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证券投资基金管理人信赖义务研究

【作者】 张弢

【导师】 高晋康;

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 , 经济法学, 2003, 硕士

【摘要】 中国的证券市场的发展离不开机构投资者的培育和壮大。在中国机构投资者的构成中,证券投资基金是最为活跃、也是最为引人注目的。自1998年至2003年3月,我国的证券市场上共有基金共72只,总规模1292.29亿份,约占股票流通市值的10%左右。基金市场的发展经历了五年的风风雨雨,成绩与问题并存,影响极大的“基金黑幕”事件就反映了由于我国基金管理人的信赖义务缺位,使得他们缺乏应有的投资水平和道德水准。本文一方面在理论上较为系统的研究了证券投资基金管理人信赖义务,另一方面也对我国现行法律的疏漏、滞后、不适之处提出了若干改进意见,以期我国的证券投资基金立法早日建立起以基金管理人信赖义务为核心的投资者利益保护机制。本文可以分为四个主要部分。第一部分是前言。在前言中,笔者阐述了研究证券投资基金管理人信赖义务的重要意义:对基金立法的完备很有价值;是基金业中的一个新鲜问题,有一定的创新;有着很大的现实必要性。由于投资基金是依据信托法理产生的,英美法系是信托法的鼻祖,大陆法系国家的信托法乃继受得来,与英美法系国家有着不同之处,为了更好的对比研究两个法系对基金管理人信赖义务的规定,笔者介绍了两个法系共通的信托法的基本法理-所有权与利益相分离;信托财产独立;克尽职守和利益冲突防范原则,为我们在两个不同的法系中研究基金管理人的信赖义务架起沟通的桥梁。为行文方便,除特别说明外,本文所指的“证券投资基金”均指的是契约型基金;将fiduciary duty译为“信赖义务”,并初步介绍了信赖义务的内容-注意义务和忠实义务。第二部分是本文的第一章和的二章。这一部分以对证券投资基金管理人法律地位的探讨为出发点,将基金管理人的法律地位定位于信托法上的受托人。然后从法理方面分析了基金管理人信赖义务的产生是来自于基金持有人-基金管理人之间的信赖关系和信托法上受托人义务的延伸。并进一步将注意义务和忠实义务作了对比,指出两者是相辅相成的关系。<WP=3>在证券投资基金法律关系中,基金管理人的法律地位或其“身份”是研究其负有的各项义务,包括信赖义务的出发点。本文的第一章第一节评析了学界关于基金管理人法律地位的意见,分析了居于信托管理人之地位和居于独立的受信任者之地位两种学说的缺陷。在第二节中,笔者结合我国的实际情况,主张将基金管理人定位于共同受托人之一的地位,以此为出发点在下文中进一步研究其所负的信赖义务。第二章中,从法理上阐述了基金管理人信赖义务的产生,一方面来自基金持有人-基金管理人之间存在着的信赖关系,另一方面是信托法上受托人义务的延伸和扩张。第一节分析了基金持有人-基金管理人之间存在着信赖关系,由于基金持有人相对于基金管理人的弱势地位和基金管理人的道德风险,为了防止基金管理人滥用这种信赖,法律上才需要特别保护基金持有人,通过对基金管理人课以信赖义务来维持基金持有人-管理人之间的信赖关系。第二节中研究了基金管理人的信赖义务是信托法上受托人义务的自然延伸与扩张。从历史角度看,投资基金是信托的产物;从法理上分析,投资基金与信托法律关系具有一致性。所以信托法上受托人的基本义务自然可以延伸适用于投资基金法上作为“共同受托人”之一的基金管理人的身上。本节中,笔者还研究了以信赖义务代替我国现行基金立法中的诚信原则作为研究基金管理人义务的基础的必要性,主张在投资基金立法中,应当在保持遵循诚信原则的要求的同时引入信赖义务,按信赖义务的要求——注意义务和忠实义务来规定基金管理人对基金持有人所负义务。第三部分是本文的第三章至第五章。这一部分主要采用了比较法的研究方法,既比较发达国家和地区基金立法中关于注意义务和忠实义务的规定,又与我国现行的法制状况作了比较,通过吸收借鉴国外先进经验,对我国现行法律的疏漏、滞后、不适之处提出了一些改进意见。第三章的第一节概述了三种信赖义务的立法体制,第二节就注意义务和忠实义务的关系作了探讨,在对“同质说”和“异质说”两种学说评析的基础上,笔者主张区分注意义务与忠实义务。二者既相互<WP=4>独立,又相辅相成,共同构建起信赖义务机制。第四章系统研究了注意义务。在对注意义务的研究中,重点阐述三个问题:注意义务的解释、注意义务的判断标准,注意义务的具体要求和我国相关法制的完善。第一节从英美法系和大陆法系两个视角对注意义务作了解释;第二节探讨了注意义务判断标准从谨慎投资者规则到现代投资组合理论的演进;第三节采用了比较法的研究方法,归纳了发达国家和地区法制对注意义务的具体要求,体现在投资对象的限制,分散投资的强制规定,基金业务范围的限制等方面。通过对比,发现了我国现行法律中的疏漏、滞后之处,有针对性的提出了一些改进建议。第五章从忠实义务的解释,自我交易的管制和图利禁止三方面研究了基金管理人的忠实义务。第一节将忠实义务的内容概括为不冲突规则和图利禁止规则,两条规则有所区别,但实质都是禁止和消除基金管理人与基金持有人之间的利益冲突,由此展开下文围绕利益冲突对忠实义务的深入研究?

