【作者】 黄卫挺；

【导师】 庞晓波；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 数量经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文针对跨期交换摩擦,重点研究了信用制度的作用及其生发机制。通过分析萨缪尔森代际交叠模型框架下跨期交换策略博弈,点破信用制度的核心职能,并挖掘了信用风险、契约不完全性、交易成本等概念的新内涵。借鉴格雷夫等人的比较历史制度分析,考察了从自然经济下家庭跨期资源配置的信用秩序到市场信用秩序的演进逻辑,以及跨期交换市场的信用制度形态及其对效率的影响。最终发现,由市场主体间博弈生发的信用制度不能实现资源跨期配置动态效率,必须依靠政府信用制度促成跨期资源配置的优化。这些尝试性研究是对相关学术争议所做的一种回应,也为深入研究跨期交换和信用制度演化提供了一个可参照的逻辑起点。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an exploratory study on the issues of credit institutions in the context of intertemporal exchange, this paper in-depth analysis of the nature of credit, credit risk, governance of credit risk and credit institutions in the perspective of intertemporal exchange. First, by re-definition of the core concept used in this paper, we pay our attention on the efficiency critique and organizational equilibrium concept of credit institutions. Then, "the credit institutions triangle" in modern economy is studied, and the efficiency of these institutions is discussed. The main framework of this paper is the overlapping generation model pioneered by Samuelson (1958, JPE). Chapters of this article read as follows:Some theoretical review and literature review is done in Chapter I. First of all, identified the crash of paradigm of classical economics and modern economics, we point out a need of paradigm change form spot exchange to the intertemporal exchange, compare analysis has been done. Based on the intertemporal exchange, this paper re-definited the cocept of credit, credit risk, intertemporal transaction costs, credit risk governance, and credit institutions. Illustrated by intergenerational exchange, a mankind’s oldest but most common intertemporal exchange, concepts involved are analyzed.Chapter II gives out a generalized theory of the credit institutions. Mainly discusses the efficient standards for the credit institutions creation, the generation, maintenance and change mechanisms of credit institutions, types of credit institutions exist in modern economy and it’s historical trajectory. A Logic framework for credit institutions study is given out in the end. Chapter II also discussed the family credit institutions from the perspective of altruism.Chapter III analyses the efficient of the family credit institutions. The following three questions are discussed: First, the ethics of family credit institutions of, family as a credit system, and the constitution theory of family, which is a different from the triggering mechanism proposed in the second chapter. Second, we extensively studied the efficiency of family credit institutions, and the conditions for optimal dynamic efficiency are discussed. Third, a comparative analysis is carried oyut on the difference of family credit institutions between European countries and Asian countries, these differences are made the reasons for the different development path.Chapter IV is devoted to the study of market credit institutions. In the context of mass market, replacement of credit risk and intertemporal transaction costs is feasible. By doing this replacement, we discussed how monetary and financial institutions eliminated the credit risk and reduced the intertemporal transaction costs. In the monetary institutions sector, we comparing analyzed the non-monetary economy and monetary economy and conclude the conditions for the monetary equilibrium. Considering the specification and labor division, a model of OLG with search is employed. In the analyses of financial institutions, moral hazard of enterprisers and and the coalition arrangement of depositors is discussed and incentive compatible financial institution designing is discussed too.Chapter V discusses the government credit institutions design. Main task of this chapter is identifying the legitimacy and efficiency of government credit institutions, and the political process behind the government credit institutions. Representation of public finance, we discussed how the credit structure is changed by the introducing of public finance, and discussed the inefficient of market credit institutions in the decentralized economic equilibrium; we showed that by introducing of public finance, efficient is improved. Finally, the political process, or the public finance game of different generations is discussed.Chapter VI is a discussion of this paper based on the above studies. Based on the previous chapters, combinational logic credit institutions in the modern credit economy, the foundation of economic operation is discussed; a informational theory of credit, money is proposed. Thinking in reality, we focus on China’s credit institutions construction, a preliminary exposition of intergenerational credit risk in contemporary Chinese is given, and a policy proposal is discussed.According to the contents of the six chapters, the main conclusions obtained in this study First, exchange is the basic unit of economic studies, the principal mode of exchange is intertemporal exchange, only within the framework of intertemporal exchange, there exists the fundamental problem of exchange. Focus on The process study of intertemporal exchange, can we found the intertemporal transaction