转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的动力学分析

【作者】 姜国俊；

【导师】 竺乾威；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 行政管理， 2009， 博士

【副题名】目标、过程与执政逻辑

【摘要】 自1978年改革开放启动了中国全面而深刻的社会转型以来,中国的行政改革一直在持续而高调地进行。前后相继的大规模行政改革就有六次,行政改革在全方位改革格局中的地位也日益凸显并逐步跃升为“全面深化改革和提高对外开放水平的关键”。但是,在行政改革30余年取得不少积极进展的同时,学术界的一个基本共识是政府职能和行政行为的现实转变还仅仅是初步的、甚至在主要方面是相对滞后的,从应然的高标准来看,行政改革尚未取得根本的突破性进展,而只是取得了相对滞后的成果。引人深思的问题是,为什么1978年以来中国的行政改革成为了一个持续推动而又相对滞后的有限改革?这就直接涉及到行政改革的动力学问题,并由此成为本文研究的缘起和贯穿始终的一个中心问题。理解和把握转型期中国行政改革的动力学,离不开四个紧密关联的核心问题:谁改革?为何改革?如何改革?改革产生何种影响?分别涉及改革主体、改革动因、改革路径和改革效果四个方面,其中最首要的方面就是改革主体。只有牢牢把握改革主体的行为逻辑这条主线,才能清晰地解释行政改革的动力学。由此,本文将行政改革动力学分析的关键视角放到了作为当代中国唯一执政党的中国共产党的行为逻辑之上。新中国成立后到1978年改革开放前,在革命党的思维惯性牵引和以党建国的建政逻辑推动下,中国共产党逐步建立起党-国高度一体化的政治架构,而在1978年以后,中国共产党开始了党-国相对自主化的调适性改革过程,但党-国一体化的总体架构没有也不可能改变。转型期中国特定的政党-国家政治架构,决定了中国共产党唯一的执政党地位和全方位改革的主导者身份,也就决定了转型期中国行政改革鲜明的执政党主导特征,因此,本文将转型期中国共产党主导下的行政改革特指为政党主导型行政改革。中国共产党民主集中制的党内权力结构,决定了中央政治权威作为党的最高权力中心和最主要人格化代表,是政党主导型行政改革的最高决策者、总体设计者和主要推动者,充当了核心动力主体的角色;党的各级政党-政府官僚作为中央政治权威的政治代理人,是政党主导型行政改革的次级决策者、局部设计者和主要执行者,充当了执行动力主体的角色。同时,决策智囊与公共学者、人民群众分别在政党主导型行政改革中起着辅助动力主体、基础动力主体的作用。中国共产党作为一个特定的行为主体,其行为无疑有特定的目标函数和条件约束,只有从多元目标导引和多重条件约束的结合入手,才能完整深入地把握其推进行政改革的特定行为。党的中央政治权威居于党-国科层体制的顶端,其自身利益与党的利益和国家利益具有高度的共容性,党的目标函数和条件约束也主要通过中央政治权威的目标函数和条件约束体现出来。结合执政党的共性和中国共产党的个性,本文分析了中国共产党“长期执政”的中轴目标、“经济发展”的核心经济目标、“政治文明”的核心政治目标和“民族复兴”的核心国家目标,以及其行为的初始条件约束、知识约束、博弈约束和意识形态约束。由此,本文将转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的演进理解为中国共产党在特定约束条件下基于自身目标函数的渐进理性选择过程。在特定的约束条件下,中国共产党基于“经济发展”的核心经济目标选择和改革经济体制,基于“政治文明”的核心政治目标选择和改革政治体制,经济体制和政治体制的选择和改革同时又都会不断受到“民族复兴”的核心国家目标和“长期执政”的中轴目标的制约和校正。而中国共产党对经济体制和政治体制的选择和改革,共同决定了行政体制的选择和改革。沿着上述思路,本文着重论述了中国共产党1978年以后为实现经济发展的核心经济目标逐步启动和持续推动经济体制的市场化转轨和适应性行政改革的基本过程和内在逻辑,为实现政治文明的核心政治目标逐步启动和持续推动政治体制的民主化转型和先导性行政改革的基本过程和内在逻辑,并从党的中央政治权威、决策智囊与公共学者、人民群众和政党-政府官僚四个主要动力主体的“上下互动”视角,对适应性行政改革的动力机制和滞后根源、先导性行政改革的动力机制和推进梗阻进行了分析,实际上就是分别论述了转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的市场化动力学和民主化动力学。其中,适应性行政改革指称1978年以来中国共产党为适应市场化导向的经济体制改革的需要而对行政体制进行的具有“适应性”特征的改革,先导性行政改革指称1978以来中国共产党为带动政治体制的民主化转型并规避可能的政治风险而对行政体制进行的具有“先导性”价值的改革。本文这两个概念主要是基于动力学意义上的区分,而不是基于内容上的区分,因此,本文虽然对适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革在内容上也作了一个大致的区分,但这种内容区分只具有相对的意义,二者的具体内容不免存在相互交叉的部分。本文进而论述了中国共产党为实现民族复兴的国家目标而于1978年后逐步启动和不断扩大对外开放、日益主动融入全球化的基本过程和内在逻辑,指出中国共产党所主导的行政改革,无论是适应性行政改革还是先导性行政改革,总体上都具有应对全球化竞争压力的显著的“压力性”特征,由此可以称之为压力性行政改革,并从发达国家的政府、国际组织、跨国公司和文化学术交流者等国际行动者和党的中央政治权威、决策智囊与公共学者、人民群众和政党-政府官僚等国内行动者的“内外互动”视角,对压力性行政改革的动力机制进行了分析,实际上就是具体分析了转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的全球化动力学。压力性行政改革是本文为了便于表述全球化竞争的外部压力转化为中国政党主导型行政改革的内部动力而界定的一个概念,其与适应性行政改革、先导性行政改革的概念区分同样是动力学意义上的,若就内容而言,实际上涵盖了适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革的全部内容。本文进而论述了中国共产党为实现长期执政的中轴目标而着力于不断巩固和重构党的执政合法性基础的政治逻辑,指出行政改革是转型期中国共产党重构和巩固执政合法性基础的重要命题乃至关键环节之一,强调执政逻辑是转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的动力学主线。中国共产党“经济发展”的核心经济目标、“政治文明”的核心政治目标、“民族复兴”的核心国家目标和“长期执政”的中轴目标之间既存在一种相互支撑的耦合关系,又在一定程度上存在着相互矛盾的冲突关系,但从根本上说,其他目标统一于和服从于“长期执政”的中轴目标。与此相应,1978年以来中国共产党之所以持续推动市场化导向的经济体制改革、民主化导向的政治体制改革、全球化导向的对外开放和相应的行政改革,从根本上说,就是为了通过不断提高经济发展水平、政治文明水准和民族复兴的实现程度来不断巩固党的执政合法性基础,不断延续长期执政的政治地位。中国共产党谋求长期执政的政治逻辑,一方面提供了党推进行政改革的持续动力,另一方面又划定了党推进行政改革的基本限度。在上述论证的基础上,本文从宏观动因与具体行动者两个层面对转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的动力学图景进行了一个总结性的系统分析。一方面,市场化、民主化与全球化的三重变奏,集中地给中国共产党执掌下的政府自身从结构设置、职能履行和行为方式提出了变革的要求,可谓是转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的宏观动力学图景;另一方面,党的中央政治权威与其他国内行动者的“上下结合”互动以及国内行动者与国际行动者的“内外结合”互动,可谓构成了转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的微观动力学图景。贯穿宏观与微观之间的动力学主线,无疑是作为关键行动者和核心动力主体的中国共产党及其中央政治权威谋求长期执政的政治逻辑。转型期中国的政党主导型行政改革,首先是党的中央政治权威在多元目标导引特别是执政逻辑驱驰下,基于经济市场化、政治民主化和融入全球化的渐进理性设计而强力推动的一种“自上而下”的强制性制度变迁。但是,这种强制性制VII度变迁很大程度上只是反映了中央政治权威的主观愿望,至于制度变迁的客观结果,还取决于其他各方行动者基于自身的意愿和利益所采取的相应行动和由此发生的“自下而上”的诱致性制度变迁。同时,在对外开放和对内改革的连续性互动中,包括党的中央政治权威在内的国内各方行动者的行为逻辑不可避免地在很大程度上受到了各方国际行动者的推动和影响。