【作者】 刘佳；

【导师】 丁永健；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 产业经济学， 2010， 硕士

【摘要】 落后产能问题一直困扰着我国的经济发展,并且变得日益凸显。国家考虑落后产能耗能高、污染重、技术水平低等产业特征,先后出台了一系列淘汰政策来提高产业结构。这些政策虽然在一定程度上收到了一些成效,但实施效果却不尽如人意。究其原因,主要与中国经济体制和政府的分成税制有关,所以本文主要研究在现有的体制安排和政府的分税制下,落后产能的形成问题。本文基于现有的相关理论研究,以财政分权为研究背景,从土地分成合约的视角对落后产能的成因给出了全新的阐释。本文分别介绍了中西方土地制度的特点和差异,同时讨论了每种土地制度下的分成合约对落后产能形成的影响。通过建立中央和地方政府间的单一土地分成合约模型,讨论并比较了在存在惩罚与不存在惩罚的情况下地方政府引进落后产能的影响因素和落后产能引进量的大小。通过引入地区差异这个影响因素对模型展开进一步讨论,并分析了其对落后产能问题加剧的影响。通过理论分析得出,中央政府与地方政府之间这种固定的土地分成合约,导致了现有体制下的落后产能的形成。地方政府作为风险规避者往往青睐于引进落后产能企业,而不是引进好企业。另外地区间差异会加剧落后产能的形成,从而使得好企业在竞争过程中被淘汰。在此基础上,本文以纺织行业为例分析了各地区落后产能的影响因素,并采用相关数据对各地区经济发展程度、地区税收收入以及其他影响因素进行了实证分析。最后,提出了加强政府监督以及推行灵活的合约安排制度来淘汰落后产能问题的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The problem of backward production capacity has been plaguing the economic development of China for a long time, and is becoming increasingly prominent. Considering the industrial characteristics of backward production capacity such as high energy consumption, heavy pollution, lower level of technology and so on, a series of phase-out policies have been issued by the government to improve the industrial structure. Although these policies have achieved some success to a certain extent, the implementation effect, however, is not entirely as desired. The reason is, primarily concerned with the economic system of China and the tax-sharing system of the government. Therefore, this paper mainly studies the formation of backward production capacity under the existing institutional arrangements and tax-sharing system.Based on the existing theoretical investigation concerned, on the background of fiscal decentralization and from the perspective of land share-cropping contract, this paper gives a brand-new explanation to the cause of backward production capacity. This paper introduces separately the characteristics and differences of the land system between the west and the east, and also discusses the influence on the formation of backward production capacity under the given land share-cropping contract. Through establishing the single land share-cropping contract model between the central and the local governments, this paper discusses and compares the influencing factors and the amount of backward production capacity introduced by the local government, both in the cases of punishment and no punishment. Through the introduction of regional disparity, this paper discusses the model further and analyzes its impact on the aggravation of the problem of backward production capacity.Through theoretical analysis, the fixed land share-cropping contract between the central and local governments causes the formation of backward production capacity under existing system. The local government, which is risk averse, tends to favor the introduction of backward production capacity instead of good enterprises. Furthermore, the regional disparity will aggravate the formation of backward production capacity and then eliminate good enterprises through competition. On that basis, this paper takes the textile industry as an example to discuss the influencing factors of backward production capacity of each region, and use related data to make empirical analysis of the degree of regional economic development, regional tax revenues and other influencing factors. In the end, this paper proposes to strengthen the government oversight and implement a flexible system of contractual arrangements to wash out backward production capacity.更多还原