costs, and definite a unified concept of "credit": credit is an incomplete contract to complete the intertemporal exchange, the game played here is a prisoner’s dilemma type game. Both Credit risk and intertemporal transaction costs are resulted from the incomplete of credit contract. In the context of intergenerational exchange, this incomplete is the enforcement risk of credit contract, which is the moral hazard in modern contract theory. Starting from the structure of the credit game, there are two mechanisms for governing credit risk, one is to change the payoff structure and another is to change the game itself, credit institutions governance credit risk in both ways.Second, the creation of credit institutions is to improve the intertemporal efficiency of resource allocation, the formation and maintenance of the credit institutions is an organizational equilibrium. Relative to the jungle, the introduction of credit institutions improved both the individual and social welfare. In the two periods overlapping generation model, we studied the full efficient credit institutions, which is called the golden rule of credit institutions. The paper concludes two conditions for the maintenance of the credit institutions, which are individual motivation condition and "non-restart condition", these two conditions, determined the intergenerational organizational equilibrium. Therefore, we concluded that the realized credit institutions in modern economy are all the organizational equilibrium. Concrete analysis of Credit institutions in different types shows special trigger strategies in the repeated overlapping game, evolutionary game can achieve the organizational equilibrium with high social payoff. From the dynamic point, this article summarizes the changes of credit institutions, "the credit institutions / credit institutions change - credit risk / intertemporal transactional cost - efficiency of intertemporal resource allocation" forms the logic of endogenous institutions changes.Third, the family credit institution is the only mechanism to governing the intergenerational exchange in the natural economy. Studying a simple family intergenerational exchange model, the paper shows the family as a credit system, and there exist a constitutional theory of family. Analysis of The efficiency of family credit institution shows, in the natural economy, the existence of moral form family credit institutions makes it possible to allocated intergenerational resource, but the efficiency of resource allocation is not dynamic efficient. According to the conclusion, the paper explains why the path of western and eastern is departing during the industrial revolution period, because there is a huge difference in family credit institutions in western and eastern. The family credit institution in China, which is prevail in eastern asian has contribute to the high performance of China’s economy in the history, however, it becomes a bottle net for the China’s economic development in modern times.Fourth, in the mass market, by replacing the credit risk and intertemporal transaction costs, we concluded that market credit institutions can save intertemporal transaction costs and therefore avoidance of credit risk. Money and financial institutions, are the main market credit institutions In the presence of intertemporal transaction costs, this study shows that the introduction of money can save transaction costs, when the money price to meet specific range, there is a purely monetary equilibrium. An OLG model with search is also studied, and we show that money can save the search costs, and also we show money is a value storage. In addition, by reseting the trade volume of intertemporal exchange, the paper pointed out that the financial institutions have the same function as money in governing the moral hazard. The maintenance of financial institutions is also studied, and a audit technology is employed to form a trigger strategies, which lead to the organizational equilibrium.Fifth, the introduction of government credit institutions is to fixed the dynamic inefficient of family credit institutions and market credit institutions. Realistic study showed that the decline of the family is high correlated to the introduction of the government credit institutions; the introduction of public finance can change the individuals’credit structure of intertemporal exchange, which then changes from horizontal to vertical structure. The classical two and three-stage OLG model shows the dynamic inefficiencies, which calls for the introducing of government credit institutions, the three-stage model also shows that public education and public pension is essential to the government credit institutions. In the political analyze of Government credit institutions, we show that the interest group game played by different generations may lead to a distortion of public finance.Based on the above conclusions, the paper concludes that the family credit institutions and market credit institutions is two functional complementary institutions and the government credit institutions is a efficient improve complementary institution to both family and market credit institutions.更多还原