【作者】 舒成；

【导师】 蒋经法；

【作者基本信息】 江西财经大学 ， 财政学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 改革开放30年以来,财政分权体制改革一直是中国经济领域研究的重要课题。经济学家们达成了一个比较广泛的共识：中国财政分权体制改革促进了地方各级政府间的竞争,提高了地方各级政府发展经济的动力,增强了地方公共品的供给,为我国30年来的经济高速发展奠定了基础。随着中央与省级“分税制”财政分权体制的确立,地方财政分权体制也沿着“分税制”的思想逐步深化,形成了地方各级政府分工、合作提供地方公共品的财政体制基础。然而,地方财政分权体制是在地方各级事权划分比较模糊,地方各级缺乏稳定收入来源的背景下实施的,而且既没有体现居民对地方公共品的偏好显示机制,也缺乏对地方各级政府有效供给地方公共品的激励。这就使得地方公共品供给中出现诸如经济增长型地方公共品投入高速扩张,各地高速公路、地铁(轻轨)、机场及城区公用事业改变惊人；以行政管理费为代表的社会管理型地方公共品增长迅猛,各地行政事业部门人员膨胀,政府治理效率低下；而医疗、教育、卫生等社会服务型地方公共品投入相对不足且效率不高。本文以地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给作为研究对象,深入探讨地方财政分权体制的制度设计、分配体制、管理机制对地方各级政府提供地方公共品的影响。本文基于前人的研究,深入分析省地财政分权体制和地县财政分权体制对地方公共品供给的影响,并在此基础上提出通过地方财政分权体制和“省直管县”财政管理体制的完善途径,以便在今后的地方财政分权体制改革中更好的促进地方公共品有效供给。本文主要包括以下五个部分。第一部分,导论。本部分介绍了本文的研究背景和意义,并对国内外关于地方财政分权体制和地方公共品供给研究进行了梳理和综述。研究发现,地方财政分权体制的实施需要相应的居民偏好显示(选择)机制、地方政府间的激励机制等措施相配套,才能使地方公共品高效供给；对地方财政分权体制与地方公共品供给之间关系的分析,需要结合不同级次的分权程度、本级财政运行状况等方面进行理论和实证方面的研究,才能得出比较可靠的结论。最后,提出了本文的研究框架和方法,总结了本文研究的创新和不足之处。第二部分,地方财政体制与公共品供给理论分析。本部分对地方公共品理论及其有效供给、财政分权理论下地方公共品的有效供给从理论层面进行了分析。在此基础上提出了本文地方财政体制下地方公共品供给的分析框架,并从地方财政分权体制制度设计、分配体制、管理机制层面对地方公共品供给影响机理进行了分析,为地方财政体制对地方公共品供给的实证分析奠定了理论基础。第三部分,中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共品供给一般分析。本部分介绍了改革开放以来地方财政分权体制的制度安排,并对制度安排下的地方公共品供给情况进行了分析。研究发现：地方公共品供给规模随着经济发展而增大,地方各级政府承担了过多地方公共品供给责任：随着地方财政体制分权化的推进,尤其是“省直管县”制度的实施,地方各级财政支出中发生了有利于基层的变化；地方公共品供给结构尚待优化,即使实行了“省直管县”,经济增长型和社会管理型地方公共品供给相对规模在省级、地级、县级中仍然高于社会服务型；从主要地方公共品供给职责来看,大体呈现“省级减少、地级稳定、县级增大”的趋势,即“省直管县”制度的实施使省级、县级在地方公共品供给中的责任增加,地级供给职责相应减少。第四部分,中国地方财政分权体制下地县级公共品供给实证分析。本部分对我国地方财政分权体制下的地县级公共品供给能力和地方财政分权体制对地级、县级公共品供给的影响进行了实证分析,并对未完全实行“省直管县”的省份与完全实行“省直管县”省份的实证结果进行对比分析。研究发现：“分税制”改革后,地级、县级财政自给率出现大幅下降,全国地级财政收入基尼系数一直处于比较平均的水平,县级则接近了不平均的警戒线；全国地级、县级财政收入泰尔指数值总体呈下降趋势,就地级而言省内差异变动程度要明显大于省际变动程度,县级则呈现出相反的趋势；在省地和地县财政分权体制下,即使“省直管县”体制实施后,地级、县级政府受财政自给能力弱、财政负担重和政府治理效率低等因素的影响,并未由经济发展型政府转向社会服务型政府。第五部分,本文实证结论与政策建议。本部分简要总结了本文的实证研究结论,并在此基础上从地方财政分权体制制度设计、分配体制、管理机制层面提出了促进地方公共品有效供给的对策。同时,在本文分析“省直管县”制度对地县级公共品供给影响的基础上,有针对性的提出了促进“省直管县”财政管理体制完善的对策。本文创新点在于：(1)结合西方财政分权理论与地方公共品供给理论的发展和我国地方财政体制下地方公共品供给制度变迁,构建了一个解释我国当前地方公共品供给的理论框架,对地方财政体制影响地方公共品供给的机理进行分析,并在此基础上进行实证研究。(2)通过基尼系数的简便算法和泰尔指数对地方财政分权体制的分配效应进行了分析,并对地县级财政收入省际和省内的差异程度对全国地方各级财政收入差距的贡献率进行研究。(3)从分析地县级分权程度和运行情况对经济增长型(基本建设支出)、社会服务型(教育事业费)、社会管理型(行政事业费)地方公共品的影响出发,对我国地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给进行实证分析。并通过对比“省直管县”省份与其他省份地方财政分权体制对上述三类型地方公共品供给的影响,探讨“省直管县”制度实施的效果。更多还原

【Abstract】 The reform of China’s fiscal decentralization system has been an essential topic in the field of economic research since China’s economic reform began 30 years ago. There has been a rather wide consensus reached among economists, i.e. the reform of China’s fiscal decentralization system intensified the competition among at and below provincial level governments which has been becoming a strong incentive of local economic growth. It also benefited the provision of local public goods to much extent and contributed as a foundation to the national high-speed economic growth since 1978. The fiscal decentralization system between the central government and the provincial level governments is mostly embodied in the’tax-sharing system’ which also directs the reform of fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. Governments at and below provincial level are supposed to cooperate and be divided in the provision of local public goods. However, the reform failed in regulating clearly the provision responsibilities taking by different levels of governments at and below provincial level. It didn’t succeed in guaranteeing the fiscal revenue necessary for the self-sustaining of different levels of governments at and below provincial level. The residents are lack of the revealing mechanism to show their preferences for the local public goods and the governments at and below provincial level are scarce of political and fiscal incentive to provide the local public goods efficiently are the other two limitations of the system. These deficiencies are attributable to the rapid expansion of local economic-growth-promoting public goods like