【作者】 郭晨星；

【导师】 郇庆治； Müller-Rommel；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 国际政治， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 全球性环境问题不像主权国家那样具有不可逾越的政治或民族的边界特征,因而旨在应对全球环境问题的全球环境治理就从根本上挑战着威斯特伐利亚体系建立以来的国际无政府状态。从这个意义上来说,正确应对当今全球环境问题主要是国际政治层面的问题,而非单纯是经济、技术和观念问题。20世纪30年代到60年代,工业化导致的环境污染在短时间内造成了大量人群的致病与死亡,震惊世界的环境污染事件频繁发生,其中最具代表性的是所谓的“八大公害”事件。为了应对此类生态环境恶性事件,西方欧美国家率先在国内建立了全国环保部门,不久,以联合国人类环境大会为标志,国际社会开始联合应对这一“人类生存危机”。尽管如此,工业化进程带来的环境污染并没有因为这些努力而停止,相反,生态环境恶化逐渐呈现出一种全球化的日益扩展趋势。全球环境治理,既是国际社会对日益严重的全球环境问题积极应对的一种实践概括,也是进一步开展理论分析的核心概念。在这一基本分析框架中,笔者不仅涵指包括主权国家、政府间组织、非政府组织的多层面立体主体架构,还将其视为多元主体在全球环境治理领域中的合作型博弈进程。也就是说,在这场合作型博弈中,不仅主权国家成为全球环境治理中的一员,而且政府间组织、非政府组织等新兴的国际关系行为体也成为全球环境治理中的重要力量。基于这种认识,本文的目标是对这样一种理想架构的现实发展状况及其面临问题进行研究,并且建构一个主体视角下的全球环境治理结构模型。全球环境治理主体模型的建构,不仅有利于从理论层面解读多元主体在该领域共同作用的复杂结构性特征,而且也有利于从实践层面验证这场特殊的合作型博弈所必需的条件是否已经具备。相应地,本文分为模型建构、经验验证和结论三部分。其中,模型建构部分包括第一章和第二章。在第一章中,笔者首先从治理主体的视角对国际关系各主要理论流派进行综述和分析,并将这些理论流派的“全球治理结构”观点以几何图形方式直观地做了表述。然后对有代表性的全球治理结构模型做了批判性分析。紧接着在第二章中,笔者指出生态环境本身具备的全球性、渗透性、非对抗性、非排他性和外部性的特性决定了全球环境治理是由多元治理主体共同参与的合作型博弈。在此基础上,笔者定性而非定量地将全球环境多元治理主体间关系静态地建构为一种“立体多面体”结构。从合作型博弈的必要条件入手,笔者将本文的研究重点确定为：多元治理主体间的互动机制和资金供给是“立体多面体”结构得以良性运行的保障性因素。本文的理论假设是：在多元治理主体互动机制运转良好并且具备足够资金支持的情况下,全球环境治理的“立体多面体”模型才能够实现良性运转。此外,笔者以两个必要条件具备与否为标准,推导出全球环境治理可能出现的四种情形。本文的第三章与第四章是对分析模型两个侧面的经验验证。在第三章中,笔者首先验证了在全球环境治理互动机制中多元治理主体间的静态“立体多面体”结构已经形成,然后以1972年联合国人类环境会议、1992年联合国环境与发展大会和2002年可持续发展世界首脑会议为例对互动机制要素进行了分析。通过对议题的设置、主导的话语、主体间博弈和达成的共识四个方面的分析,笔者判定合作型博弈中的互动机制已经具备。在第四章中,笔者通过对全球环境基金机制的资金供给总量、资金供给的程序与原则、资金供给的领域与分布情况三个方面的分析,详细验证了全球环境治理的资金供给因素。在多元治理主体共同参与的合作性博弈中,已经形成了一种固定的资金供给渠道,而且运作良好,当然,它至今不能承担充足的职能。在结论部分,首先笔者在前两章对互动机制和资金供给两个必要条件分析的基础上,将现阶段的全球环境治理归纳为“治理主体间存在合作,但缺少实现合作目标的能力”,也就是与理论假设推论的第二种情形一致,即“有心无力的治理”模式。然后,笔者使用“立体多面体”分析模型对刚刚举行的哥本哈根世界气候大会做了初步分析。分析表明,这次会议既证实了一种立体化合作机制的存在,也突显其在良性互动与资金供给方面的局限。笔者认为全球环境治理中的这个单次博弈为：在全球环境治理“立体多面体”模式基本具备的情况下,治理主体间互动性机制运行不畅,且缺少充足资金供给。也就是说,哥本哈根世界气候大会与理论假设推论中的第四种情形一致,也就是“名实不符的治理”模式。最后,笔者从一种现实的环境主义视角展望了后哥本哈根时代的全球环境治理趋势。一方面,笔者认为：全球环境治理的合作型博弈仍是主流方向,尽管大家对哥本哈根会议的结果都不满意,但终究还是会再次坐在一起找到一种替代方案。另一方面,笔者认为：由于发达国家与发展中国家对全球性环境问题认知感受的巨大差异等因素,人类对全球性环境问题的应对近期内可能更多呈现出国家间或区域性合作的特征,也就是“新国际主义”。也就是说,无论是国内层面还是国际层面,未来的全球环境治理将会更倾向于大国博弈和政府应对的局面。笔者承认政府以及政府间组织是解决全球环境问题的关键角色。因此,在可预见的未来,国家的中心地位会更加突出。此外,像欧盟、“10+3”、东北亚地区等区域性环境合作可能会更加受到国家的青睐。更多还原

【Abstract】 Global environmental issues do not have the limitation of insurmountably political or national boundaries like sovereign states. Thus, the global environmental governance (GEG), which tending to address global environmental issues, has challenged the state of anarchy since the building of Westphalia system. In this sense, the correct response to the current global environmental problems, are mainly referring to the international political issues rather than simple economic, technical or conceptual problems. From 1930s to 1960s, the environmental pollution which caused by industrialization had led to a great amount of death and disease in such a short time. The serious pollution accidents happened frequently to shock the world, and the most representative events among them are so called "Eight Social Effects of Pollution". In order to prevent such ecological vicious accidents, western countries are the first to establish the environmental protection department respectively. And then, be marked by The United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, the international community have begun a joint response to this "Crisis of human survival". Nevertheless, environmental pollution which brought by the process of industrialization, did not stop for these efforts. On the contrary, deterioration of the ecological environment has shown a gradual trend of ever-expanding globalization.GEG, is a practice summary of the positive response of international community to the increasingly serious global environmental problems, and also is the core concepts for further theoretical analysis. In this basic analytical framework, the author not only covers Multi-faceted three-dimensional structure of subjects which are involved Sovereign states, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, but also view it as cooperative game in the GEG In other words, besides the nation-states being significant actors in the GEG, the emerging actors of intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and other actors have also become the important force of GEG Based on this understanding, the thesis aimed to investigate an ideal framework for such developments and the realities of these problems. And then, from subjective perspective to construct the structural model in the GEG This model not only helps to interpret the complex structural features in such field, but