【摘要】 在联邦贸易委员会诉阿特维斯案中,最高法院认为一个涉及品牌药的专利权人向仿制药侵权人支付以使其离开市场的专利侵权诉讼和解协议,根据反垄断法可能是违法的。布雷耶大法官的多数意见令人惊讶地宽泛,这表现在两个关键的意义上。首先,他谈到了一种远远超出仿制药争议范畴的普遍性,这些争议已经引发了大量的延迟支付和解协议。其次是法院选择的侵略性做法。一种显而易见的替代方案是大多数巡回法院普遍采用的规则,即任何和解协议如果它表面上在"专利范围内",则免受反垄断攻击。根据这种方法,法院可能不会通过调查专利的有效性来对和解协议进行二次推测;和解协议本身就可以屏蔽法院的这种质疑。第二种替代选择是,一个巨额的和解付款就表明专利存在问题,从而提请法院更密切地审视基础专利,以确定和解是否真的是一种管理诉讼和商业风险的善意尝试。第三种方法是,根据反垄断合理原则,与诉讼风险不成比例的大额和解排除支付可能是违法的,而无需询问专利是否事实上无效,即使和解协议并未超出专利名义上覆盖的范围。最后,法院可能会应用"快速审查",或者缩短的反垄断分析,其中原告可以享有关于市场力量或反竞争效果的推定。最高法院选择了第三种方法,即合理原则,但它明确指出原告不需要完成一个长形式的合理原则的证明,并提出重要的捷径。同样重要的是,双方无异议地一致认为消费者福利应当是反垄断法的目标。数额大小与风险相关的支付对于企业决策至关重要,但企业风险通常是私有的,因为企业拿自己股东的资源冒风险。然而,在药品延迟支付的环境中,被置于风险中的是原研药企的投资和消费者福利,这是两种相反方向上的利益。消费者代表了一种重要的外部性。他们不是这场纠纷的参与者,但他们将失去原本会发生的竞争的好处。传统的和解协议反映了他们所谓的专利无效的风险。例如,由于各方直观认为专利较弱,和解的许可费率将较低。哈奇—韦克斯曼法案创造了一种独特的激励,让各方去消除专利中的所有风险,因为在和解协议的有效期内,没有第三方会对专利提出质疑。即使是一个非常弱的专利也能获得对第三方的排他性以及与专利产品全部卡特尔价值相当的利润。虽然法院没有讨论私人消费者的挑战,但它对法律的实质性修改同样适用于私人诉讼,并且可以合理地预期会出现一些私人诉讼。尽管那些从反竞争的延迟支付和解协议中寻求反垄断超额赔偿的购买者将受到法院为联邦贸易委员会创建的相同的合理原则限制,但是他们应该能够在不用证明专利无效的情况下继续进行诉讼。最后,阿特维斯案意见的宽泛使其与哈奇—韦克斯曼制度语境外的许多情况发生关联。例如,最高法院的判决严格限制了它在1926年通用电气案中允许专利及其被许可人之间进行价格固定的决定,并含蓄地否决了诸如比门特案的决定,这些决定允许一个专利池内的成员之间进行产品价格固定。一个核心问题是,专利法是否明确地或是通过合理的暗示,授权了被质疑的行为。如果答案是否定的,则可以进行一般性的反垄断分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 In FTC v. Actavis the Supreme Court held that settlement of a patent infringement suit in which the patentee of a branded pharmaceutical drug pays a generic infringer to stay out of the market may be illegal under the antitrust laws. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was surprisingly broad, in two critical senses. First, he spoke with a generality that reached far beyond the pharmaceutical generic drug disputes that have provoked numerous pay-for-delay settlements.Second was the aggressive approach that the Court chose. The obvious alternatives were the rule that prevailed in most Circuits, that any settlement is immune from antitrust attack if it is facially "within the scope of the patent." Under this approach the court may not second guess the settlement by inquiring into the validity of the patent; the settlement itself shields this query from the court. A second alternative concludes that a very large settlement payment is a sign that something is wrong with the patent, inviting the court to look more closely at the underlying patent to determine whether the settlement is really a good faith attempt to manage litigation and business risk. A third approach is that a large settlement exclusion payment disproportionate to litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust’s rule of reason,without inquiry into whether the patent is actually invalid, and even if the settlement agreement does not go "beyond the scope" of the patent’s nominal coverage. Finally, the court might apply a "quick look," or truncated, antitrust analysis in which the plaintiff can enjoy presumptions about market power or anticompetitive effect. The Supreme Court chose the third, or rule of reason, option, but it made clear that the plaintiff need not make a long form rule of reason showing and suggested important shortcuts.Also significant is that both sides, without dissent agreed that consumer welfare should be the goal of antitrust law.Payments whose size correlates with risk are essential to entrepreneurial decision making, but entrepreneurial risk is usually private in the sense that the firm risks the resources of its own shareholders. In the pharmaceutical pay-fordelay setting, however, what is being placed at risk is both the investment of the pioneer and the welfare of consumers,interests that pull in opposite directions. Consumers represent an important externality. They are not participants in this dispute, but they stand to lose the benefits of competition that would otherwise have occurred. Traditional settlements reflect the risk of patent invalidity in their terms. For example, as a patent is perceived by the parties to be weaker,settlement royalties rates will be lower. The Hatch Waxman Act uniquely creates an incentive for the parties to take all risk out of the patent because for the life of the settlement no third party may challenge it. Even a very weak patent can obtain both exclusion against third parties and profits equal to the full cartel value of the patented product.While the Court did not discuss private consumer challenges, its substantial revision of the law applies equally to private actions and it is reasonable to expect that several will emerge. Purchasers seeking antitrust overcharge damages from an anticompetitive pay-for-delay settlement should be able to proceed without proving patent invalidity, although they would be subject to the same rule-of-reason constraints that the Court created for the FTC.Finally, the breadth of the Activis opinion makes it relevant for many situations outside of the Hatch-Waxman context. For example, the Court’s dicta severely limited its 1926 GE decision permitting price fixing among a patent and its licensees, and implicitly overruled decisions such as Bement, which permitted product price fixing among the members of a patent pool. A central question was whether the Patent Act, either explicitly or by reasonable implication,authorized the challenged conduct. If the answer is no, ordinary antitrust analysis can proceed.更多还原