highways, subways, light rail, airports and some other urban public services. Of the public expenditure structure, the administrative expenditure keeps rising while the expenditures on education and health services are still far from enough which could be described as inefficiency in local public goods provision.This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods in the context of China’s fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and deepens the influence research on the provision of local public goods put by institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. Based on the current research, this paper specifies the influences put by the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level on the provision of local public goods. Some reforms are therefore suggested to help improve the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and’province-direct-governed county’fiscal system in the intent of improving the provision of local public goods. This paper consists of five chapters as followings.Chapter I is the introduction. This part introduces the research background and needs. After comprehensively reviewing the current research in domestic and abroad, it concludes that the revealing mechanism of residents’ preferences and the incentive mechanism of governments at and below provincial level are imperative to the effective implementation of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. And also, the provision of local public goods varies among different level of governments at and below provincial level due to the practical divergence which means more necessarily positive research. In the rest, the part introduces the framework and methods of this paper and also points out the innovations and shortcomings.Chapter II prepares the theoretic foundation for the fiscal system at and below provincial level and the provision of public goods. It begins from the local public goods theory, the efficient provision of local public goods theory and the counterpart under the system of fiscal decentralization. Then it provides a framework for analyzing the efficient provision of local public goods which should include three aspects, i.e. the institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. This is the theory foundation of the following positive research.Chapter III focuses on the reform of China’s local public goods provision under the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. After reviewing the institutional change of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and the consequent provision of local public goods, it concludes the governments at and below provincial level are taking more and more responsibilities in providing the local public goods even to an over-taken share. Meanwhile, as the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level furthered, especially after the implementation of ’province-direct-governed county’ system, there has been a beneficial change happened to the government at and below provincial level in their expenditures on the provision of local public goods.However, the public expenditure structure at and below provincial level still needs adjusting because the expenditures on the administrative and economic-growth-promoting part still dominate in the whole public expenditure while public-service-type expenditure scares comparatively even after the reform. Among the responsibility shares taken for the provision of the local public goods, the provincial government tends to decrease, the district government almost keeps it unchanged while the county level tends to increase.Chapter IV is the positive analyses on China’s provision of district and county public goods. This part positively studies on the district and county’s provision ability of public goods and the influences on the district and county’s provision of public goods put by the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. This positive analysis extends to compare the different result between the districts who employ ’province-direct-governed