【作者】 叶卫华；

【导师】 伍世安；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 产业经济学， 2010， 博士

【副题名】以应对全球气候变化为例

【摘要】 全球负外部性是全球化时代国际社会共同面临的最棘手的全球性问题。随着经济全球化进程的不断推进,全球在生产、消费、贸易、投资、金融、技术开发和转移等各领域更加紧密地联系在一起,也使得各个国家相互依赖的程度比以往任何时候更高。全球化带来发展机遇的同时,也带来了严峻的挑战,包括资源枯竭、环境污染、气候变化、人口与贫困、流行病毒肆虐、经济危机以及恐怖主义等。全球性负外部问题涉及的方面很广,有自然、政治、经济、卫生健康、国家安全等方面；产生的原因与历史遗留、利益冲突、经济和社会发展不平衡等也有关。但其共性是个体对公共利益的冷漠,或者说个体理性与集体理性之间的冲突。例如,厂商为降低生产成本,放任温室气体的排放,最终造成全球气候变暖,引发全球性灾害,然而厂商并不为此支付赔偿。外部性的本质与资源的稀缺和人的本性有关。外部性造成损害却没有赔偿显然意味着资源配置不合理和效率的损失,因此需要治理。在国家层面,常用的治理手段包括：政府管制、法律手段、一体化、“庇古税”、“科斯产权”等。全球负外部性不是外部性在空间概念上的简单延伸。全球外部性同样也会造成全球资源的无效配置,因此需要治理,但不能简单地套用国家层面的治理手段,因为负外部性溢出了国家层面,其治理存在困境,具体包括：(1)世界政府的困境。国际社会没有超国家主权的世界政府,因而不能使用政府管制、法律手段、一体化等在政府框架下的外部性治理方式。(2)全球税的困境。在没有世界政府的前提下,全球征税其实也只有理论上的可能性。即使是碳税,目前也只是区域性实行,还受到很多国家的反对。(3)全球产权的困境。使用科斯手段治理全球负外部性,也同样存在困境。全球公共资源的产权很多情况下无法明晰或明确,全球产权谈判的交易成本极高,效率极低。因此,全球负外部性的治理必须要有理论上的突破。突破全球负外部性治理的困境在于全球合作。全球负外部性的影响是全球性的,损害的也是全球的利益,因而需要全球合作来解决。单一国家不可能有能力来解决全球负外部性的治理问题,也没有动力来解决。即使某一国家甚至一些国家自觉进行负外部性治理,只要还有其他当事国不予参与,主动治理的国家的积极性就可能受挫,全球负外部性的治理效果也会大打折扣。尽管全球负外部性的治理需要国际合作,但国际合作也存在困境。由于国家像个人一样也可以表现为理性,也存在搭便车行为,国家个体的理性不能导致国际集体的理性,加上众多的国家数目及国际社会的无政府状态,国际合作中出现的公地悲剧、囚徒困境和集体行动的困境并不少见。无论是全球安全、环境污染、核武器扩散,还是消灭贫穷、防止气候变化等,全球合作都面临反复而冗长的谈判。国际合作存在困境,但并不意味着国际合作没有可行性。考察国家的本质,可以从国家的人格化着手。人的本性不是“经济人”,而是复杂的“社会人”,即“社会关系的总和”。人是利已和利他的混合体。人既可能竞争也可以合作,其行为选择是由社会存在所决定的。“社会存在”表明资源是稀缺的,社会性的人是相互交往和依赖的。这种交往和依赖会围绕着稀缺资源的拥有、利用和消费而产生重复性的竞争。重复性的动态竞争,共同的利益和兼容的规范等可以产生互惠的行为,导致合作的产生,以促进稀缺资源的利用能力和效率。竞争和合作利益的并存及竞争和合作行为的互动,使社会人既利己又利他。国家也是“社会人”。全球资源的稀缺性导致国家间的竞争,但国家相互的交往和依赖以及交往中产生的共同的利益和兼容的规范会促进国家间的共同行动。国家选择竞争还是合作是由国家社会的存在所决定的。因此,作为利己和利他混合体的国家,竞争和合作都是其常态。国际合作可以在无政府状态的国际社会中进行。无政府状态表明国际社会不存在超国家主权的世界政府,但这并不意味着国际社会是混乱和无序的。国际社会既不是霍布斯式的无政府状态,也不是洛克式或康德式的无政府状态,而是动态的、有序的自主治理状态。无政府状态下,国际制度、国际组织及主权国家相互作用保证了国际社会的基本秩序和相对稳定。尽管国际社会处于无政府状态,国家也可能呈现理性,但奥斯特罗姆的自主治理理论及国际合作实践表明,国际合作仍然具有可行性。这是因为国际社会相互依赖并存在着广泛的共同利益,人类社会不断进步和发展的同时也促进国际社会对国际制度和规范形成兼容与认同,国家作为“社会人”所具有的利己和利他的双重性,可以使各国在增进共同利益的基础上产生互惠行为,达成国际合作。国际社会的合作不是必须要有霸权的存在才可以进行。霸权并没有给国际社会带来持久的稳定,也不能长久地提供全球公共物品。霸权后时代,国家也可以合作。国际制度、国际组织以及非政府组织是国际机制的重要组成部分。国际制度可以促进交易成本的减少,提升相互依赖的程度,提高收益预期。国际组织能促进国际合作与协调,管理全球公共物品,调解国际争端,制定和实施国际规则。非政府组织可以为政府及政府间国际组织提供信息与咨询,对政府与政府间国际组织的决策施加影响,并影响公众舆论,监督政府与政府间国际组织的行为。存在国际合作的可行性并不意味着合作的成功。可以而且应当通过大国合作来有效地破解国际合作的困境。大国是指相对其他国家其综合实力在世界上具有较大影响的国家。大国合作的逻辑是：首先,由于大国利益占据了全球利益的相当份额,在促进全球性利益的同时也可提升自身影响力和自身利益,所以存在着大国主动倡议、发起、或支持合作的可能；其次,由于大国的数目比较少,因此它们之间的合作可以大幅度减少因国家谈判数目带来的合作困境,从而降低交易成本,提高合作效率；第三,大国通过合作所达成的一致,有助于国际制度的形成、实施和监督,避免或减少其他成员国搭便车的行为；最后,大国之间领头遵守、执行和实施已达成的协议,可以为他国及其合作提供领导和示范效应,促进国际集体行动的成功,从而有效地实现全球负外部性的自主治理。大国之间的合作也不是一蹴而就的,因为存在影响大国合作的不利因素,包括国家的安全利益、政治利益和经济利益等方面的冲突,有可能使大国合作陷于困境。然而,双边或多边合作谈判、世界首脑峰会、国际组织和非政府组织等大国合作机制,有助于促使大国之间加强沟通,消除分歧,弥合争端,达成合作。温室气体排放是典型的全球负外部性。从产权角度说,地球大气是公共资源,属全球公共物品,因而产权属于全球所有的人,全球所有国家都可以免费使用大气,且不受限制地排放温室气体。不受限制是指从技术角度上无法限制某个国家使用大气这种公共资源,比如向大气排放温室气体。其结果是这种全球公共资源很可能成为公地悲剧。要防止公地悲剧的发生,必须减少温室气体的排放,这就需要依靠全球所有国家的集体行动,合作治理温室效应。国际社会合作应对全球气候变化历经20余年,达成了一系列重要的协议,如《联合国气候变化框架公约》、《京都议定书》等,但仍未就温室气体减排达成全面且有法律约束力的协议。国际合作应对气候变化的谈判遭遇困境与国家的政治利益、经济利益、科学认知等有关,其中最重要的是经济利益,具体表现在合作原则、减排方案和资金落实等关键问题上。合作原则关乎合作能否启动,最重要的原则就是公平,但各国对公平的理解却不尽相同。发展中国家强调“共同而有区别的责任”原则,尤其是要考虑到历史责任,而发达国家更强调共同责任和现实责任。目前,发达国家与发展中国家就“共同而有区别的责任原则”基本达成了共识,但在具体的减排方案中如何体现这一原则,又成了谈判的焦点。以往达成的协议中的资金和技术因为没有得到落实,也在很大程度上影响发展中国家的谈判态度。全球应对气候变化在本质上是各国之间的一种利益博弈,但主要在三大集团(国)之间展开,即欧盟、美国(伞型国家)、中国(基础4国及77国集团)。欧盟作为一个成熟和较稳定的经济体,基础设施业已完善,经济技术和管理方面均有独特优势,应对气候变化的能力也比较强,因此在气候变化谈判中处于“先锋”。美国尽管一直是世界碳排放最大国家,但凭借自身对气候变化较强的应对能力和先进的管理技术,总是借口要绑定发展中国家一起减排,才承诺有效减排,其实质仍然是将国家利益摆在全球利益之上。中国是最大的发展中国家,近年来经济社会发展迅猛,但由于工业化方式还比较粗糙,在温室气体排放上已经超过美国而成为碳排放量最大的国家,因此受到的国际社会压力也越来越大。随着中国国力不断增长,国际影响不断提升,中国已经成为国际舞台的重要角色。然而也要清醒地看到,中国是一个发展中大国,而不是发达的强国。作为一个发展中大国,中国要发挥大国影响和承担大国责任。作为碳排放量大国,中国要承担大国责任,必须自觉进行节能减排。要发挥发展中大国的影响,就必须积极主动地参与国际合作,同时需要采取灵活的博弈策略。展望未来气候变化谈判,国际社会尤其是大国之间通过继续进行建设性的合作,还是有望达成一项有约束力的的国际气候协议。但这一目标的实现,有赖于以下几个关键条件。第一,大国必须平衡好国家利益与全球利益。第二,大国之间必须首先合作谈判,唯有这样才能减少众多的国家谈判数目带来的“无休无止的争吵和讨价还价”。第三,必须在发达的大国与发展中的大国之间首先达成一致,也就是发达国家的强制减排与发展中国家的自主减缓行动之间要实现合理的平衡。第四,大国必须领头遵守业已达成的协议,包括建立制度化的平台来落实发达国家对发展中国家持久的资金和技术支持,以及发达国家和发展中国家制定严格的相关规定,确保所有国家统计数据的透明性,使“可测量的、可报告的和可核查的”减排行动能够受到国际社会的监督。更多还原

