【摘要】 作为重要的公司治理机制,董事高管责任保险由于直接影响管理层的激励约束和风险偏好,因而与企业创新存在理论上的关联,但是否具有事实上的因果关系,却并未得到充分的实证研究。本文以2003—2016年沪深A股上市公司为初始样本,基于PSM的研究设计,实证发现董事高管责任保险的引入,显著提高了企业的创新产出和创新效率,从而符合激励效应假说。Heckman两阶段法等一系列检验结果也表明了该结论的稳健性。机制分析表明,董事高管责任保险的引入,主要是通过风险承担渠道和管理效率渠道来影响企业创新。在考虑了制度环境的调节效应后,进一步的研究发现,当投资者保护程度较高、公司面临被诉风险较大时,董事高管责任保险的激励效果和对企业创新的促进作用更加显著。本研究提供了保险合约通过公司治理渠道影响企业创新的证据,表明董事高管责任保险在中国资本市场中仍然是一种较为有效的公司治理机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an important corporate governance mechanism,Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O Insurance) directly affects the incentive constraints and risk preference of management.However,whether D&O Insurance affects corporate innovation has not been fully studied.Based on the PSM research design,this paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2016 as the initial sample,and finds that the D&O Insurance significantly improves the innovation output and innovation efficiency,thus conforming to the incentive effect hypothesis.A series of test results such as that of the Heckman two-stage method show the robustness of the conclusion.The mechanism analysis shows that the D&O Insurance mainly affects corporate innovation through the risk-taking channel and the management efficiency channel.After considering the moderating effect of institutional environment,it is further found that the incentive effect of D&O Insurance is more significant when the degree of investor protection is higher and the company faces greater risk of being sued.This study not only provides evidence that insurance contracts influence corporate innovation through corporate governance channels,but also indicates that D&O Insurance is a more effective corporate governance mechanism in China’s capital market.更多还原