【作者】 钟哲辉；

【导师】 张殿业；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 资源优化管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 供应链信息共享在相当程度上是一种思想和理念,既可以应用于职能操作层面,也可以运用于供应链资源整合与优化层面,成为供应链资源共享与资源整合的核心要素之一。如果再往上升的话,供应链信息共享应该是思辨层次的,首先,物流信息是供应链的一种重要资源,这种资源由于其稀缺性、公共性以及再创造性而具有超大升值潜力,而成为企业争夺的制高点；其次,由于供应链相关节点企业的信息共享能力的差异,导致资源的极度浪费和供应链服务的贬值,由此形成“两难”困境。论文分别从供应链信息共享的概念入手,探讨供应链交易信息共享、管理控制信息共享、决策分析信息共享和战略计划信息共享等功能层次与水平。从横向方向上看,信息共享的内容与物流职能活动关系密切,它们之间分别通过数据交换、共享信息查询、共享服务等方式进行共享,由此形成点对点直接共享、基于Internet互联共享和集成管理等供应链信息共享模式。在此基础上,本论文通过一个生产商和一个经销商组成的供应链,经过分析生产商和经销商在进行信息共享和信息不共享时的价格策略、利润对比,探讨供应链信息共享行为。这样,供应链成员中无论生产商还是经销商,可以将行为分析结果作为进行信息共享和供应链运作、管理的决策依据。接着,论文构建一个包含m生产商(上游)和n经销商(下游)的二阶供应链。利用三阶段博弈模型分析信息共享对生产商、经销商、供应链总利润和供应链社会福利的影响情况。在不考虑信息共享扩大供应链市场需求的情况下,进行信息共享过程中,生产商往往利用经销商提供的共享信息进行经济寻租、信息寻租,通过批发价格策略追求自身利益最大化,使经销商的利润受到损害,而经销商则表现出并不积极地参与信息共享。但是,如果经销商与生产进行充分信息共享,必然形成一个垄断集团,控制供应链中的批发价格和销售价格,在供应链下游市场需求变动不太明显的情况下,供应链的利润明显增加,但以牺牲用户的社会福利为代价。为了进一步分析供应链信息共享,论文将生产商与经销商追求利益最大化目标与用户需求均衡的相互作用表述为一个双层规划问题,其中,上层规划为生产商与经销商的经销价格优化模型,下层为用户购买与需求均衡模型,反映供应链需求对上层定价的响应行为,包括生产商与经销商选择、购买方式选择以及信息共享方式选择等。同时,文章设计了灵敏度分析算法和迭代方法求解该双层规划问题。算例分析表明,不同信息共享机制将导致不同的供应链利润、社会福利和市场需求分布,从而产生不同的增值效应。综上所述,在包含生产商和经销商的二阶供应链中,经销商往往不会主动与生产商进行信息共享,而生产商却有进行信息共享的积极性。因此,生产商如果按照一定的共享信息补偿策略对经销商进行补偿,可以激励经销商参与信息共享。但是,就生产商而言,并不是给每个经销商和每条共享信息进行补偿,对经销商的共享信息补偿往往是有针对性的。而生产商对经销商进行的共享信息补偿只是作为激励经销商参与信息共享的一种手段,通过补偿之后所进行的信息共享能够在一定程度上增加供应链的利润。由此,供应链信息共享可以在一定程度上得到实现,并具有一定理论意义和实践意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 Information-sharing in supply chain, to a certain extent, is a kind of ideal and concepts that can be applied both in the operational level of function and the integration and optimization of resources in supply chain. Therefore, what is one of the core elements for resources integration and resources sharing in supply chain, and information sharing in supply chain should be raised to thought-level if that applied to further increased. First of all, the logistics information is an important resource in supply chain will become the commanding heights for enterprises which attributes to its scarcity, the public, as well as re-creative and a super-high appreciation potential. But which forms the dilemma because of the difference of information sharing capabilities between the supply chain-related enterprises and logistics node whch leads to the extreme waste of resources for logistics or depreciation of supply chain services.This Paper explores information-sharing level and the level of functionality which includes the trade information sharing of supply chain, management and control information sharing, decision analysis and strategic plan for information-sharing and so on from the concept of information-sharing in supply chain. On horizontal direction from the point of view, the content of information-sharing activities and logistics functions are closely related through data exchange, sharing information retrieval, shared services approach etc., That forms information-sharing model for supply chain which includes directed peer-to-peer sharing, Internet-based Internet sharing and integrated supply chain management.On this basis, this paper explores the supply chain information-sharing behavior through analysing pricing strategies and compared profits either ihformation sharing or not to do so by constructing a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. In this way, regardless of manufacturer or retailer in supply chain can act the results of information sharing as the decision-making basis for operations and management supply chain.Then, this paper constructs a second-order supply chain that contains m manufacturers (upstream) and n retailers (downstream), and probes the impact of manufacturers, retailers, total profit and the social welfare in supply chain by the use of three-stage game model of information sharing. Manufacturers, in the process of information sharing, often advances economic rent-seeking, information seeking through using shared information what provided by retailers, and pursues to maximize their own interests through the wholesale pricing strategies, so that will damage to the profits of retailers. Therefore the retailers do not actively participate in information sharing, so do as manufacturers. However, they are bound to the formation of a monopoly to control the supply chain if the retailer and the manutacturer share information perfectly, such as wholesale prices and selling prices etc.. Therefore, the interests in supply chain will increase obviously and take the expense of the cost of social welfare if the market demand of downstream in the supply chain does not change significantly.In order to analysising the supply chain information sharing further, the article builds a bilevel programming problem which assumes that the interaction between manufacturers and retailers will be pursued to maximize the objectives and the user needs, which based on the dealer pricing problem in different information-sharing mechanisms and different the mode of purchase behavior of users to share logistics information. In the model, the upper Planning is the retail price optimization models for uppliers and retailers, the lower model is the equilibrium between purchase and demand for the user, which involves with the selection of manufacturers and retailers, the way to buy and the mode of information sharing of logistics that reflects the needs in supply chain that responds to the upper pricing behavior. The article designed sensitivity analysis algorithm and iterative method for solving the bilevel programming problem. In addition, examples analysis showed that the different information-sharing mechanism will lead to different supply chain profit, social welfare and the distribution of market demand, which results in different value-added effect.To sum up, the retailers, in the second-order supply chain that includes the manufacturers and dealers, often do not take the initiative and the sharing of information producers, and manufacturers have to carry out information-sharing initiative. Therefore, if the manufacturers share information in accordance with a certain degree of compensation strategies to compensate for the dealer, which can motivate dealers to participate in information sharing. However, the compensation of sharing information on the dealer is often targeted, and the manufacturer does not make up to each dealer or each shared information. In other word, the manufacturer takes compensation of shared information to the dealers only as a means of incentive for dealers to participate in information sharing, and which can increase profits in the supply chain to a certain extent.Thus, information-sharing in supply chain can be achieved to some extent, and has a certain theoretical and practical significance.更多还原