【Abstract】 Global negative externalities are the thorniest issues that the international community has to face in the age of globalization. With the development of globalization, the whole world is being closely linked together in terms of production, consumption, trade, investment, finance, technology development and transfer. As a result, all countries have never been more interdependent than ever before. Globalization has brought not only opportunities for development but also huge challenges, including resource depletion, environmental pollution, climate change, population explosion, poverty, economic crisis, terrorism, epidemic disease outbreak, etc.Global negative externalities are broadly related to nature, politics, economics, health care, national security, etc. The causes of global negative externalities are also related to historical problems, interest conflicts, and the discrepancies in economic and social development in the world. But the common cause is however the indifference that the individual shows to the public interest or the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality. Global negative externalities, for instance, occurs when a firm, in order to cut the production cost, emits greenhouse gases (GHGs) which may contribute to the global climate change and eventually harm the earth, and will not have to pay the cost of emitting.The essence of externalities is actually concerned with the scarcity of resources and the nature of man. Externalities need to be remedied since they cause inefficiency and inefficient distributions of resources. At the national level, externalities can be corrected by means of government regulations, legal methods, unitization, taxation (Pigouvian Taxes), and/or the application of the Coase Theorem.A global negative externality is not a simply-extended conception of externality in terms of space. Global externalities can also generate inefficiency of global resources and thus need remedying. Approaches for remedying externalities on the national level would however fail to apply to the global level due to the existence of the governance dilemmas, including 1) the world government dilemma. In the absence of a world government that has supranational authority, externality governing approaches at the national level would fail.2) global tax dilemma. Without a world government, a global tax would only be theoretically possible. Carbon tax is subject to a few countries in the region and is also opposed by many countries on the global scale.3) the dilemma of global property rights. A dilemma also exists when Coase bargaining is used to correct global negative externalities. In many cases, the property rights of global public resources cannot be clearly defined and the costs for property rights negotiation can be very high, which leads to very low efficiency. As the externalities spill over the national border, national approaches for correcting externalities cannot be used and new approaches are thus called for in both theory and practice.The solution to the dilemmas of the global negative externalities rests on international cooperation. Since a global negative externality creates a global effect and causes a global harm as well, global cooperation is thus needed. A single country is not likely to provide a solution to the global negative externalities and has no incentive to do so. Even though a country or some countries would offer to solve the global issues, yet its/their enthusiasm can be curbed as long as there are countries in question which refuse to join. Consequently the effect of the global governance will not be achieved.Nevertheless, the dilemma of international cooperation also exists despite the call for global efforts to eliminate the global negative externalities. Due to the state rationality and the free riding problem, the