【Abstract】 China’s securities industry needs institutional investors for its development. Securities investment fund plays a very important role as one of these institutional investors in securities market. After five years’ development ,the industry has got a lot of achievements ,but many problems also have emerged. "Inside story of fund" exposed the dark side of fund in China’s market. Due to the lack of fiduciary duty, many fund managers can not meet the proper standard of competence and morality. This article on one hand discussed the fiduciary duty of securities investment fund managers and on the other hand put forward some advices to our present fund law to build a fiduciary-duty-centered investor protection mechanism .The article is divided into four parts. The first part is preface. In this part ,the author explains the meaning of research about fund managers’ fiduciary duty .To compare and bridge the different rules about fiduciary duty in two legal systems, the author introduces the common principals of the law of trust. The author also briefly explains the content of fiduciary duty-duty of care and duty of loyalty.The second part includes chapter one and chapter two. This part begins with the discussion of fund managers’ s legal status in chapter one, then analyzes the origin of fiduciary duty and further compares the duty of care and duty of loyalty which supplement each other.In chapter one , section one makes a comment on the legal status of fund manager, points out the deficiency of present theory. In section two, the author claims that fund manager should be one of the common trustees .Chapter two explores the origin of fiduciary duty. Section one indicates the fiduciary relationship between fund-holders and fund-managers. To avoid the abuse of this kind of relationship , the fiduciary duty is necessary in law to protect investors. In chapter two, the<WP=6>author finds that from the points of view of history and legal theory ,fiduciary duty is the extension and expansion of trustees’ liability in the law of trust. The author also argues that it is necessary to replace the principal of good faith with fiduciary duty to be the foundation of the research in the law of fund.The third part of this article is composed of chapter three, four and five. In this part, the author compares the rules of fiduciary duty between two legal systems and puts forward some advices to our present law.Chapter three summarizes the legislation of fiduciary duty and probes into the relationship between duty of care and duty of loyalty.Chapter four makes a deep investigation into the duty of care .The author focuses on three questions: the definition, criterion and the requirements of the duty of care. Section one explains the duty of care . Section two discusses the evolvement from prudent investor rule to portfolio theory. In section three , the author makes a comparison of specific requirements of duty of care in developed countries and regions and finds the deficiencies in our present law and advanced some remedies.Chapter five researches the duty of loyalty in three aspects: explanation, regulation on self-dealing and no-profit rule. Section one explains the duty of loyalty. Section two discusses the regulation on self-dealing and gives some suggestions about self-dealing in present fund law. Section three discusses how to restrict simultaneous dealing according to no-profit rule.The last part is conclusion. The author emphasizes again that the fund law should be built on the basis of fiduciary duty to achieve the goals of protecting ordinary investors.

  • 【分类号】D912.28
  • 【被引频次】5
  • 【下载频次】202
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