【作者】 马泉；

【导师】 蒲勇健；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 股票期权制度是基于股票期权合约的创新，作为一种薪酬制度被广泛应用于激励企业经理人。由于股票期权将经理人的报酬与公司的远期股票价格联系和捆绑在一起，从而能有效地规避企业经营者的短期行为，并在一定程度上解决了两权分离后企业产生的委托代理问题，是一种报酬和风险相匹配的长期激励制度。股票期权制度在实际应用中取得了巨大成功，但也产生了一些问题并引发了广泛的争议，特别是在最近几年，一些知名的大公司采用了股票期权制度，但却发生了系列经理人违背股东利益的巨大道德风险行为。对股票期权制度的激励机制进行研究，揭示其激励的机理并分析产生激励效果的所需条件，对理论研究以及实际运用有着重要意义。论文运用博弈论、信息经济学以及经济学原理进行建模，对股票期权制度激励机制的三个重要方面进行了研究。 首先论文对通过信息揭示对导入股票期权制度后经理人市场筛选的效率进行研究，结论证明，股票期权制度的采用，能够有效地规避了低能力的经理人冒充高能力的经理人，使得股东从经理人市场上更有可能招聘到高能力的经理人，而且大大降低了股东的筛选成本。然后论文对股票期权制度的激励机理及对企业长期发展的影响进行了研究，结论表明，股票期权制度将经理人期望收益同公司的近期、远期绩效同时联系在一起，使得经理人在位期间有积极性注重企业的长期发展，在理论上实现了股东和经营者之间的激励相容，在一定程度上解决了现代公司所面临的委托代理问题。同时也比较性研究了传统薪酬制度，指出固定工资制是最差的薪酬制度，没有任何激励作用；年薪制忽视了企业的长期发展绩效，也不能使股东效用最大化。最后论文在对经理人在职道德风险行为进行分解的基础上，对股东采用股票期权制度后，产生激励效果的条件进行了研究，得到了委托人的最优激励监督合同，同时产生四个重要结论。论文最后部分还比较分析了国内外股票期权的实施情况，并讨论了中国目前实施股票期权制度所遇到障碍因素：公司治理结构、股票市场效率、中介机构及财务会计法规等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Stock option system, based on the innovation of stock option contract, has been used extensively as a kind of salary system to encourage the business managers. Due to the salary of manager is bound to the future stock price of the company, and accordingly, the short-term behavior of the manager can be avoided, and to certain degree, the principal-agent problem appeared after separating ownership from right of control can be solved. So to speak, stock option is a long-term incentive system based on the match of return and risk. . Stock option system has obtained great success at actual application, but also aroused some problems and caused extensive dispute. In recent years, some well-known companies have adopted the stock option system, however, a series of behaviors that managers take great moral hazard to disobey the shareholder’s benefits have happened. For both theoretic research and practical application, it is important to study and analyze the incentive mechanism of stock option system and to discover the requirements to produce incentive effect.This dissertation studied the three important aspects of the incentive mechanism of stock option system through building mathematic model based on game theory, information economics and economics principle. First, the dissertation studied the efficiency of sorting managers after adopting stock option system. It shows that the adoption of stock option system can availably evade the low-ability managers from pretending to be of high-ability, and make the shareholder to have more possibility to choose manager of high ability, so to reduce the cost.Then this dissertation studied the incentive mechanism and its influences to the enterprise’s development in long-term. It shows that the expecting return of managers can be connected with the short-term and long-term performance so to make managers to focus on the enterprise’s development in long-term. Therefore, the incentive compatibility between shareholder and manager can be realized theoretically and to certain degree, the principal-agent problem can be solved. Meanwhile, it compared the traditional salary system and pointed out that fixed salary system is the least effective, while the annual salary ignores the long-term performance of the enterprise and can not<WP=5>maximize the shareholders’ utility. Finally this dissertation studied the requirements to produce incentive effect after adopting the stock option system on foundation of the specializing moral hazard of managers and achieved the optimal incentive and supervised contract and other four elemental conclusions.In the last part, it comparatively analyzed the application of shock option in domestic and foreign countries, and discussed the obstacles that stock option system encountered in China: corporate governance, the efficiency of stock market, agency institution, finance and accountancy laws etc.更多还原