rationality of an individual state will not lead to that of the international community. Plus the world anarchy and a great number of countries in the world, the cases of "the Tragedy of the Commons", "the Dilemma of the Prisoners" and the dilemma of collective action thus prevail. International cooperation seems to be a long bickering and very inefficient process on the issues concerning global security, environmental pollution, nuclear proliferation, poverty, and climate change,Despite the dilemmas of international cooperation, there still exists the likelihood of it. A state can be personified in order to explore its nature. As is proven, the nature of man is not homo economicus but rather a complicated social man, in other words, "the totality of social relations". Man is a mix of being self-interested and altruistic. Man can either cooperate or compete and his decision making is determined by his social existence. The "social existence" suggests that the resources are scarce and social men are interdependent. Communication and interdependence will lead to repetitive competition for the ownership, utilization, and consumption of the scarce resources. Repetitive and dynamic competition, common benefits and compatible norms will result in cooperation to boost the effective utilization of the resources. The co-existence of competition and cooperation and the interactions between competition and cooperation will make a social man both self-interested and altruistic. A state is also a social man. The scarcity of global resources leads to countries competing against each other, but the interactions, interdependence, the common benefits and compatible norms will all enhance the collective action of the countries. Whether to choose cooperation or competition is determined by the social existence of the state. As a mix of being self-interested and altruistic, cooperative and competing actions are both normal for a state.International cooperation can be implemented under anarchy in the international community. Anarchy suggests the absence of a supranational world government, but it does not necessarily follow that the international community is in the Hobbes’ state of nature nor the state described by Locke or Kant, but rather in a dynamic and orderly state of self-governance. Under anarchy, international institutions, international organizations and sovereign states will interact and guarantee the basic order and stability of the international community.Although the international community exists where there’s anarchy and a state can be rational, yet the study of the mechanisms of self-governance by Ostrom,2009 Economics Nobel Prize laureates, and the successful cases of cooperation prove that there’s still likelihood for international cooperation in the long term because the international community shares broadly common benefits and states are complexly interdependent. The social development of mankind will meanwhile help the international community recognize and accept the international institutions and norms. As a social man, the dualism of being self-interested and altruistic can cooperate on the basis of promoting common interests and thus foster the global cooperation.International cooperation can be implemented without a hegemonic power. Hegemony does not help stabilize the international community and neither can it provide global public goods in the long run. International institutions can effectively help foster international cooperation.International institutions, international organizations and international non-government organizations (INGOs) are important parts of the international regime. International institutions can help reduce the transaction costs, promote the interdependence, and improve the expectations of the benefits. International organizations can help foster the coordination of the international cooperating, manage the global public goods, mediate