转型期中国的政党主导型行政改革正是在这种市场化、民主化和全球化三元契合、国内外行动者“上下结合”与“内外结合”两相互动的过程中得以发生和演进的。需要强调的是,在对适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革的动力学分析中,本文实际上用很大的笔墨从各方具体行动者的视角,从认知、利益和体制三个层面分析了转型期中国政党主导型行政改革的滞后机理。关键的一个影响因素是,政党-政府官僚在转型期中国的政党主导型行政改革中扮演着执行动力主体和主要阻碍力量的双重角色。政党-政府官僚在行政改革的动力大系统中处于“上下夹击”的中间位置,在行政改革中所持的立场也是历史的和具体的,随官僚的类型或个体差异以及特定阶段行政改革的特定内容对于特定官僚利益的影响变化而变化。政党-政府官僚作为政治代理人,既具有与中央政治权威的部分共容性利益,也存在着其自身的局部利益和个人利益,而且随着官僚层级的降低,其自身利益与党的长期执政利益乃至国家全局利益之间的共容性利益也相应减少。特别是,随着行政改革的基本阶段从“放权让利”演进到“制度创新”,基本主题从结构调整演进到职能转变与行为规范,从总体上说,各级政党-政府官僚的既得不当权力日益受限、既得不当利益日益受损,其行政改革的阻碍角色日益凸显。现实政治实践中,既有不少政党-政府官僚基于民主集中制的权力结构规制、晋升锦标赛的政治激励机制、财政联邦化的经济激励机制和自身的责任感使命感,在一定范围内和一定程度上成为了适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革的重要推动力量,也有众多政党-政府官僚在经济利益驱动下和政治晋升博弈中采取了大量的与适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革方向相悖的机会主义行为,成为了行政改革的主要阻碍力量。为了不使行政改革停滞不前和流于形式进而影响到党的执政全局,党的中央政治权威在层级委任体制的总体框架内采取了多种手段,力图有效地激励和约束各级政党.政府官僚、确保行政改革的战略贯彻,其中政绩考核和权力监控是两个最基本的制度化手段。但是,由于现行政绩考核体制和权力监控体制“自上而下”运作的体制性困境,不仅政党-政府官僚追求政绩最大化的不少行为在相当程度上偏离了适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革的基本方向,而且官僚权力滥用和腐败现象的蔓延也未能得到根本性的遏制,因而政府职能的实质性转变仍然困难重重,适应性行政改革和先导性行政改革的实际成效仍然不容乐观。由此引申出作为本文结束语的政党主导型行政改革的“诺斯悖论”及其克服问题。本文的一个政治前提和研究假设是,党的中央政治权威本身是超越了统治者自利性的、以立党兴国和执政为民为己任的政治企业家,从而把“诺斯悖论”的克服问题简化为一个官僚控制的问题。从适应性行政改革的滞后根源和先导性行政改革的推进梗阻来看,如果缺乏横向层面的其他政治权力主体对政府官僚的有效控制,如果缺乏公民“自下而上”的对政府官僚的有效监督,单凭党的中央政治权威的“自上而下”的强力推动和单向监控,难以有效地激励和监控政党-政府官僚真实的行政行为,从而难以有效地推动中国行政组织体系即狭义政府从结构、职能到行为方式的实质性变革。因此,即便从官僚控制的简化视角来看,中国政党主导型行政改革的实质性推进到位,仍然有赖于中国共产党主导下的政治体制改革的进一步深化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the reform and opening-up in 1978 which launched the comprehensive and profound social transformation of China,the administrative reform of China has been continuously and piously implementing.There are six extensive administrative reforms successively,the status of administrative reform has been highlighted day by day among overall reform frameworks and has gradually become the "key for comprehensively in-depth reform and improving the level of opening-up to the outside".But when the administrative reform achieved many active achievements in recent 30 years,a basic consensus of academic circles is that actual transformations of government function and administrative behavior are only in preliminary stage,even the main aspects are backward,and the administrative reform has not obtained a fundamental breakthrough process from the perspective of due high standard and it only has obtained relatively limited achievement.A thought-provoking question is that why the administrative reform of China starting from 1978 becomes a limited reform which is constantly impelled? This directly involves the question on the dynamics of administrative reform which is the original reason for research in this article and a core theoretical proposition running throughout this article.With regard to understanding the dynamics of Chinese administrative reform during the transformation period,the following four core questions which are closely interrelated can not be divided:Who conducts the reform? Why the reform is conducted? How the reform is implemented? What kind of influence will be exerted by the reform? They separately involve the four aspects of main body of reform, motivation of reform,path of reform and effect of reform,among which the most important aspect is the main body of reform.Only when the action logic of main body of reform,as the main line,is firmly grasped,we can clearly explain the dynamics of administrative reform.Herefrom,this article puts the key angle of view on the dynamic analysis of administrative reform upon the action logic of CCP(Chinese Communist Party) which serves as the sole ruling party of contemporary China.From the foundation of new China to the reform and opening-up in 1978,under the traction of thinking