【作者】 卞琳琳；

【导师】 王怀明；

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2009， 博士

【副题名】基于中国上市公司的实证研究

【摘要】 二十世纪九十年代初中国政府开放股市以来,短短十余年时间,中国股市发展迅速,取得了举世瞩目的成就。然而,因为脱胎于传统体制,产生于经济转轨时期,中国上市公司身上留下了深刻的时代烙印,一些深层次问题和结构性矛盾,也制约了上市公司竞争力的提高。随着入世过渡期的结束,中国市场将以更快的速度面向国际开放,中国的上市公司将面临更大的竞争压力,中国企业如何提升自身的竞争能力,进一步开拓国内外市场,已是其需要解决的紧迫问题,很有研究的必要。而公司治理作为现代企业制度的一项重要内容,是协调企业中相关要素所有者和其他利益相关者相互之间关系的契约的总和,它的完善不仅有助于吸收高质量的经济资源,而且有利于引导这些资源向最优方向配置,从短期来看有助于提高企业盈利能力,长期来看,无疑有助于提升企业的竞争力。但是,纵观国内现有的文献,从改善公司治理角度研究如何提高企业竞争力的研究还比较少。本文试图做出这方面的努力,旨在弥补这一研究领域的不足。为此,本文以公司治理与竞争力领域内相关的文献资料为先导,以计量经济学理论为指导,坚持实证分析与规范分析相结合、定性分析与定量分析相结合、理论与实践相结合、综合分析与逻辑分析相结合的综合方法,以2004-2006年中国沪深两市1015家上市公司为研究样本,对这一问题进行了深入研究。全文共分八章：第一章为导论,主要介绍了选题的背景、意义和研究目标,对国内外有关研究进行了概括性的介绍,提出了研究的问题、内容和技术路线。第二章为公司治理与竞争力关系的理论分析。首先介绍了竞争力和公司治理的基本概念、内涵和基本研究理论,然后从股权结构、董事会特征、高管激励三个方面,全面、系统地分析了公司内部治理结构与竞争力的关系,为下文进一步的研究打下了理论基础。第三章首先介绍了一些主要的竞争力评价方法,然后在总结前人的基础上,根据目标性、科学性、可比性、可行性、适量性五个原则,提出了具有较强操作性的竞争力评价体系,从规模、增长、效率三个方面,选择了九个指标对企业竞争力进行评价。本文的全部指标均可从上市公司年报中获得,力图使更多的人能够在花费较少精力的前提下,对中国上市公司竞争力做出一个正确的判断。运用第三章提出的评价体系,本文在第四章中对2004-2006年度中国1015家上市公司竞争力情况进行了评分。评分之前,本文首先将这1015家上市公司的每一指标用标准离差法进行了分行业标准化处理,由此得出的各指标的标准值均带有了行业信息,即都是经过行业平均值调整后的数值,反映了企业相对竞争优势的强弱,因此,将所有企业的竞争力标准值直接进行排序具有科学的比较意义。总体来看,2004-2006年度,1015家上市公司多数评价指标呈上升趋势,企业竞争力逐渐上升；具体数值上,三年竞争力平均得分名列前茅的行业是房地产业、信息技术业和石油化学塑胶塑料制造业,排在最末位的是批发和零售贸易业；从地区视角来看,竞争力比较强的省、直辖市、自治区是山东、北京、云南和江苏等,比较弱的则是西藏、宁夏、青海,和陕西等。从第五章到第七章是计量分析部分,也是本文的核心章节。第五章主要从股权集中度、股权性质、股权流通性三个方面,探讨了上市公司股权结构与竞争力的关系。实证结果表明,在现阶段的中国,适度的股权集中是必要的,盲目地追求股权分散并不适合中国的国情。但是,股权的过度集中会导致大股东对中小股东利益的侵害以及公司治理的过度强化,中国上市公司离不开适度的股权制衡。今后,中国上市公司应继续保持适当的股权集中度,不能因目前上市公司出现的大股东不规范甚至恶意行为而因噎废食,矫枉过正,简单而人为地强制股权分散；国有股对中国上市公司竞争力的影响是非线性的,国有股比例独大或独小并没有对公司竞争力产生不利影响,相反,适度混合的股权结构对公司竞争力是最不利的。因此,在现阶段中国的现实国情下,没有必要盲目地推进国有企业民营化,一拥而上地变国有控股企业为混合所有制企业,而应冷静持有国有股,等待市场时机的成熟。在我国目前既缺乏法律保护,又不能很快出现私人大股东的情况下,国有股权带来的政府监督是改善公司治理结构、对管理人员进行有效制约的次优选择；股权的流通与否并未对中国上市公司竞争力产生显著影响,这和流通股比例较低、流通股股东构成,以及流通股股东的持股目的有着密切的关系。在中国,上市公司的流通股比例过低问题已经导致了证券市场的功能畸形,集中反映在股价不能充分反映上市公司竞争力。从长远看,应逐步提高流通股比例,有步骤地减少上市公司非流通股比例,最终使得所有的股权都能够流通,最大限度地发挥流通股对促进企业竞争力提升的积极作用。第六章从董事长与总经理的两职设置、独立董事制度、董事会规模和董事会会议频率四个方面,探讨了上市公司董事会特征与竞争力的关系。实证结果表明,在我国股东大会已蜕变为“大股东会”,监事会形同虚设的情况下,董事长和总经理的两职分任尤为重要。今后,我们应该继续响应党的十五届四中全会的号召,在中国上市公司中进一步推进两职分离工作；管理层引进独立董事制度尽管具有良好的意图,但其效果在短时期内显然尚未体现,这和我国的独立董事制度的不完善有相当大的关系。今后,我们应该从确保独立董事的“独立性”、确保独立董事具备相应的任职能力、确保独立董事具备相应的权力三个方面着手,逐步完善我国的独立董事制度；对一个特定的企业来说,应该存在一个最优的董事会规模,在这个最优规模尚未达到之前,公司竞争力和董事会规模显著正相关,在董事会规模超过这一规模之后,公司竞争力会随着董事会规模的增加而逐渐下降。对于中国上市公司而言,应该谨慎选择这个规模,以使其竞争力最大化；在上市公司正常的经营过程中,董事会召开的次数往往较少,而当公司经营出现问题、竞争力下降时,董事会的活动往往会忽然频繁,以对公司生产经营中的重大问题进行决策,高频率的董事会会议因此成为了公司竞争力下降的迹象之一。为了改进董事会会议,充分发挥其作用,公司应提前向董事呈报有关的常规资料和对关键问题的分析,以便董事为会议做好准备,在董事会会议上,大部分时间应该主要集中在新的决策、战略和政策的讨论上,而不仅仅是考核历史业绩。除了管理层的发言外,应该有足够的时间进行深入讨论。另外,从国外经验来看,在董事会下设立常设委员会不失为一个明智之举,它们可以有效的促进董事会行为的规范化和决策的科学化,提高董事会治理水平,从而促进企业竞争力的提高。第七章主要从高管薪酬、高管持股比例两个方面,探讨了上市公司高管激励与竞争力的关系。实证结果表明,中国上市公司竞争力和其高管薪酬之间,确实存在着显著的正向联系,上市公司应当充分发挥薪酬激励的正面影响,以努力提高其竞争力。这就需要中国上市公司在今后的工作中,进一步完善公司和经理的报酬-绩效契约。我们认为,本文所提出的竞争力评价体系,可以作为衡量企业表现的依据；由于现阶段经营者防御效应在中国并未体现,发生作用的主要是利益一致性效应,所以上市公司应充分重视股权激励在管理层报酬结构中的积极作用,合理有效地进一步提高管理层人员的激励性持股比例。为此,我们应该加强立法、完善法规,同时加强对股权激励股份的管理。第八章在全文理论分析和实证检验的基础上,对全文内容进行了总结,从改善公司内部治理的角度,提出了提升中国上市公司竞争力的政策建议。文章的最后,还对未来的研究方向进行了展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 China’s stock market has made remarkable achievements since last century Chinese government opened it. But, Chinese listed companies still have deep problems and structural contradictions in a transitional economy. With the ending of WTO transitional period, Chinese listed companies will face great market competence. It is important to research about how to improve listed company’s competitiveness and extend their market.And as a part of modern enterprise system, corporate governance plays an important role in coordinating the interests of