【作者】 杨席；

【导师】 陈岱松；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2010， 硕士

【副题名】以独立董事与监事会为视角

【摘要】 各国公司治理的完善主要围绕强化公司监督职能而展开,我国也不例外,2001年独立董事制度的引进正是为了改变我国监事会虚化的状况。但从目前来看,独立董事与监事会并存的中国公司内部监督模式并没有显示出理想中的效果,独立董事的引进并不成功,并且监事会的监督职能还有进一步弱化的趋势。在公司内部如何进行分权制衡,如何强化公司内部监督,使公司的运转更加稳健,成为各界学者普遍关注的焦点。通过对国内外公司内部监督机制的比较分析,笔者也试图加入到完善中国公司内部监督机制的探索之路上。本文共分为五个章节。第一章主要阐述了公司内部监督机制的相关概念,论述了公司治理与公司内部监督的关系,公司内部监督机制的概念、内涵及目的,从委托代理理论、利益相关者理论和分权制衡理论分析了公司内部监督机制产生的理论依据,也为完善公司内部监督拓宽了新维度,为公司内部监督机制的创新提供了新视角。第二章主要阐述了我国公司内部监督机制的发展历程与现状评价。本章首先梳理了监事会制度在我国的发展历程,从1904年清政府颁布的《大清公司律》中的查账人制度,到2005年《公司法》确立了独立董事和监事会在我国并存的法律地位,我国公司内部监督机制在曲折中前进。其次,本章对当前我国独立董事制度与监事会制度存在的问题逐一分析,进一步指出独立性不足、监督能力和监督时间受限制以及激励约束机制的缺乏是独立董事与监事会共同存在的问题,并强调监事会行权保障机制的缺失限制了监事会监督职权的行使,进而提出当前我国独立董事与监事会并存的公司内部监督模式造成两者职能重叠和关系扭曲,严重影响公司监督职能的发挥。第三章分析了当前国际上几种典型的公司内部监督模式,主要讲述了美国一元模式、德国二元模式、日本并列模式以及法国选择适用模式。在对各国典型模式分析后发现:不同公司内部监督模式之间不存在绝对的优劣之分,一个国家的公司内部监督模式只有适应本国的法律、经济、政治、文化等环境,才能发挥其应有的监督作用,盲目的法律移植很可能造成引进制度的本土化障碍。第四章是在前几章论述的基础上,提出了未来我国公司内部监督模式的构想。独立董事制度有其固有的制度缺陷性,无法在中国发挥其监督职能,中国未来公司内部监督模式应当以监事会作为公司唯一的监督机构,强化监事会的职权,在监事会下设立审计委员会等常设机构,让审计委员会直接领导公司内部审计机构,在公司内部建立起强大的监督体系,从而为公司监督职权的强化提供了制度环境。第五章主要是我国未来公司内部监督模式的一系列保障性措施。监事会监督职能的强化,必须建立在一系列完善的配套措施基础之上。目前推崇的外部监事制度及职工监事制度并不能发挥其应有的监督作用,应当予以取消。债权人对公司的利益非常关切,应当引进债权人监事制度。监事会职权不足也是监事会弱化的重要原因,应当充实监事会的职权,特别要强化监事会的不当行为制止权、临时股东大会召集权。为了防止大股东掌控监事的选任,应当引进表决权限制和推广累计投票制。另外,激励约束机制也很重要,应当加快监事薪酬激励的市场化改革,并强化监事的责任体系。使监事有动力、有压力、尽职尽责地履行好监督职能。更多还原

【Abstract】 The improvement of corporate governance all over the world is oriented to strengthening the supervision mechanism, and so is china. The introduction of independent director system has ended the status of supervisory emptiness in China’s companies since 2001. However, the coexistence of independent directors and board of supervisors within the supervisory mode does not show the expected effect. The introduction of independent directors is not successful, and the function of the board of supervisors is gradually weakening. What experts and scholars are greatly concerned is that how to separate the three powers in companies, how to strengthen internal supervision and how to make company’s operation steadier. Through the comparative analysis of the internal supervision mechanisms of domestic and foreign companies, I also try to explore the road of improving the internal supervision mechanisms of Chinese companies.This paper consists of five sections. Chapter I mainly describes the related concepts concerning internal supervision mechanism, and discusses the relationship between the company governance and internal supervision as well as the concept of internal supervision mechanism, contents and purposes. The theoretical basis of the company internal supervision mechanism is entrusted agency theory, stakeholder theory and the theory of check and balances of companies powers, which broaden the dimensions of the internal supervision, and provide a new perspective for the innovation of company internal supervision mechanisms.The second chapter mainly elaborates the development of internal supervision mechanism of domestic corporations and the appraisal of present situation. Firstly, this chapter introduces the developing history of board of supervisors system in our country The Qing Dynasty government promulgated Qing Dynasty Corporation Law in 1904 and founded the auditor system. Under PRC Corporation Law revised in 2005, the rules of independent director and the board of supervisors coexisted in China. The internal corporation supervision mechanism in China went through frequent changes by the government. Secondly, this chapter analyzes the existing problems of independent director system and the board of supervisors system in our country in details, and points out that the common problems of the independent director and the board of supervisors are shortage of independence and the mechanism of incentive, and restraint, as well as the limit of surveillance ability and time. The power of board of supervisors is confined due to little guarantee is available for supervisors to exercise their rights. Finally, this chapter puts forward that independent directors and the board of supervisors coexisting internal supervision mode creates both function overlap and relationship distortion, and it seriously influences the function display of company supervision.Chapter III analyzes the current international company supervision of several typical patterns, which is mainly about dollar mode of the U.S., dual mode of Germany, Japan and France opt in parallel mode. Through the analysis of national typical model, I find there is no clear distinction between good and bad independent director systems and the board of supervisors systems. As long as a country’s internal supervision model can meet their legal, economic, political, and cultural environment, it can play supervisory role. Therefore, blind legal transplant may lead to inadequate localization of the system.Based on the previous chapters, the future concept of internal supervision model is discussed by the fourth chapter. The independent director system has its inherent flaws so that it can not perform supervision function in China. Internal supervision board shall be the sole supervisory body in China’s future mode. In order to establish a strong in-house monitoring system in China companies, we must strengthen the supervisory powers and establish the permanent establishment of audit committee under the board of supervisors to let the audit committee lead the company’s internal audit agency. In this way, a system environment could be provided for strengthening the company supervisor’s authorityThe fifth chapter mainly discusses a series of security measures to protect the future mode. Strengthening the functions of the board of supervisors must be based on comprehensive supporting measures, external supervisors and staff supervisors should be abolished because they can not play due role. Creditors are concerned about debtor companies. That is why the creditor should be the supervisor. The power of board of supervisors should be enriched because the supervisions’powers insufficiency causes the weakness of board of supervisors function. In particular, the rights to stop the misconduct and to convene the Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting of the board of supervisors should be strengthened,. In order to prevent the major stockholder from controlling supervisor’s election, the introduction of voting restriction and the cumulative voting system should be promoted in china. Moreover, incentive mechanism is also important. China should speed up the supervisor salary market-oriented reforms and the supervisor’s accountability system should also be strengthened. Thus, supervisors have power and pressure to perform due diligence supervisory functions.更多还原