inertia as a revolutionary party and with the impetus of political construction logic as establishing the country based on the party,the Chinese Communist Party has gradually established a political framework with a high integration of party and state,but the Chinese Communist Party began the adaptive reform process for relative independence of party and state after 1978 and the overall framework of integration of party and state is not changed and also will not be changed.The political framework based on party and state with Chinese characteristics in the transformation period determines the status of CCP as the sole ruling party and the identity as the leader in the comprehensive reform,and it also determines the vivid leading feature as a ruling party in the administrative reform during the transformation period,therefore the administrative reform under the leading of the Chinese Communist Party is interpreted as the party-led administrative reform in this article.The power structure within the communist party which is called the democratic centralism of the Chinese Communist Party determines that the centrally political authority serves as the representative of supreme power center of party and the most important personification and it is the supreme decision-maker overall designer and main propellent of party-led administrative reform.The party-government bureaucrat is the sub-decision maker,the designer of partial affairs and the principal agent,which plays a role as the body of implementation motivation. At the same time,the decision-making brainpower,the public scholars and mass people separately play a role as auxiliary propulsion body or body of fundamental propulsion in the party-led administrative reform.As a special body of behavior,the behavior of Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly has special objective function and conditional restriction.Only starting from the guidance of multiple goals and the restraint of multiple conditions,the special behaviors of impelling the administrative reform can be entirely and profoundly grasped.The centrally political authority of the party is on the top of bureaucratic system of party and state,and its own interest has a high compatibility with the party’s interest and national interest,and the objective function and conditional restriction are also embodied mainly through the objective function and conditional restriction of centrally political authority.This article conducts the analysis on the pivotal goal of the Chinese Communist Party "in power for a long time" and the core economic goal of "economic development",the core political goal of "political civilization",the core national goal of "national rejuvenation" as well as the starting condition restriction of behavior,knowledge restriction,gaming restriction and ideology restriction through integrating the universality of ruling party and the individuality of the Chinese Communist Party.Therefore,the evolution of the administrative reform under the leading of the Chinese Communist Party in the transformation period is interpreted as a gradual process of rational choice conducted by the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of its own objective function under the special constraint condition in this article.Under the special constraint condition,the Chinese Communist Party chooses and reforms economic system on the basis of the core economic goal as "economic development" and chooses and reforms political system on the basis of the core political goal as "political civilization".The choice and reform of economic system and political system continuously suffer the restriction and revision implemented by the core nation goal as "national rejuvenation" and the pivotal goal as "being in power for a long time".But the choice