the international conflicts, establish and implement the international institutions. INGOs play an important part in providing consultation and information for governments and inter-governments, exerting influence on governmental policy making and mass media, supervising the conduct of the governments and inter-governmental organizations.The existence of likelihood for international cooperation does not mean the success of international cooperation. The successful solution to the dilemma of international cooperation can and should be through the great power cooperation. A great power is a nation or state which has relatively great influence on a global scale, compared with other nations or states. The logic of great power cooperation is as follows:1) due to the large share of the global benefits that great powers possess, great powers have the incentive to initiate, propose, or support the global collective action and meanwhile promote its own internationally influence and benefits as well.2) due to the relatively small number of great powers, the great powers cooperation can greatly help eliminate the dilemma caused by the great number of players in the international cooperation and thus reduce the transaction cost and promote the efficiency of cooperation.3) the agreement reached by the great powers will help make international institutions formed, implemented and supervised and then reduce the possibilities of other states taking a free ride.4) leading by example that the great powers show how they themselves follow the existing international institutions will in return have an effect on their followers and eventually foster the international cooperation on the governance of global negative externalities. International cooperation will not come easily because there are some factors which have impacts on it. These factors include national security concern, political and economic interest concerns. However, the mechanism of great power cooperation can greatly reduce the risks of these factors by means of bilateral and multi-bilateral talks, world summits, international organizations and INGOs.Greenhouse gases (GHGs) emission is a typical case of a global negative externality. From the perspective of property rights, the global atmosphere can be seen as a global public good, which is excludable. By excludability, it means that it is impossible to exclude any nation or state from consuming the atmosphere technologically. As a result, the so-called "tragedy of the commons" may arise. To prevent from emitting GHGs, all countries will have to take globally collective action to battle the climate change.About 20 years have passed since the international community began to cooperate on the battle against the climate. A series of important international agreements like United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol, etc., have been reached but so far there is no binding agreement for all nations.The international cooperation dilemma is closely related with factors concerning a state’s political interest, economic interest, science recognition, etc., among which the economic interest is most vital. Disagreements over cooperation principles, GHGs emission programs, finance loom over international cooperation on climate change. Cooperation principle determines the possibility of whether to initiate the cooperation. The most important fact concerning the cooperation principle is equity. However different nations do not have a consensus understanding of equity. The developing countries value the "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDR) principle, emphasizing the historical responsibilities of the developed nations. The developed countries, on the contrary, emphasize the principle of common responsibilities, arguing that in history they did not emit the GHGs on purpose due the limitation of scientific level then. So far the developed countries and