【作者】 逯东；

【导师】 杨丹；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2010， 博士

【副题名】基于国有上市公司的经验证据

【摘要】 2008年的全球金融危机凸现了政府对经济干预和控制的作用,对各类社会问题或是经济问题的讨论,政府背景的考虑是不可缺少的。而我国作为转型经济国家,自1978年的经济改革开始,尽管非国有经济在不断发展壮大,但国有企业始终在国民经济中占据着相当大的比例,尤其是绝大多数上市公司都是被政府所控制的国有企业。因此,结合我国的转型经济背景,进一步讨论政府控制在国有企业中的作用具有极其重要的现实意义。我国的国有企业改革也先后经历了不同的阶段,从最初的“分权化”改革,扩大企业的经营自主权,到后来为解决国有企业的融资困难和公司治理问题所建立的资本市场,再到“抓大放小”和“战略调整”策略以及目前仍在进行的建立现代企业制度和国有资产管理体制的改革,整个改革的策略和路径在不断的演化。目前,国有企业改革已经进入了制度创新和结构调整的道路,大量国有企业已初步建立了基于现代企业制度下的公司治理模式,但国有企业经营效率低下的问题仍未得到根本性解决。在国有企业,为什么现代公司治理模式未能发挥其应有的效能?作为国有企业的最终控制人的政府在国有企业的公司治理中发挥着怎样的作用?这些问题都值得进一步的探讨。而2003年以前,由于缺乏专门的国有资产管理机构,国有企业一直存在着政企不分、出资人缺位、内部人控制现象严重等问题,国有企业产权改革往往可能伴随着国有资产的流失,未能完全体现政府的战略动机,例如曾经引发广泛社会争议的管理层收购(MBO)。2003年,国有资产监督管理委员会的成立,意味着国有企业出资人缺位问题得到一定程度的解决,国有企业的公司治理机制将更能体现政府意志和动机。为更有效的研究上述问题,本文的研究阶段将主要集中于2003年及其以后。对于政府在经济发展中的作用,学者们基于不同的假设前提,先后提出了“扶持之手”(Musgrave,1959; Stiglitz,1989)和“掠夺之手”(Shleifer andVishny,1998)的理论模型。其中,“扶持之手”假定政府追求的目标是社会福利最大化,目的是为了纠正诸如垄断定价、外部性、失业、不完善的企业信贷等市场失灵的问题。而“掠夺之手”则假定政府追求的目标并非社会福利最大化,而是自身的私利；认为应当公正地看待政治,政治过程是政府行为的决定性因素；政治家常常利用所掌握的权力,实现个人政治或经济目标。尽管这两种相互冲突的理论模型有着不同的研究起点,但我们可以发现无论是“扶持之手”还是“掠夺之手”其研究视角都是静态的,忽略了对制度变迁、经济演化等动态因素的考虑,对经济现象的解释存在着片面化的问题。事实上,政府的目标存在着多重性,其行为非常复杂,绝非简单的静态假定其追求社会福利最大化还是自身利益最大化所能认识的,政府往往同时存在着“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”两只手。本文的研究将基于中国特殊的转型经济背景,综合“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”两种理论,围绕“动机”→“控制权”→“人事控制”这三个问题逐层推进,展开经验研究,讨论政府控制对国有企业公司治理机制的影响,以期进一步揭开国有企业治理结构背后的“黑匣子”。具体而言,“动机”就是指政府控制国有企业的目的。而“控制权”和“人事控制”是政府控制国有企业的途径,“控制权”属于政府控制的产权层面,“人事控制”即人事任免权,属于政府控制的具体表现,“控制权”是“人事控制”的基础,两者属于政府控制的不同层面,政府的动机或目标将通过这两大途径最终反映到国企治理结构上,进而影响公司价值。本研究包括导论和正文两部分内容,各部分内容如下：导论部分包括本文的选题背景、研究意义、研究思路与研究方法、论文结构介绍。正文共分六章。第一章,文献回顾与理论基础。本章首先结合文献回顾,给出了本文研究的理论基础,主要包括早期有关国家所有权理论的争论、产权理论、“扶持之手”、“掠夺之手”模型以及公司治理中的两类委托代理理论(包括股东与管理层之间的利益冲突、大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突)。接着从政治联系与公司绩效、国有股权结构与公司绩效、我国政府行为与国企治理这三方面回顾了政府控制对公司绩效影响的经验研究。最后对现有经验研究进行了评价,总结了当前研究仍然存在的一些问题。第二章,制度背景。本章结合已有的制度分析文献,介绍与回顾了改革开放30年来我国政府内部激励与治理的变革过程、国有企业改革的历史进程、国有资产管理体制改革、国有企业公司治理改革,展现了我国国有企业治理结构背后的制度背景变迁过程,为后续的实证研究提供必要的制度背景铺垫。第三章,政府转让国有企业控制权的动机研究。本章主要是对政府控制国有企业的动机进行实证检验。考虑到政府控制与政府转让控制权是一枚硬币的两面,本章首先实证分析了政府转让国有企业控制权的决定因素,从另一面揭示了现阶段政府控制国有企业的动机。接着又进一步实证检验了国有企业控制权转让后的业绩表现,讨论政府转让国企控制权的事前动机与事后企业业绩表现是否具有一致性。最后基于上述的实证研究结论,进一步对国有企业的产权改革进行了讨论。第四章,政府控制权与公司价值。基于政府的控制动机,。本章实证检验了政府控制权和公司价值之间的关系。首先结合“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”的理论分析,讨论了政府控制权对公司价值可能同时存在着“正”、“负”两种效应,通过对两种效应做边际分析,理论推导了政府控制权与公司价值之间可能存在的关系,接着通过数据进行了实证检验。并进一步检验了在不同的政府主体控制下,政府控制权与公司价值之间的关系是否存在差异。第五章,政府控制、高管行政经历与公司价值。本章讨论的是在政府的人事控制下,具有行政经历的国企高管其经营行为是否与一般传统意义上的企业高管存在着差异。重点解决三个问题：(1)行政型出身的高管对国有企业的业绩是损害还是促进?(2)行政型出身的高管是如何影响国有企业业绩的?(3)在不同的政府主体控制下,行政型出身高管对公司价值的影响是否存在差异?本章的实证设计紧紧围绕这三个问题展开讨论,以全面认识行政型高管对公司价值的影响途径,为国企高管行政任命制度的改革提供必要的经验证据。最后是全文结束章,对全文的主要研究结论、政策启示和研究局限性进行了总结,并展望了未来的研究方向。本文的主要研究结论如下：1.近几年来政府转让国有企业控制权的政治动机(即维持社会稳定和国家安全战略)明显,而追求企业经营业绩的经济动机减弱,转让中倾向于保留大规模和有战略意义的企业。结合已有文献的研究结论,本文推测可能存在着这样一种情况：在近三十年的国有企业改革进程中,随着改革开放的逐步深入,政府转让国有企业产权的动机可能经历了一个“以经济动机为主→经济动机与政治动机并重→以政治动机为主”的渐进式变迁路径。2.民营化确实提高了企业经营业绩,但终极控制权仍保留在政府内部的“换汤不换药”的控制权转让方式并没有显著改善企业业绩。3.尽管民营化带来了国企事后的业绩改善,但政府事前却因为政治顾虑而不存在把业绩不好的企业转让出去的明显倾向,这种逻辑不一致性折射出我国当前国有企业改革中面临的困境。也进一步表明,在现阶段,政府控制国有企业更多地源于政治考虑,政治动机更为明显,而追求经营效率的经济动机呈现出减弱的趋势。4.由于政府基于政治动机控制企业的行为同时存在着“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”这两只手,两只手所同时带来的“正”、“负”效应使得政府控制权与公司价值之间呈现出“倒U型”关系。由于地方政府比中央政府的干预力度更大,这种“倒U型”关系在地方政府控制下更为明显。5.政府为加强对企业的控制往往选拔了大量曾在政府部门担任过领导职务的官员出任国企高管。而这些行政出身的高管由于其存在政治晋升通道和目标多元化,往往会更少的将自身能力用于企业经营上,从而造成了对企业价值的损害；但在地方政府的强干预背景下,行政出身高管的价值损害效应存在一定程度的缓冲。本研究的主要改进和创新体现在以下三方面：第一,本文发现在2003-2007年这个区间,政府在推行民营化改革时,更多是出于保持稳定和战略性行业的政治顾虑,政治动机显著而以往文献提到的经济动机则不明显。