and reform which are conducted by the Chinese Communist Party for the economic and political reform jointly determine the choice and reform of the administrative system.Along with above stream of thoughts,this article discusses the basic process and internal logic of starting and impelling the track transferred to marketization and adaptive administrative reform for realizing the core economic goal of "economic development",which is conducted by CCP after 1978 gradually and constantly.It also dicusses the basic process and internal logic of CCP’s starting and impelling the track transferred to marketization and precursory administrative reform for realizing the core political goal of "political civilization".Then this article conducts the analysis on the motivation mechanism of adaptive administrative reform and source of lag,the motivation mechanism of precursory administrative reform and obstruction of impelling from the perspective of the "up and down interaction "of the central political authority,decision-making brainpower,public scholars,mass people and party- government bureaucracy,as the four main motivation bodies,which means that the article separately discusses the marketization dynamics of administrative reform and democratization dynamics implemented by the Chinese Communist Party in the transformation period.Thereinto,the adaptive administrative reform is interpreted as the reform with the characteristic of "applicability" on the administrative system implemented by the Chinese Communist Party since 1978 to adapt the demand of economic system reform of market-oriented and the precursory administrative reform means the precursory value reform conducted by the Chinese Communist Party since 1978 on the administrative system for driving the democratization transformation of political system and avoiding possible political risks.Such two concepts in this article are mainly for the distinction on dynamics,but not for the distinction on the contents.Accordingly,although this article has made a rough distinction on the contents of the adaptive administrative reform and the precursory administrative reform,such distinction on contents only has a relative meaning,the contents of the two unavoidably have a intersectant part.This article further discusses the basic process and internal logic of gradually starting and constantly enlarging the opening to the outside world,and actively joining the globalization by CCPC for realization of national rejuvenation after 1978. Then it points out the administrative reform led by the Chinese Communist Party,no matter the adaptive administrative reform or the precursory administrative reform, they all have the obvious "characteristic of pressure" as a whole,which is used to deal with the pressure of competition of globalization.So,it can be called as the pressure administrative reform,and the analysis is conducted on the motivation system of the pressure administrative reform from the perspectives of "inside and outside interaction" of international activists such as governments of advanced nations, international organizations,multinational corporations and communicators of culture and academy,and domestic activists such as central political authority of the party, decision-making brainpower,public scholars,mass people and party-government bureaucrats,which actually conducts the specific analysis on the globalization dynamics of the party-led administrative reform during the transformation period.The pressure administrative reform is a concept defined for conveniently expressing the internal drive of the administrative reform led the party of China which is transformed from the external stress of globalization,and its concept differentiation with the adaptive administrative reform and the precursory administrative