parties from internal and external. It will help improving the absorption of high-quality economic resources, and guiding them to the optimal configuration. So there is no doubt that corporate governance can not only help to improve the profitability in the short term, but also enhance the competitiveness in the long term. However, we found little about this by literature review. This paper attempts to make efforts in this regard to fill the gap.On the base of former thesis on corporate governance and competitiveness, this paper follows the route of economics methodology, using econometric analysis chiefly, and combined with empirical and normative analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis, theory and practice analysis, comprehensive and logical analysis. The research sample is 1015 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, using their data during 2004-2006. Full text is divided into eight chapters:Chapters 1 is the Introduction, which introduces the background and significance of the topic, then makes a general literature review, and sets up research objectives, content and technical route.Chapter 2 is the theoretical analysis of corporate governance and competitiveness, which first introduces the basic notion, then illustrate their relationship from shareholder structure, Board characteristics, and incentive to executives, building a basis for further research.Chapter 3 introduces some of the major competitiveness evaluation methods and put forward a reasonable competitiveness evaluation system. The system selects nine indicators to evaluate enterprises competitiveness from three aspects:size, growth, and efficiency. In this paper, all the nine indicators are available from annual reports of listed companies. By doing so, the paper is trying to make more people be able to use this system.The paper evaluates above 1015 Chinese listed companies during 2004-2006 in chapter 4, using our system. To do this, the paper uses standard deviation method to standardize each indicator according to the company’s sub-industry, thus the resulting indicators have industry information, which reflect relative competitive advantage in one’s industry, so the paper can use these standard values for direct comparison. As a whole, during 2004-2006, major evaluation indicators are rising, the listed companies’competitiveness is gradually increasing. In details, seen from three-year average score, the highest competitiveness industries are real estate, information technology, petrochemical and plastics manufacturing, and the lowest is the wholesale and retail trade industry; Seen from regional perspective, the strongest provinces are Shandong, Beijing, Yunnan and Jiangsu, and the weakest are Tibet, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Shaanxi.From Chapter 5 to Chapter 7, the paper uses econometric analysis, and they are core chapters in this article.In chapter 5, the paper mainly discusses the relationship between shareholder structure and competitiveness from three aspects as follows:equity concentration, the nature of equity, and equity liquidity. The empirical results show that firstly, on equity concentration, at this stage of China, a modest equity concentration is necessary, the blind pursuit of equity decentralization is not suitable for Chinese national conditions. Secondly, on the nature of equity, the state-controlled ownership has a obvious non-linear effects on competitiveness, which indicates that it is too early to reduce the proportion of state-owned shares. Thirdly, on liquidity, there is no obvious relationship between the proportion of tradable shares and competitiveness, which may be the result of lowest tradable shares and