进一步,通过对事前(Ex ante)政府控制权转让动机和事后(Ex post)公司表现的检验,发现以往文献多以事后(民营化后)的公司业绩表现来反推政府事前的放权动机存在偏差,因为事后业绩与政府的事前动机可能是不一致的——尽管民营化带来了企业事后的业绩改善,但政府事前却没有明显的把业绩不好的企业放权出去的倾向,这种逻辑不一致性折射了我国当前国有企业改革的困境。第二,基于政府较强的政治干预动机,结合“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”的理论分析,本文首次从理论上和实证检验上确定了政府控制权比例与公司价值之间存在非线性的“倒U型”关系,但这一关系主要是由地方政府控制的上市公司所决定,而中央政府控制的上市公司的政府控制权比例与公司价值不存在明显关系。第三,弥补了当前文献专门针对国有企业高管政府背景的实证研究上的匮乏,而目前大多数研究主要集中于对家族或民营企业的高管政府背景的考察。并在Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007)的研究基础上进行了扩展,实证检验了国有企业高管的行政经历损害公司价值的原因。考虑到中央政府和地方政府对企业的干预力度存在差异,本文进一步研究了在不同的政府主体控制下,国有企业高管的行政经历对公司价值的影响是否表现出明显差异。更多还原

【Abstract】 Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Company triggered a global financial crisis on September 15th 2008 once again. The financial crisis led to an intervention on the market economy from the government. Thus, for all kinds of social problems or economic problems, the government as a key factor has to be considered. Although the non-state economy continues to grow since 1978, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has always occupied a considerable proportion in the national economy in China, especially the vast majority of listed companies are SOEs controlled by the government. Therefore, the discussion of government control of state-owned enterprises has important practical significance.SOEs reform has gone through various stages, from the initial "decentralization" reforms, expansion of the operational autonomy of enterprises, establishment of capital market to overcome the financing difficulties of SOEs and corporate governance, "grasping the large and letting go the small" and "strategic adjustment" strategy, to the ongoing establishment of a modern enterprise system and state-owned assets management system reform. As a whole, the overall reform strategy is constantly evolving. At present, the SOEs reform has been on the system innovations and restructuring. Although a large number of SOEs have established a corporate governance model based on modern enterprise system, low operating efficiency of SOEs still have not been fundamentally resolved. Why the modern corporate governance model does not play its proper role in SOEs? What role should the Government play in corporate governance? These issues are worthy of further study. Due to the lack of specialized state-owned assets management institutions, there had been a great number of problems in SOEs before 2003, such as "the functions of the government and enterprises mixed up", vacancy of the investor, and insider control. Thus, SOEs reform of property rights’ may often be accompanied by the loss of state assets. As a result, the reform did not fully reflect the government’s strategic motives. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission established in 2003, which means that the problem of investor absence is resolved partly. In addition, SOEs’ corporate governance mechanism would reflect the government’s aspirations and motivation to some degree. To better study these problems, the research period will be on 2003 and beyond.Scholars has proposed "the hand of support" (Musgrave,1959; Stiglitz,1989) and "the grabbing hand" (Shleifer and Vishny; 1998) theoretical model from different assumptions. Meanwhile, "the hand of support" assumes that the Government’s goal is to maximize social welfare, so that market failure problems can be solved, such as monopoly pricing, externalities, unemployment, inadequate credit. "The grabbing hand" assumes that the objective pursued by the government is to maximize their own self-interest. It also suggested that politics should be taken fairly, because