reform is based on dynamics.As to the contents,it actually covers the entire contents of adaptive administrative reform and the precursory administrative reform.This article discusses the political logic of constantly consolidating and reconstructing the legitimacy foundation as the ruling party by CCP for realizing the pivotal goal as a long-time ruling party,and it points out that the administrative reform is an important proposition even one of the key procedures of reconstructing and consolidating legitimacy foundation as the ruling party conducted by CCP in the transformation period.This article emphasizes that the ruling logic is a main line of dynamics of administrative reform led by CCP in the transformation period.One kind of coupled relation which is supported mutually not only exists among the core economic goal of "economic development",the core political goal of "political civilization",the core national goal of "national rejuvenation" and the pivotal goal of "as the ruling party for a long time" but also one kind of conflict relation of mutual contradiction in certain degree existing among them.But other goals basically unify and yield with the pivotal goal of "as the ruling party for a long time". Correspondingly,the reason for continuously impelling the economic system reform with market-orientation,the political system reform with democracy-orientation,the opening to the outside world with globalization-orientation and the corresponding administrative reform conducted by CCP since 1978 is to basically continuously consolidate the legitimacy foundation as the ruling party and continuously prolong the political position as a ruling party for a long term.The political logic of striving for being a ruling party for a long time conducted by CCP provides the continuous driving force of impelling administrative reform conducted by the party on the one hand,and it delimits the basic limitation of administrative reform conducted by the party on the other hand.On the basis of above arguments,a summative system analysis is conducted from two aspects,the macroscopical motivation and the concrete activist on the dynamics prospect of party-led administrative reform during the transformation period.On the one hand,the triple variations of marketization,democratization and globalization intensively require the demand to reform the government managed by CCP from its own layout of structure,fulfillment of function and way of act,which is the dynamics prospect of party-led administrative reform during the transformation period;On the other hand,the interaction of "combination between the higher and lower levels" of central political authority of the party and interaction of "combination between the internal and the external" by the domestic and foreign activists consisting of the micro kinetics prospect of party-led administrative reform in the transformation period.Throughout the thread between macro kinetics and micro kinetics,it undoubtedly serves as the political logic as the ruling party for a long time pursued by CCP and its centrally political authority,as the critical activists and the core motivation body.As to the party-led administrative reform during the transformation period,firstly, drived by guidance of multiple goals,especially the ruling logic,on the basis of marketization of the economy,democratization of politics and gradual rational design for merging into globalization,the central political authority of CCP experiences one kind of bottom-up institutional change with coerciveness which is forcedly impelled. But,this kind of institutional change with coerciveness only reflects the subjective desire of central political authority,and the objective result of institutional change relies on the corresponding actions conducted by other various