基于公司治理的R&D投入与企业绩效关系研究

【作者】 任海云；

【导师】 师萍；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 企业层面的R&D活动越来越重要,从R&D经费规模上看,我国企业己成为R&D活动的主体,具备了发达国家相似的特征,但从企业构成来看,外资企业R&D经费偏高,内资企业R&D投资还严重不足。R&D活动的特质(高风险性、收益跨期性、严重信息不对称性)使得委托代理问题尤其严重,这可能制约着投入水平和执行效果,良好的公司治理机制可以降低信息不对称性,有效解决代理问题,因此,本文从公司治理视角研究企业R&D投入及其绩效的制约因素,具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文的主要工作是：在现有关于公司治理对R&D投入的影响、R&D投入与企业绩效的关系以及公司治理对R&D投入与绩效关系影响效应研究综述的基础上,提出本文研究的重点；基于委托代理理论,对R&D活动中的委托代理问题、公司治理对R&D投入的影响以及公司治理对R&D投入与绩效关系的调节效应进行了理论分析,并且提出研究假设：最后,采集中国制造业上市公司数据,实证检验了假设,根据检验结果得出本文的研究结论并提出相应的政策建议。实证研究中主要采用了描述性统计分析、单变量T检验、多变量回归分析,利用层次回归方法和分组分析方法,充分识别了公司治理变量的各种调节效应。本文的主要创新点可以归纳为以下几点：第一,借鉴国外关于公司治理对R&D投入与绩效关系调节效应的研究,实证研究了公司治理对中国企业R&D投入与绩效关系的调节效应。结果表明：国有控股,领导权结构是纯调节变量,非机构企业法人大股东是半调节变量,改变R&D投入与绩效关系的方向或形式,起一种直接调节作用；董事会会议强度、经理层持股、董事会持股是同质调节变量,改变R&D投入与绩效关系的强度,起一种间接调节作用；机构投资大股东、个人大股东、董事会规模、战略委员会、独立董事对二者关系没有调节作用。第二,对我国机构投资者在R&D活动中的作用进行了全面分析和验证。结果表明,我国机构投资者已经不符合短视投资者假设,机构投资者利用专业优势,全面评价企业信息,选择发展潜力比较大、创新能力比较强的企业投资,我国机构投资者符合高级投资者假定。第三,在检验公司治理对R&D投入与绩效关系调节效应的过程中,不仅验证了董事会和大股东的调节效应,而且验证了经理层股权激励的调节效应。实证结果显示,独立董事和机构投资者对我国R&D投入与绩效的关系都没有调节作用，经理层股权激励对R&D投入与企业绩效关系有正向调节作用,这在一定程度上说明R&D活动严重的信息不对称性和高度的专业性使得对其监督的难度比较大,通过给经理人一定的股权,使他们成为股东,用激励机制解决R&D活动中的代理问题可能效果更好。通过本文的研究为优化我国上市公司的治理结构,提高企业R&D投入及其利用效果,增强企业自主创新能力,最终提升企业绩效提供一定的理论指导和实证经验。更多还原

【Abstract】 Corporate R&D activities have been increasingly important and firms in our country have become the main funding body of R&D, which is similar to developed country. However, the structure is not proper that foreign enterprises’R&D funds are too high while domestic enterprises’R&D funds are seriously inadequate. The nature of R&D activities (high-risk, trans-period income, serious information asymmetry) makes agency problem particularly serious, which will directly affect R&D investment level and outputs. Appropriate corporate governance mechanisms can reduce information asymmetry, so as to solve agent problem. Consequently, the study researched the restrictive factors of R&D input and output from the perspective of corporate governance.At first, the paper reviewed the documents of the effect of corporate government on R&D input, the relationship between R&D input and firm performance and the moderating effect of corporate government on the relationship between R&D input and firm performance. Then, the paper put forward to hypothesis based on analyzing the agent problem of R&D activity, the relationship between corporate government and R&D input and the moderating effect of corporate government on the R&D input-firm performance relation. Finally, the paper examined the hypothesis using Chinese listed manufacturing firm’s data and proposed policy suggestions. In empirical study, descriptive statistical analysis, independent-samples t-test and multivariate regression analysis were used. This paper identified all kinds of moderating variables by hierarchical regression and subgroup analysis. The main contributions of the study are as follows:Firstly, using foreign study experience of corporate government’s moderating effect on R&D input-firm performance relation for reference, the paper studied corporate government’s moderating effect on the relationship between Chinese enterprise R&D input and performance. Results show that:state holding and leadership structure are pure moderator and non-institutional corporate shareholder is quasi moderator, which moderate the direction and form of the relationship between R&D investment and firm performance and play a direct role; Board meetings, managerial ownership and board ownership are homogeneous moderator which change the strength of R&D-firm performance relation and play a indirect role. while institutional block holder, individual block holder, board size, strategic committee and independent directors have no moderate effect on the relationship.Secondly, this paper comprehensively examined Chinese institutional investors’role in R&D activities. The results show that institutional investors no longer accord with myopic investors hypothesis and with professional advantage and scale effect, they evaluate firms synthetically and invest to firms with large development potential and strong innovation capacity. So Chinese institutional investor is in accord with superior investor hypothesis.Thirdly, this study not only examined the moderating effect of board and block holder but also examined the moderating of executive’s equity incentive. The empirical results indicate that independent directors and institutional investors have no moderating effect on the relation, while managerial equity incentive moderates R&D spending-performance relationship positively. We can draw the conclusion that it is very difficult to supervise R&D activities due to its serious information asymmetry and high degree of professionalism and incentive mechanisms that is to give managers a certain degree of equity may be better to solve the agent problem.This study provides some theoretical guidance and empirical experience to optimize the governance structure of China’s listed companies, to improve corporate R&D investment and its outputs, to enhance firm’s independent innovation capability, and to promote company performance eventually.更多还原