developing countries seem to have reached an agreement over the principle of CBDR. However disagreements still remain over how to embody the principle and it is still the focus of the negotiation. As many developed countries have not yet fulfilled their commitments as are listed in the existing agreements to provide financial aids and technology for the developing countries, of which the enthusiasm to participate in the negotiation of GHGs emission reduction has been affected.International cooperation on the climate change is in essence a game in which the players of nations try to maximize their own benefits. The major players, mainly three countries or three groups that represent their followers or allied countries, are the EU, the US (or the Umbrella Group), and China (or BASIC countries). The EU, as a well-developed and stable economic entity, has advantages in terms of management and technologies to battle climate change over other groups and thus acts as a pioneer at the table of the international negotiation. The USA, which has also better abilities to address the climate change, suggests it will only promise to reduce GHGs emission significantly as long as the developing countries are also included in the binding agreement. So the USA is blamed by the developing countries for putting its national interest above the global interest. China, as the biggest developing country and also the biggest carbon emitter due to the fast growth of its economy over the recent years, is faced with increasing pressure coming from the international community. As China is growing fast, its influence also increases. China now plays an important role in the stage of the world politics. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that China is still a developing country rather than a developed one. As a great developing country, China must exert its influence and assume its matching responsibilities. As a big country of carbon emitter, China will have to volunteer to cut out carbon emission and conserve energy, take an active part in participating in the international cooperation, and adopt flexible strategies at the negotiating table.Looking to the future, a legally binding climate deal is still expected of the great powers as long as they continue to perform constructively and productively in the international cooperation. To achieve this goal, these conditions will have to be met:1) The great powers will have to balance their national interest and the global interest. The base for international cooperation will be eroded if each of the great powers puts its national interest above the global one.2) The great powers will have to strike a deal before all the other countries come to the negotiating table. Only in this way, can it help reduce the snail-paced international negotiation caused by the great number of the international negotiating parties and unrelenting bickering between rich and poor. The great powers must follow the principle of CBDR established by UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, which is also seen as the precondition for moving the cooperation forward.3) an agreement must be reached between the great powers before the all the other countries come together again to the negotiating table in order to avoid the inefficiency of large scale conventions. But it is a must to strike a balance between the developed countries with the legally binding commitment to carbon emission reduction and the developing countries with non-legally binding promises to cut out carbon emission.4) the great powers will have to show a leadership example by implementing the existing international institutions, including the provision of financial aids to the poor by the developed countries, and the provision of accurate and transparent statistics concerning carbon emission reduction by the developing countries in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.更多还原