激励模式的特点和联系，并从企业股权结构特点(或者说企业类型)、企业所属行业特点、企业发展阶段等方面分析了我国民营科技企业股权激励模式的选择以持股系(经营者持股、员工持股、股票奖励)和期股系(股票期权、期股)为主。 明晰的产权界定是现代企业制度的基础，是公司内部治理结构的重要内容。只有在产权边界清晰的条件下，才能建立有效的法人治理结构，从而较好地解决激励机制、约束机制和信息沟通机制的问题。我国民营科技企业发展过程中出现了三种典型的模式：北京中关村模式、深圳模式和浙江温州模式。按照产权特征进行分析，本文认为中关村模式以公有民营为主，如四通集团、联想集团等；浙江温州模式以民有民营为主，如正泰集团等。不同产权特点的民营科技企业，其股权激励实践具有不同的特点，通过对四通、联想的持股激励和正泰的限制性期权激励案例研究，本文探讨了上述企业集团持股激励和期权激励实践对我国民营科技企业实施股权激励的启示。 股权激励机制内在的缺陷、我国外部市场环境的不完善和相应的服务体系不健全，是我国民营科技企业实施股权激励机制的制约因素。具体包括：股权激励中的政府干预、资本市场的不完善及弱有效性、激励股票的来源、购股资金来源、股票的流通、股权激励实施相关法律法规(《公司法》、税法、企业会计准则和处理方式等)等。基于上述思路，本文最后提出了我国民营科技企业实施股权激励的基本原则和战略对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 Starting from general document analyses of the incentive theory at first, this paper holds the view that stock and option incentive mechanism embodies the innovation of incentive theory through reviewing some achievements in research of the incentive theory in economics and management briefly. So-called stock and option incentive mechanism, evolved from U.SA, means that the company carries on a certain stock right to arrange with some staff or all staff. It springs from western property right theory human capital, principle-agent theory, risk theory and technological innovation theory. The stock and option incentive mechanism and the characteristics of American corporation governance structure links to each other closely.The characteristics of governance structure lie in the double dependences on material capital and human capital obviously, but the human capital occupies the leading position. The risk distribution of production and management is multipolar in modern hi-tech enterprises day by day. So, basic orientation that its internal governance structure innovates is to correspondingly improve interests share of the person who puts into human capital on the basis of strengthening rights and interests of persons who put into of material capital, then offer correspond residual claim right and residual rights of control to the person who puts into human capital according to relative status and risk state of the human capital of high-tech enterprise. Thus, this paper thinks that the stock and option incentive mechanism can perfect the governance structure, strengthen the manpower capital incentive, promote enterprise’s technological innovation, and ensure enterprises to develop continuously.The practice of the stock and option incentive mechanism includes the following several contents: the object of incentive, regulations about purchasing and selling stocks, rights and obligations, management of stock and option. According to these differences, the modes of the stock and option incentive mechanism are as follows: Employer Stock Ownership Plans, Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Stock Award, Deferred Compensation Plan, Performance Stock, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Stock Appreciation Rights, Phantom Stocks, etc. According to different standards, these modes can be divide into two major classifications and five series, Two classifications: the incentive mechanism based on the historical contribution and that based on the future performance, five series of stock holding, achievement, appreciation, deferred compensation and option. By the comparison, this paper analyzes the characteristic and connections between different modes, and then thinks that two series of stock holding and restricted stock are the general choices of the incentive mechanism in our country’s non-state owned Hi-tech enterprises as far as the ownershipstructure, industrial characteristic, development stage are concerned.Distinct definitions of property rights are the foundation of modern enterprise system, which is the important component of corporation internal governance structure. Only under the condition of clear border of the property rights, could we set up to effective legal person responsibility structure, thus to solve the problems of incentive mechanism, restrict mechanism and information sharing mechanism well. Three kinds of typical modes have appeared during the Development of our country’s Non-state owned Hi-tech Enterprises: the mode of Shenzhen, the mode of Wenzhou, Zhejiang and the mode of Zhongguancun, Beijing, By the analyses of the property right characteristic, this paper thinks that the mode of Zhongguancun relies mainly on publicly-owned and private Hi-tech enterprises, such as Stone Group, Levono Group, etc.; The mode of Wenzhou, Zhejiang relies mainly on the non-state owned and private Hi-tech enterprises, such as Chint Group ,etc. The stock and option incentive mechanism of non-state owned Hi-tech enterprises is difficult because of the different characteristics of property rights system. Through the case stu更多还原