political process is the decisive factor of government action. Moreover, it believed that politicians often used their economic control right to achieve personal political or economic objectives, such as the allocation of resources to political supporters and upholding their own political status. Although the two conflicting theoretical models have different starting point, it can be seen that they are from the static view and ignore the institution changes and the dynamic of economic evolution.In fact, the goal of government is complex, and both of "the hand of support"and "the grabbing hand" take effect on economy.This study will discuss how government control influences the mechanism of corporate governance of SOEs with the background of transitional economy in China. Two theories, "the hand of support" and "the grabbing hand", are integrated to analyze three problems, "motivation"→"control right"→"staff control". This research is aimed to further reveal the "black box" of governance structure of state-owned enterprises.The dissertation is arranged as follows:First, it begins with an introduction. The introduction outlines the background, the significances, methodology and paper structure.The Text Part is made up of six chapters.Chapterl:Literature review and theoretical basis. Literature review shows the theoretical foundation of the paper. Then it reviews these literatures on how government control influence company performance from three areas, including the political ties and firm performance, ownership structure and firm performance, government behavior and governance of SOEs.Chapter2:Institutional background. This chapter introduces government incentives and governance process of change, the historical process of state-owned enterprises reform, state assets management system reform, corporate governance reform of SOEs, which shows institutional background of change processes of SOEs since reform and opening up.Chapter3:State-owned enterprises’government control right transfer. This chapter is an empirical research on government motives of control right transfer. Firstly, it analyzes the decisive factors of State-owned enterprises’government control right transfer, revealing the motives of the government. Then, it further studies the performance of SOEs after control right transfer. It discusses whether the SOEs’performance is consistent before and after the event. Finally, based on the previous research, this chapter further discusses the property right reform of SOEs.Chapter4:Government control and firm value. This chapter studies the relationship between government control ratio and firm value through empirical data analysis. Firstly, combined with "the hand of support" and "the grabbing hand" theoretical model, this chapter discusses the positive and negative effect of government control right on firm value. Then, it tests the relationship between government control right and firm value through the comparison of the positive and negative marginal effect of government control right on firm value. Finally, it confirms that whether there is relation between government control right and firm value under different government control systems.Chapter5:Government control, executive administrative experience and firm value. This chapter discusses whether executives with administrative experience and those with business experience have different actions under the control of the government personnel. Three problems are to solve:(1)Are executives with administrative experience harmful or beneficial on the SOEs performance? (2)How executives with administrative experience affect the