county’ system and those who don’t. After that, it finds out since the reform of ’tax sharing system’, the fiscal self-sustaining ability rate of district and county level governments has been decreasing to the much extent. Specifically, as the district Gini coefficient per capita has been around the average level nationally, the county one is close to the warning off-average level. The district and county fiscal Theil index per capita is in a down trend nationally. In the district level, the inequality coefficient within provinces is obviously bigger than that among provinces. The district inequality coefficients within eastern and western provinces are bigger than that within central China provinces. This trend contradicts in an opposite way in county level. Anyway, even employing ’province-direct-governed county’ system, the district and county governments still fail in transiting from an economic-growth-promoting government to a public-service-type one due to fiscal deficiency and operational inefficiency.Chapter V is main conclusions and policy suggestions. It starts from making brief conclusions about the former chapters. Then, some suggestions are brought up about the institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level intending to provide local public goods more efficiently. At the same time, some policies are also put forward on how to adjust’the provincial government’s direct administration over the county government’ fiscal administration system.The contributions of this paper are as follows:(1) it sets up a theoretical framework to explain the local public goods supply in China based on development of western fiscal decentralization theory and local public goods supply theory, and on the transformation of local public goods supply under the fiscal system at and below. provincial level in China. Within the theoretical framework the author analyzes the mechanism of how fiscal system at and below provincial level influences local public goods supply, and makes an empirical study accordingly. (2) It analyzes the redistribution effect of decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level via the simple arithmetic of Gini coefficient and Theil index, and studies the contribution rate of municipal and prefectural government revenue disparities within a province and cross provinces to the revenue disparities of government at all levels in China. It finds that from 1999 to 2006, the Gini coefficient of municipal government revenue is at the average level all along, while the Gini coefficient of prefectural government revenue is close to the critical point of unevenness; the municipal government revenue disparity in a province varies greater than that across provinces, whereas the prefectural government revenue disparity shows an opposite tendency. (3) it makes an empirical study on local public goods supply under the decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level in China, by analyzing the impact of municipal and prefectural decentralization degree on local public goods in three categories:economic growth (infrastructure expenditure), social service (education fees), and social management (administration fees). On the basis of comparison of the impact on the supply of above three types of local public goods by decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level between provinces with ’province-direct-governed counties’ and those without, it discusses the effects and problems of ’province-direct-governed counties’ policy. The author finds that even with the policy of ’province-direct-governed counties’, the decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level at provincial level makes no help for prefectural governments to realize a transformation from’economic-growth type’to’social-service type’. A sufficient prefectural public goods supply may be more likely achieved by enhancing the prefectural government governing efficiency and alleviating its fiscal burden than simply promoting the decentralization among governments of different levels.更多还原