盈余管理研究

【作者】 吴勇；

【导师】 余海宗；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 工商管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 盈余管理问题在西方由来已久，被称为“市场参与者的游戏”，近年来也日益受到我国会计学界的关注。有关实证研究结果表明，我国企业（特别是上市公司）中存在大量的盈余管理行为。从有效契约的角度看，适度的盈余管理行为可以使企业灵活面对契约的不完全性和刚性，降低契约成本，提高企业价值。从资本市场看，适度的盈余管理是尽快、尽多地传递内部信息，减少沟通障碍所造成的信息滞导的手段。但是，过度的盈余管理完全是一种过度的机会主义行为，会导致会计信息失真，损害投资者利益，甚至会影响证券市场的健康发展，扰乱正常的社会经济秩序。目前，我国企业的盈余管理大多存在过度行为，如不加以治理，有成泛滥之势。笔者想就此问题进行一些探讨，以期对我国企业的盈余管理行为的治理提供一些益处。本文先对盈余管理的基本涵义进行界定，然后分析盈余管理存在的原因及技术方法，在此基础上研究盈余管理的识别方法和治理对策。基于这种思路，论文的内容包括五个部分：盈余管理的基本涵义和基本特征研究；盈余管理动因分析；盈余管理技术方法分析；盈余管理识别研究；盈余管理治理对策研究。对于盈余管理的基本涵义，国内外学者并无完全统一的意见。本文在借鉴已有研究的基础上，提出盈余管理的基本涵义，即盈余管理是指在法律责任之外，企业管理当局通过会计政策的选择和“构造”交易事项等方式向会计信息使用者传递利好信息，以实现经营者自身利益或企业价值最大化的行为。进而研究了盈余管理的四个基本特征：盈余管理的主体是企业管理当局；盈余管理的客体是公认的会计原则、会计方法和会计估计，以及时间特别是时点的选择；盈余管理的主要目的在于获取私人利益；盈余管理的途径主要有两条：职业判断和规划交易。盈余管理受多种激励因素的驱动而存在。本文就企业盈余管理动<WP=3>因主要从两方面进行分析，一是存在的原因，二是实施的动机。由于市场机制的不健全，会计政策的不规范，以及市场监管滞后，惩罚力度不大等原因，盈余管理的产生存在客观必然性，要完全消除盈余管理是不可能的，也是不必要的。另一方面，由于企业及管理者出于政治、经济、物质等诸多自身或企业利益的需要，盈余管理的实施具有主观能动性，使得有效抑制盈余管理行为成为可能。盈余管理的主要目的在于获取私人利益，但最终要通过企业的会计行为来实施，具体表现形式则是会计数据。本文就此讨论了企业进行盈余管理的技术方法，揭示了虚假确认收入、虚假确认费用、利用关联交易、利用非经常性损益、变更会计政策与会计估计等盈余管理的手段和方法。在盈余管理识别研究中，笔者阐述了如何发现企业进行了盈余管理。关注注册会计师的审计报告、管理当局对审计报告解释性说明或保留意见的说明、会计政策和会计估计的变更、会计报表合并范围发生的变动、公司连续年度报表的比较、关联交易和非经常性损益项目等有助于发现企业的盈余管理行为。盈余管理不仅是一个简单的会计问题，而且涉及到管理学、经济学、商业伦理学等多学科的知识，同样其治理也需要多管齐下。本文的最后部分，主要从市场机制、公司治理结构、会计规范、市场监管及诚信教育等方面对如何约束我国企业的盈余管理行为提出了一些建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Earnings management, which is called "a game of market participators", has a long history in western countries, and more attention has been paid to by our country’s accounting academia in recent years. Related empirical results show that there are large numbers of earnings management behaviors in our country’s companies (especially in listed companies). From the efficient contract point of view, appropriate earnings management behaviors can help the company to face the inadequacy and rigidity of contract flexibly, so that the company can reduce the contract cost and increase the company value. From the capital market point of view, appropriate earnings management can transfer internal information as much and soon as possible, and it can decrease the information lagging caused by communication barrier. However, excessive earnings management is totally an overmuch opportunism behavior. It will do harm to accounting information infidelity, investors benefit, development of stock market and the social economy system. At present, most of our country’s companies has excessive earnings management behavior, and this trend will overflow without governing.This paper firstly defines the basic meaning of earnings management, then analyses the cause and technique methods of earnings management, and finally studies the identification methods and governing countermeasures of earnings management. Based on such frame, this paper is divided into five parts: the basic meaning of earnings management; the motive analysis of earnings management; the technique methods analysis of earnings management; the identification study of earnings management and the governing countermeasures of earnings management.<WP=5>Scholars at home and abroad didn’t agree on the basic meaning of earnings management. Based on former researches, this paper gives a basic meaning of earnings management, earnings management is the behavior that in order to maximize the administrator’s interest or company value, the company management board transfers beneficial information to the accounting information users by choosing accounting policies and "constructing" transactions, which is beyond their legal responsibilities. Furthermore, this paper studies four basic features of earnings management: the subject of earnings management is company management board; the object of earnings management is generally accepted accounting principles, accounting methods and accounting estimation and choice of time as well as date; the main purpose of earnings management is to get private interest; there are two ways of earnings management: professionals judgment and transactions layout.Earnings management is driven by many activation factors. This paper analyses the motive of earnings management mainly from two aspects: the first one is its cause of existence, and the second one is its motive of implementing. On one hand, because of imperfect market system, nonstandard of accounting policies, laggard market custody and insufficient punishment, earnings management exists inevitably, and it is impossible to be banished entirely. On the other hand, because of the various demand of self interest or company interest, such as politics, economy and material, the implementing of earnings management is subjective, which makes effective control of earnings management behavior possible.The main purpose of earnings management is to get private interest, but this has to be done by company’s accounting behavior, with form of accounting data. This paper discusses the technique methods to manage earnings, discloses the methods and means of earnings management, such as<WP=6>recognizing fake income, recognizing fake expenses, using connected transactions, using unusual profit and loss, changing accounting policies and accounting estimation and so on.In the study of earnings management identification, the author expatiates on how to discover the earnings management of company. It will help discover the company earnings management behavior by paying attention to the更多还原