performance of SOEs? (3)Do executives with administrative experience have different effect on firm value with the background of different government control?Chapter6:This chapter includes the main conclusions, policy implications and research limitations, and prospects for future research.Main Findings in this dissertation are as follows:1. In recent years, political motives of SOEs control right transfer are obvious, while economic motives are not obvious. Government tends to retain large-scale and strategic enterprises. Based on the literature review, this research infers that government motives of SOEs control right transfer may experience three stages: economic motives, coexistence of economic motives and political motives, and political motives.2. Privatization of enterprises improves operating performance effectively, while the ultimate control right still retained in the government does not lead to significant performance improvement.3. Although the privatization has improved the state-owned enterprise’s ex-post performance, the government has not shown any tendency to privatize the enterprises with poor performance out of the political concern. It is a difficult dilemma which Chinese government faces in the progress of state-owned enterprises’reform. Moreover, it reveals that government’s political motives prevails economic motives.4. Because there is two hands including "hand of support" and "grabbing hand", the "positive" and "negative" effect of the two hands simultaneously make the government control right and company value show "inverted U" relationship. As the local government of greater intensity than the central government’s intervention, this "inverted U" relationship is more obvious under the control of the local government.5. Government appoints many government officials as executives of SOEs to strengthen control of the business. Because of promotion channels and divers political goal, these executives often use less ability for the business, thus causing damage to the enterprise value. However, in the context of the local government’s strong intervention, there is a certain degree of buffering effect when Chief executives with administrative experience damage to corporate value.This dissertation is an exploratory research. Major improvements and innovations are evident in the following aspects:1. In recent years, political motives are the main motives of property rights reform of state-owned enterprises, while economic motives are not obvious. Based on test of prior (Ex ante) government control over the transfer of motive and after (Ex post) firm performance, it is found that although the privatization has improved the state-owned enterprise’s ex-post performance, the government has not shown any tendency to privatize the enterprises with poor performance out of the political concerns. It is a difficult dilemma which Chinese government faces in the progress of state-owned enterprises’reform.2. This research clarifies that the core of government control of state-owned enterprises is control right, expands the previous research horizon. Combined with "the hand of support" and "grabbing hand" theoretical analysis, it is tested that the "inverted U" relationship between the ratio of government control right and corporate value.3. This research fills the vacancy of previous study on executives’ government background in SOEs. Based on Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007), this research further discusses why corporate executives with governmental experience have negative effect on firm value and the difference of different government control.更多还原