【作者】 周益利；

【导师】 饶晓秋；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 会计学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 近年来，受世界经济不景气的影响，全球并购交易陷于低迷状态，而中国企业间的并购活动日益频繁，过去5年内中国企业并购交易额以每年70％的速度增长。但是，我国独具特色的环境也给并购交易提出了种种挑战。根据麦肯锡研究：我国企业并购成功率非常低，不到30％。这引起社会各界对我国企业并购风险的广泛关注。并购活动是由多种活动组成，财务活动是其核心。本文试图对并购财务风险的研究，以期提高我国企业并购成功率。为此，本文通过四部分来研究：第一部分主要介绍并购财务风险的概念、类别及定量模型。这是本文的基本理论部分。通过对并购财务风险的概念研究发现，目前对企业并购财务风险的研究很多，但对其概念的认识存在分歧。主要有两种观点：并购财务活动风险论和并购融资活动风险论。通过对两种观点的比较，笔者认为：“界定并购财务风险应结合财务要义、风险的本质和现代企业制度的要求，基于此，第一种观点比第二种观点更符合上述要求。在具体内容上，应包括并购投资战略风险、目标公司价值风险、融资风险和财务整合风险。另外，根据并购财务风险的过程性和系统性，采取定量分析即层次分析法，可以很好的解决风险决策问题。”第二部分主要研究目前我国企业并购财务风险情况。通过广泛研究发现，近年我国政府通过颁布诸多法规以规范并购市场；社会团体举行各种论坛探索我国并购存在的问题以及我国企业在并购实践中对风险采取了众多谨慎做法，种种迹象表明，并购风险已受到我国社会各界广泛关注。另外，通过对我国近期大量并购案例研究发现，目前我国企业并购存在诸多风险，主要有：国有产权流动风险；委托代理风险；盲目性并购风险；虚假财务报告风险；定价方法不客观风险；融资渠道狭隘、支付方式单一风险。第三部分主要分析我国企业并购财务风险产生的原因。这是本文研究的重点。主要是运用产权理论、委托代理理论以及博弈论对上述风险进行分析，经分析发现：国有产权流动风险源于我国特殊的国有企业产权结构，即剩余索取权和控制权配置不合理，导致国有企业所有权主体(国资委)错位，所有权虚置，形成内部人控制，进而导致谈判复杂和兼并后产权不明的可能；委托代理风险除了与上述产权下的内部人控制有关外，还与信息不对称下，代理人的道德因素有关；盲目性并购风险是因为战略制定复杂且我国企业家能力有限：另外，与决策本身存在的主观因素有关；虚假财务报告风险主要是因信息不对称下，目标公司的机会主义，以及审计活动本身存在风险而致；定价方法不客观风险是因为运用国际通用定价方法受条件限制，以及政府主导意识给定价造成障碍；融资渠道狭隘、支付方式单一，这与我国资本市场发育不成熟有很大关系。 第四部分主要提供我国企业并购财务风险规避的意见。目前我国正处于经济转轨时期，并购已成为国企改革和经济发展的有效手段。因此，加强并购财务风险管理意义重大。同时，人们对风险的认识和管理水平已有了很大提高，各种国内外中介机构相继参与我国的并购市场;一系列规范并购市场的法律法规陆续出台;而且，我国资本市场和发展完善，各种支付手段不断创新。这都为我国企业并购财务风险的防范提供了很好的条件。鉴于此，笔者建议应从以下几个方面来降低我国的并购财务风险:首先、引入私资本，适度分散国有股权，创造多元化股权结构;同时，加强内部财务监督力度;开展并购决策阶段风险研究。其次、进一步完善财务报告体系;发挥注册会计师的作用，有目的、有针对性地调查隐形债务;并且，对我国企业并购定价方法选择应该遵循“应类制宜、适当修正”的原则。最后、多方面建立和完善我国企业并购融资的政策体系，以解决并购融资难问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, under the depressed influence of international economy, the global M&A trade sinks into the depressing state, and the merger among Chinese enterprises is still frequent, the volume of Chinese enterprise M&A increases at the speed of 70% every year in the past 5 years. However, our country’s distinctive environment has put forward all sorts of challenges for M&A. Study according to McKinsey: the success rate of Chinese enterprise M&A is very low , less than 30%. This causes various circles of society to extensively concern on risk in M&A in china. M&A is made up of many kinds of activities, the financial activity is its core. This text attempts to research financial risk in M&A for improving the success rate of M&A in china. For this reason, this text studies through four parts:First part mainly introduces concept ,classification and quantitative model of financial risk in M&A. This is a basic theory of this text. Through research on the concept of financial risk in M&A, a lot of revenant studies have been done for the moment, but there is difference to the understanding of its concept. There are two kinds of views mainly: the view of financial activity risk in M&A and the view of the financing activity risk in M&A. Through the comparison of two kinds of views, the writer think : "Defining financial risk in M&A should combine financing activity essence, risk essence and request for the modern enterprise system, so the first kind of view accords with above- mentioned requests even more than the second kind of view. At the concrete content, should include the investing strategic risk in M&A, value risk of targeted company , financing risk and combining financial affairs risk . In addition, according to the course and system of financial risk in M&A, quantitative analysis can be very good to solve the problem of the risk."Second part mainly researches on the situation of financial risk in M&A at present. Our government issued a great deal of regulations to regulate the M&A market in recent years; Public organization hold various kinds of forum to explore the existing problem of M&A in china and our enterprises take numerous prudent methods to M&A risks, all sorts of signs show they have already received the extensive concern of various circles of society. In addition, through a large number of M&A cases in china, discover a great deal of financial risks in M&A at present, as follows mainly: transaction risk of state-run property right; principal-agency risk; Blindness risk in M&A; False financial report risk; pricing method risk; narrow financing channel and single means of payment.The third part mainly shows the reason that financial risk in M&A cause. This is afocal point studied by this text. Mainly use the theories of the property right, principal-agency and game to knowledge above-mentioned risks. Transaction risk of state-run property right comes from the special property right structure of state-owned enterprise, namely it is unreasonable to dispose residual claim and control power , cause the ownership of state-owned enterprise (state-run assets committee ) to misplace, form insider control with the possibility of unidentified property right and complicated negotiation and annex; Principal- agency risk does not only relate to insider control but asymmetric information and agent’s ethical factor; Blindness risk in M&A is for complication of strategy, entrepreneur ability limited and itself subjective factor existing; False financial report risk mainly result from the opportunism of the targeted company for asymmetric information and audit risk; Pricing method risk is the reason that the internationally agreed pricing methods are limited by the condition , and government’s leading consciousness causes the obstacle to fixed price; Narrow financing channel and single means of payment come from undeveloped capital market in china.The fourth part offers the suggestion of evading financial risk in M&A mainly. Our country is in economic transition period at present, M&A is the effective mea更多还原