the constitution of shareholders, as well as the purposes shareholders holding them. In China, low tradable shares have led to functional abnormalities, focusing on the phenomenon that the share price does not fully reflect the competitiveness of listed companies. In the long term, we should gradually improve the ratio of tradable shares, reduce the proportion of non-tradable shares step by step, and ultimately makes all of them tradable.In chapter 6, the paper mainly discusses the relationship between Board characteristics and competitiveness from four aspects as follows:the combination or separation of chairman and CEO, the independent director system, the size of Board, and the frequency of Board meeting. Empirical results show that firstly, compared to combination, separation of chairman and CEO is better for our country, we should keep on promoting it. Secondly, Though has good intentions, independent director system does not have immediate efficiency, which maybe the result of our imperfect system. In the future, it is good to gradually improve China’s independent director system by ensuring their independence, their ability, and their corresponding power. Thirdly, for a specific enterprise, there exists an optimal size, before it, the size of Board and the company’s competitiveness have a positive correlation; after that, they have a negative one. For a Chinese listed company, it should be careful to select this scale, in order to maximize their competitiveness. Fourthly, too frequent board meetings maybe a signal of lower competitiveness. To improve the efficiency of Board meeting, the company should notify directors the conventional information and analysis on key issues in advance, so that directors can prepare for the meeting. And the discussion of the meeting should be concentrated in new decision, strategy and policy, not just the history of performance appraisal. At the same time, apart from listening to management speech, enough time should be used to in-depth discussion. In addition, experience from abroad tells us that it is a wise move to set up Standing Committees under the Board, they can effectively promote the standardization of board activities, and improve the level of Board governance, thus contributing to enhancing enterprise competitiveness.In chapter 7, the paper mainly discusses the relationship between incentive to executives and competitiveness from two aspects as follows:salaries to executives and the share proportion executives holding. Empirical results show that firstly, there truly exists significant positive link between salaries to executives and competitiveness of China’s listed companies, listed companies should give full play to the positive effects in an effort to improve their competitiveness. To do so, listed companies should further improve their compensation-performance contract to managers. We think our competitiveness evaluation system can be used as a basis for measuring corporate performance. Secondly, on the share proportion executives holding, the Defensive Effect does not function at this stage of China, which plays a main role is the Consistency Effect. Therefore, listed companies should pay full attention to the management equity incentive compensation, and try to find a rational and effective way to improve it. It is necessary to strengthen legislation, improve laws and regulations, and strengthen the management to equity incentive shares.In chapter 8, based on the theoretical analysis and empirical testing, the paper summarized the whole text, and put forward some policy recommendations on enhancing competitiveness by improving internal governance. Finally, the paper looks forward for the future research.更多还原