【作者】 韩艳旗；

【导师】 王红玲；

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 自1996年美国批准NuCOTN33B和NuCOTN35B两个转基因抗虫棉品种商业化推广之后全球转基因农作物种植面积就呈现出迅猛增长的势头,这不仅得益于转基因农作物本身所具有的抗虫、耐除草剂等特性能大幅降低生产成本,更得益于知识产权(IPRs)保护的加强使得研发者能够攫取更多的经济剩余从而在转基因农作物研发领域吸引大量资金,特别是私人研发者的大举进入。不可否认农业研发知识产权保护的加强有利于激励私人部门进入研发领域、开发改进新品种从而提高农业生产效率,这对于发达国家和发展中国家而言都是如此,但我们更应该清醒的看到以美国为首的发达国家之所以在全球范围内大力倡导严格的农业研发知识产权保护在很大程度上是出于国家利益考量的结果,当前国际上绝大多数转基因农作物专利技术都被Monsanto、Pioneer等极少数发达国家农业生物巨头所拥有,特别是美国在全球农业生物技术研发领域更是占据绝对的优势,这使得他们对市场拥有了相当大的垄断力量且为了攫取巨额利润在国际上力主实施严格的知识产权保护政策,很显然这种有失偏颇的国际农业研发知识产权保护框架严重违反了现代知识产权法“利益平衡”的基本精神和立法宗旨,对广大发展中国家的农民非常不利,使得他们时常很难支付由这些跨国种子巨头所收取的高昂的种子费用。本文的研究即是基于发展中国家在农业转基因种子研发及应用过程中所面临的这些急需解决的问题为切入点,以利益平衡为基本准则,以我国在农业生物技术研发和产业化推广的基本情况作为构建模型的依据,在对发达国家农业生物技术研发市场结构特点及其成因分析基础上,选择转基因Bt抗虫棉为研究对象,通过构建3地区局部均衡贸易模型及开放条件下的农业研发经济剩余模型对不同知识产权保护、技术外溢水平等情形下美国、中国和以印度为代表的世界其他地区各主体福利变化进行测算及对成本收益差异进行比较,紧接着对国际农业生物技术研发领域的新进发展—基因利用限制技术(GURTs, Genetic Use Restriction Technologies)的潜在影响及在我国的适用性进行研究,最后分析当前发达国家农业生物技术研发知识产权保护可能存在的“陷阱”、对我国的潜在不良影响及应采取的规避措施,通过这几个环节构建一个基于IPRs的转基因种子研发福利效应与政策研究的全面分析框架,探寻当前最适合我国的农业生物技术研发与知识产权保护的策略,它既能提高我国的整体福利特别是生产者即农民的福利,避免陷入发达国家知识产权保护“陷阱”,又能给国外研发者和国内研发者以适当的激励,在国内棉农、消费者、研发者和国外农业生物研发巨头之间取得利益的“有序均衡”,从而达到促进跨国育种公司技术外溢和促进我国种子研发市场化建设的双重目标,并促使我国的农业转基因研发企业增强竞争力并尽快成长起来,能够参与到全球竞争中去。本文可能的创新点如下：①研究视角的创新。本文以知识产权(IPRs)“利益平衡”的立法宗旨为基本准则,在对发达国家农业生物技术研发市场结构特点及成因分析基础上通过构建嵌入技术使用费变量的3地区局部均衡贸易模型和大国开放条件下的农业研发经济剩余模型对转基因棉花研发福利效应进行测算,并对当前发达国家农业生物技术研发知识产权保护可能存在的“陷阱”、对我国的潜在不良影响、基因利用限制技术(GURTs)在我国的适用性及政府行为进行了深入分析,从而构建一个基于IPRs的转基因农作物研发福利效应与政策研究的全面分析框架。②研究方法及其运用方面的创新。其一,通过构建包含中国、美国和以印度为代表的世界其它地区的3地区局部均衡贸易模型从反现实价格视角对3种情形下的转基因棉花研发福利效应进行测算：不同的知识产权保护、技术外溢及价格支持水平,并对模型关键变量的敏感性进行分析。其二,本文首次将开放条件下的农业研发经济剩余模型运用到我国转基因棉花研发福利效应的测算,对跨时期1996～2008年间的研发福利效应在发达国家、发展中国家及各利益主体间的分配进行研究。③研究结论方面的创新。转基因新技术使各国整体福利显著增加,但新技术带来的“农业踏车效应”使得棉花生产者损失严重；美国国内棉花价格支持政策虽使得中国棉农福利有所受损,但中国整体福利却因全球棉花价格下降而有所增加；取消技术使用费以增加棉农收入的策略不可取,提高单产及综合生产能力是今后中国棉花产业发展最优的政策选择。更多还原

