【作者】 李杰；

【导师】 张蕊；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 会计学， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 现代公司广泛的存在着委托——代理问题，由此催生了全球公司治理运动。委托——代理问题产生于所有权与经营权的分离之后，由于委托人与代理人的信息不对称，导致代理人有机会牺牲甚至侵害委托人的利益而追求自己的目标。 现代公司中的委托——代理关系有多种，如债权人与股东的委托代理关系、股东与经营者的委托代理关系、小股东与大股东(外部股东与内部股东)的代理关系等等。不同的委托——代理问题，导致了不同的公司治理结构。某一委托代理关系的凸显，导致了公司治理模式的分化。在以德国为代表的国家里，债权人、股东和职工与经营者之间的代理关系的占据主导地位，造就了控制模式的公司治理结构。在这一模式下，债权人和职工的地位得到了尤其的尊重，而股东则被放在较低的位置上。不发达的证券市场对于这一模式的形成有着重要的影响。在以美国的为代表的国家里，外部股东与内部股东、经营者之间的代理关系成为主要矛盾，成就了市场模式的公司治理结构，发达的证券市场是这一模式形成的关键性因素，“股东至上”是这一模式的纲领。即使在同一国家，不同的公司结构和性质也导致其委托——代理问题的主要矛盾的不同，最明显的便是上市公司与非上市公司之间的差别。 从证券市场的发展历程来看，随着证券市场发达程度的提高，代理关系发生了从德国式向美国式的转化。我国也正处于这一过程之中。 通过优化公司治理结构解决委托——代理问题的主要方法是改进公司治理结构中的权力分配，其中主要涉及的权力为战略决策权、日常经营权和监督权。本文所关注的主要是上市公司监督权的配置问题。 我国的公司法监督权赋予了上市公司监事会，而这一机构的效能颇受诟病。报章杂志之间的怒骂与呵斥不绝于耳，学术界也有研究发现上市公司监事会未能发挥作用。但经过对这些研究的仔细梳理，本文发现，这些研究往往局限于某一地域，如湖南省、上海市，或某一领域，如在上海证券交易所上市的公司，因而不能说明中国上市公司监事会整体的效能状况；这些研究的采用的方法比较单调，且主观性较强，因而其说服力有限；这些研究对于监事会工作的细节关注不够，因而不能有针对性的观察监事会工作的效果。 本文试图在以上几个方面做出突破，首先，对于上市公司监事会的制度背景与功能设计进行深入的分析，分析了我国上市公司治理结构的权力配置状况，以及上市公司监事会的利益方构成、监督目的、监督内容和工作方式。其次，针对上市公司监事会的设计功能，设计了本研究的着眼点，对监事会监督的5个主要方面的问题进行考察，包括公司依法运作、财务检查、募集资金使用、重大资产购售交易和关联交易，来研究上市公司监事会效能实现状况。再次，在2000年底的1088家上市公司中随机抽取门 家上市公司的数据进行研究，并推断上市公司监事会整体的效能状况。最后，采用从上市公司年报披露的与监事会相关的定性信息中进行分析井判断监事会效能的研究方法，这一方法与之间本领域内的研究方 豆法完全不同，可对以前之研究结论进行印证。 以前对于上市公司监事会的研究主要集中在三个方面：监事会的组织结构、制度建设和职能履行。本文的研究仅限于上市公司监事会的组织结构和职能履行两个方面。在这两个方面，具体而言，以前的研究主要涉及上市公司监事会的规模、监事会的文化水平和职称、机构设置、利益方结构、监事会会议召开频率、监督的具体内容等。本文的研究则包括上市公司监事会的规模、年龄构成、性别构成、监事会召集人的职务名称、监事在上市公司受薪状况、会议召开频率、审议议题和发表的独立意见等八个方面。本文对于上市公司监事会效能实证研究的结论是，其未能发挥设计者所期望的效能。 效能不佳的主要原因是制度存在问题。监事会制度无效的直接原因在于它是一种代表监督、弱式监督、游离监督和延时监督，而更本质的原因在于这一制度与其背景——证券市场要求——的不适应，也即不适应上市公司特殊的委托——代理关系。 对于监事会制度的改进问题，本文的观点是，不同的治理结构和监督机制是针对不同的委托一代理关系的。上市公司存在的代理关系不是目前我国公司法所，确定的治理结构和监督机制所能解诀的，发展证券市场必须引入、建立与之相适 Q应的公司治理结构和监督机制：让上帝的归上帝，悄撒的归悄撒。更多还原

【Abstract】 The principal-agent Problem omnipresent in modern corporations expedites the global corporate governance movements. The problem was born at the time of the divorce of ownership and management, as the information asymmetry lies between the principal and the agent, chances are the latter sacrifices and even the former’s interests and pursues self-interest objectives.The principal-agent relationship in modern corporations varies, e.g. the principal relationship of debtors to shareholders, and of shareholders to management, and of minor shareholders to dominant shareholders (outside shareholders to inside shareholders), and etc. The Principal-agent problem varies, and the corporate governance structure follows. Particular principal-agent relationships stand out, and the models of corporate governance differentiate. In the countries represented by Germany, the principal-agent relationships of debtors, shareholders, and employees to management pop out, and bring in the control model governance structure. Under this model, the status of debtors and employees gain extra respect, while shareholders are badly treated. The underdeveloped security market played an important role in the forming of this model. In the countries represented by the U.S., the principal-agent relationships between outside shareholders and inside shareholders and management dominate, thus the market model governance structure came into being. One key factor to the model’s forming is the well-developed security market; "shareholder paramount" is the creed of this model. But even if in the same country, the varied structure and character of the companies also lead to different principal-agent problem-the major conflict-e.g., the most obvious differences lies between the listed and unlisted companies.In the history of security market, we can see, as the security market become more and more developed, the principal-agent relationship switch from the Germany style to the U.S. style. The Security market in China is just in the process.The primary method of solving the principal-agent problem through optimizing corporate governance structure is to improve the power allocation, and it involves the power of strategic decision-making, everyday operation, and supervision. This research focuses on the allocation of supervision power in listed companies.The Corporation Act in China gives the supervision power to supervision boards in listed companies, but the boards are badly scolded by the public. Blames and abuses suffuse newspapers and magazines, and researches of academe also found that the supervision boards of listed companies did not work. But after carefully carding, the current paper found that: these researches are often localized in some provinces, such as Hunan Province and Shanghai, or in some domain, e.g. the companies listed in Shanghai Security Exchange, hence can not demonstrate the total functioning status of supervision boards of listed companies in China; the methods employed by the studies are dull, and overly depend on subject matter, thus the persuasion is limited; working details of supervision boards are ignored to some extent, therefore they can not study the functioning of supervision boards measure for measure.This research tries to make breakthroughs in the aspects hereinbefore. Firstly, we deeply analyze the institutional background and function design of listed companysupervision boards, and the power allocation state in Chinese listed company governance structure, and the interests representative, supervision objective, supervision content and working manners of supervision boards. Secondly, aiming at the intending functions, we examined 5 key respects supervised by supervision boards, including operation legitimacy, financial check, committed capital using, major assets purchase and sale and related party transactions, to study the functioning of supervision boards of listed companies. And thirdly, we randomly selected 111 listed companies from the 1088 listed ones at the end of year 2000 for study, and dedu更多还原