also helps to verify necessary conditions in this Special cooperative Game. Correspondingly, the thesis is divided into three parts, namely, model construction, empirical demonstration, and conclusion. And the model construction consists of the chapter one and two. The chapter one summarize and analyze the main theoretical schools of international relation from the perspective of governance subject, and intuitionally express them with the creative geometry figure by the view of the global governance structure of different theoretical schools. On the other hand, the author has a critical reference to the previous governance structure model. In the chapter two, the author points out that the global, permeability, non-contest, non-exclusive and externalities’ nature of ecological environment, which determine GEG is a cooperative Game. Based on this understanding, the author qualitatively rather than quantitatively constructs the relationship among multiple subjects as a static three-dimensional polyhedron. Start with the necessary conditions of cooperative game, the author sets Research focus as:the interaction regimes of the multiple governance subjects and the fund support are supportive factors for the three-dimensional polyhedron model. And the theoretical assumption of this thesis is:only the interaction regimes of the multiple governance subjects run smoothly and the fund support is enough, the three-dimensional polyhedron model of GEG would have a good operation. Besides this, the author deduces four possible states of GEG, according to the two necessary conditions.The chapter three and four are the experience validation to the model. In chapter three, the author firstly verifies the static three-dimensional polyhedron structure has formed in the interaction regimes of GEG. Then, the author analyzes the interaction regimes, taking UNCHE, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) as the cases. By the analysis to the agenda setting, dominant discourse, inter-subjective game, and achieved consensus, the author affirms the condition of interaction regimes in the cooperative game operates well. In chapter four, take Global Environmental Facility (GEF) as an example, the author gives a detailed validation to the fund support of GEG in the three aspects, which are total amount, procedure and principle, field and distribution. In the cooperative game of multiple governance subjects, the fixed fund support channel was formed. But, it still cannot afford adequate functions.In the conclusion part, the author reduces the current GEG as "there is cooperation existing among the governance main bodies, but short of capability to realize the cooperation target", so-called "desirable governance without enough strength", which based on the two necessary-condition judgments of interaction mechanisms and fund support in the first two chapters. Then, the author analyzes Copenhagen Climate Change Conference with the structural model of "three-dimensional polyhedron". Analysis showed that this Conference did confirm a three-dimensional existence of cooperation mechanisms, but highlights constrains of interactive regime and fund support. In addition, the author defines this single game as:Although the GEG model of "three-dimensional polyhedron" is basically available, the interaction mechanisms among governance main bodies does not operate well and lacks of fund support. In other words, the Copenhagen Conference matches the fourth theoretical assumption, "the model unworthy of the title".At last, the author prospects the post-Copenhagen environmental governance from the realistic environmentalist’s perspective. On one hand, the author puts forwards that cooperative game is still the mainstream direction. Although we are not satisfied with the results of this conference, but in the end we will sit together again to find an alternative. On the other hand, the author reckons that the GEG will enter the era of "new inter-nationalism" in the foreseeable future, because of developed and developing countries experience significant differences on global environmental issues. In other words, no matter on the domestic level or international level, the GEG in the future tends to a situation of big powers game and governmental response. The author admits that the government and intergovernmental organizations are key roles to address the global environmental issues. As a result, the central position of nation-states will become more prominent. In addition, like the European Union, "ASEAN+3", Northeast Asia regional environmental cooperation and so on may be more favored by the nation-states.更多还原