【作者】 宋亚峰；

【导师】 赵宝福；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁工程技术大学 ， 企业管理， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 长期以来，我国企业经营者的薪酬与企业的业绩脱离，经营者利益得不到保障，并由此加剧了“委托—代理”矛盾，最终导致企业发展缺乏内在动力。国外实践证明，经营者股票期权激励机制可以有效解决这一问题，并将使经营者的利益与股东的长期利益保持一致，从而避免了经营者的“短期行为”和“道德风险”。因此，建立完善的股票期权激励机制成为我国企业薪酬制度改革的重要方向。论文在对国内外实行股票期权激励机制的实践进行研究的基础上，结合我国的具体国情，对在我国实施经营者股票期权激励机制的一系列问题进行了设计研究。论文首先对经营者股票期权激励制度进行概述，阐述股票期权的概念、种类以及股票期权的激励作用及其理论基础；接着，分析了我国实行股票期权面临的障碍，总结国内外的实践对我国实行这一制度的启示。最后分析了股票期权的内外基础及设计原则，并重点进行了经营者股票期权激励机制的设计研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 For a long time, the salary of enterprise’s operator of our country is independent from the achievements of enterprises, and aggravate the" principle-agent " contradiction, cause enterprise’s development to lack inherent motive force finally. Foreign practice prove executive stock option incentive mechanism may solve this problem effectively, make benefit and the shareholder’s long-term benefit of operator keep unanimity, thus avoided the operator’s " acts and efforts for expediency " and " morals risk ". So set up perfect stock option incentive mechanism has become of our country enterprise salary system important direction of reform. On the basis of the thing that carry on research to practice of implementing the incentive mechanism of the stock option thesis both at home and abroad, combine concrete national conditions of our country, to implement executive stock option a series of issue of incentive mechanism go on research of designing in our country. The thesis carries on the summary to executive stock option incentive mechanism at first, explain concept, encouragement function of the stock option and its theoretical foundation of the stock option; Then, analyses our country implement obstacle that stock option face, summarize the enlightenment of this system both at home and abroad. Analyses the internal and external foundation of the stock option and design principle finally, and carried on the design research of executive stock option incentive mechanism especially.更多还原