【Abstract】 The global transgenic crop planting areas had seen a sharply rising trend since two genetically modified cotton varieties, NuCOTN33B and NuCOTN35B containing the BollgardTM (Bt) gene were introduced commercially in 1996 through a licensing agreement by US government. We should attribute this not only to the characteristics the transgenic crops owns such as resistant to insect pest and herbicide resistant and so on that could decrease the agricultural production cost largely, but also furthermore to the R&D field could attract much fund as the intellectual property rights strengthen that the researchers could get much more economic benefit, especially so many private R&D companies enter the transgenic seed field. There is no doubt that the strengthen of agricultural R&D intellectual property rights is beneficial to stimulate private R&D companies could enter this field to develop new varieties and so improve agricultural productivities, this is true both for developed and developing countries. But we should see clearly that the main reasons that the developed countries leading by the United States propagate strict agricultural R&D intellectual property rights in the world is because of country’s interest to much extent, nowadays most of the global transgenic crop patens are owned by only several agricultural biotechnology giant of developed countries especially the United States have the absolute comparative advantage in the global agricultural biotechnology R&D field. This empower them have heavy monopoly power on transgenic seed market and they try their best to enact strict intellectual property rights in the whole world for the purpose of getting big interest. Obviously today the biased international agricultural R&D intellectual property rights to some extent have gravely violated the principle of balancing of interest, which is the fundamental spirit and legislation purpose of modern intellectual property rights law. And this will be harmful to the peasants in many developing countries because this let them sometimes can’t pay the expensive seed charged by transnational seed giant.This paper just choose the problem badly in need of solving be the penetration point faced by developing countries during the course of R&D and applying of agricultural transgenic seed, take balancing of interest as basic principle and developing models base on the fundamental conditions of agricultural biotechnology R&D and apply in our country, after analyzing the characteristics of the agricultural biotechnology R&D market structure as well as its causes in the developed countries, we choose the Bt cotton as object of study, through developing a partial equilibrium three-region world trade model and an agricultural R&D economic surplus model under the condition of opening to measure the welfare change of main body such as peasant, consumer and researcher in scenarios with different intellectual property rights levels and technology spillover levels in China, the United States and other regions in the world represented by India and have a comparison analysis of the cost and returns in these three regions, following that we have an analysis of the potential impacts and its applicability of genetic use restriction technologies in our countries, which is one of the latest development in the international agricultural biotechnology R&D area, finally we have a study on the possible agricultural biotechnology R&D intellectual property rights traps in developed countries and its potential harmful effect for our country and what evade measure should we take. Through these several part we construct an all-round analytical framework of transgenic seed R&D welfare effect and policy based on intellectual property rights perspective, to explore the agricultural biotechnology R&D and intellectual property rights policy that most suit for our country, avoid being caught in agricultural R&D intellectual property rights traps of developed countries, meanwhile give appropriate stimulation to both domestic and foreign R&D company, and to reach ordered interest balance between domestic cotton peasants, cotton consumer,researchers and transnational agricultural biotechnology R&D giant, so finally to realize the double-target of promote the technology spillover of transnational seed giant and construction of our country’s seed R&D market, and to promote our country’s agricultural transgenic seed R&D company strength competition and grow up as soon as possible,and be able to participate in international competition in the future.The possible innovative points of this paper are as following:firstly, is the innovation of research perspective. We take the balancing of interest, which is the legislative purpose of modern intellectual property rights, as the basic principle, we develop a partial equilibrium three-region world trade model implanted a technology fee variate and a agricultural R&D economic surplus model under the condition of opening to have an empirical research on genetically modified cotton R&D welfare effects after analyzing the characteristics of the agricultural biotechnology R&D market structure as well as its causes in the developed countries, and then we have an analysis of the possible agricultural biotechnology R&D intellectual property rights traps in developed countries and the potential impacts and of GURTs in China and the relevant government behavior, so we construct an all-round analytical framework of transgenic seed R&D welfare effect and policy based on intellectual property rights perspective. Secondly is the innovation of research method and its application. On the one side, through developing a partial equilibrium three-region world trade model including China, U.S, and the other regions in the world represented by India to measure the genetically modified cotton R&D welfare effects from the perspective of counterfactual price in three scenarios:different degree of intellectual property rights protection level, technology spillover level and price support level and have a sensitivity analysis of the model’s key parameter. On the other hand, this paper use agricultural R&D economic surplus model under the condition of opening to measure the China’s Bt cotton R&D welfare effects for the first time and have an empirical study of the assignment of R&D welfare effects in between the north and south countries and benefit counterparts such as researchers, farmers and consumers. Thirdly is the innovation of research results. The welfare of each country as an entirety increases notably, but cotton producer loses heavily because of agricultural treadmill effect, U.S. cotton price support benefits development of its cotton industry despite hurting Chinese cotton producer, China’s welfare as a whole increase obviously because the world cotton price decrease. The tactic of trying to cancel technology fee so as to increase farmers’ revenue is not advisable, and to improve per unit area yield and synthetically efficiency is the optimum policy chooses for the development of our country’s cotton estate in the future更多还原