【作者】 王公为；

【导师】 贺立；

【作者基本信息】 内蒙古大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 商业银行在经济发展和国家金融安全中具有特殊重要地位。商业银行高管薪酬激励的有效性直接影响到对代理人的激励效果,进而影响银行的经营效率和经营风险。商业银行的股权结构是其治理结构的基础,在商业银行公司治理中发挥着重要的治理效应。在商业银行高管持续多年获取高额薪酬的背景下,本研究以中国上市商业银行为研究对象,根据在沪深两市上市的2005-2010年间的16家商业银行的年度财务数据,从股权结构视角对中国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励有效性进行了实证分析。鉴于商业银行的特殊性,本研究将反映银行盈利性、流动性、安全性、成长性等指标纳入银行综合绩效范围,采用因子分析法,构建了商业银行综合绩效模型,并测算了各上市商业银行的综合绩效得分。本研究以高管薪酬指标为被解释变量,以银行绩效、资产规模、董事会规模、独立董事比例以及股权结构作为解释变量,构建了回归模型。实证结果表明：第一,股权集中度与商业银行高管薪酬水平负相关；第二,股权集中度高的商业银行高管薪酬激励有效性强于股权集中度低的商业银行；第三,第一大股东为国家股的商业银行高管薪酬水平低于第一大股东为法人股的商业银行；第四,第一大股东为国家股的商业银行高管薪酬激励有效性强于第一大股东为法人股的商业银行。基于实证分析的结果,为了改进商业银行高管薪酬激励有效性,完善商业银行治理机制,本研究提出了我国各商业银行高管薪酬激励有效性改进的建议。首先,应完善高管薪酬激励有效性的基础条件,例如构建组合激励的薪酬体系,优化薪酬支付方式,加强内外部薪酬监管等。其次,应基于股权结构改进高管薪酬激励有效性,例如优化股权集中度,减少国家股持股比例,形成合理的股权机构；引入境内外的机构投资者；加快建立商业银行经理人市场等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Commercial banks occupy specially important status in the economy development and country’s financial security. The validity of top-management compensation incentives of commercial banks has the direct effect on the deputy’s incentive impact, and have the effect on the bank’s working efficiency and operating risk. Being the base of the governance structure, commercial banks’ownership structure plays important governance impact.In the context of the senior executives of commercial banks getting high salaries for many years, the research based on chinese listed commercial banks,according to the listing on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 2005-2010 years of annual financial data between 16 commercial banks, has an empirical analysis on the validity of top-management compensation incentives of china’s listed banks from the ownership structure. In view of the particularities of the commercial bank, the study puts the indicators that reflect bank profitability, liquidity, security, growth into the scope of banking performance,using factor analysis method, builds a comprehensive performance model of commercial banks, and measures the overall performance scores for the listed commercial banks. This study targets executive pay as explained variable, bank performance, asset size, scale, proportion of independent directors of the board and equity structure as explanatory variables, builds the regression models. The empirical results show that:Firstly, the ownership concentration appears a negative correlation with the commercial executive pay levels. Secondly, the validity of top-management compensation incentives in the commercial banks of high ownership concentration is stronger than the banks of low ownership concentration. Thirdly, the commercial bank’s executive pay level of the largest shareholder as a unit of the state is lower than that of the first shareholder of the corporate shares of commercial banks. Finally, the executive compensation incentive validity of the largest shareholder as a unit of the state commercial banks is higher than the first shareholder for the corporate shares of commercial banks.Based on the results of the empirical analysis, in order to improve the effectiveness of the commercial bank executives’compensation incentive, improving banks’governance mechanism, this study puts forward the recommendations of the effectiveness of pay incentives. Firstly, we should improve the basic conditions of the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive,for example we should construct a combination of incentive pay system, optimize pay payment, strengthen internal and external salary regulation, etc. Secondly, the improvement should be based on ownership structure executive compensation incentive validity, for example the china’s commercial banks should optimize the ownership concentration forming appropriate ownership concentration, reduce national unit stake to form reasonable equity agency, introduce domestic and foreign institutional investors, and speed up the establishment of commercial banking manager market, etc.更多还原