activities on the basis of their own desires and interests and the induced bottom-up institutional change triggered.At the same time,during the continuous interaction of opening to the outside world and internal reform,the action logics of various activists in China including the central political authority inevitably suffer from the impetus and influence of various international activists to a large extent.The party-led administrative reform during the transformation period experiences the occurrence and evolution during the process of triple compatibility of marketization, democratization and globalization and mutual interaction between "combination between the higher and lower levels" of domestic and international activists and "combination between the internal and the external".What is needed the emphasis is that this article actually pays much attention to conduct the analysis on the mechanism of lagging behind of party-led administrative reform in the transformation period in the cognition,interest and system three aspects from the perspectives of various specific activists,through the dynamics analysis on the adaptive administrative reform and precursory administrative reform.One pivotal influencing factor is that the party- government bureaucrat plays a dual role of body of implementing motivation and primary block force in the party-led administrative reform during the transformation period.The party- government bureaucrat is in the middle position of "converging attack from top and bottom" in the huge dynamical system of administrative reform and its standpoint in the administrative reform is also historical and concrete,and it changes along with the change of type of bureaucrat or individual difference as well as the change of the influence of triggered by specific content of administrative reform in the specific stage.As the political agent,the party- government bureaucrat has the partial interest of compatibility with the centrally political authority and it also has its own partial interest and individual interest.And the bureaurats’ interest of compatibility with the party’s interest of being in power for a long time and even the general interest of country will correspondingly decline along with the decline of level and rank of bureaucracy.Especially,along with that elementary stage of administrative reform evolves into "system innovation" from "granting power and surrendering part of the profits",its basic theme evolves into transformation of the functions and behavioral norms from structural adjustment.Generally speaking,the underserved and improper power of party-government bureaucrat at all levels is increasingly limited and their undeserved and improper interest is increasingly impaired,and the role of setting back the administrative reform is increasingly obvious.In the actually political practice,on the basis of regulation of power structure, politically incentive mechanism of promotion tournament,economically incentive mechanism of financial federalization and its own consciousness of responsibility and consciousness of mission,some party- government bureaucrats become the important driving force of adaptive administrative reform and precursory administrative reform within certain range and certain degree,while some party- government bureaucrats conduct lots of opportunistic behaviors which are opposite the reform orientation of adaptive administrative reform and precursory administrative reform,which become the primary block force of administrative reform.In order to do not make the administrative reform come to a standstill and become a mere formality which further affect the overall situation of being in power, the centrally political authority conducts various methods on the overall framework at commission system of hierarchy to effectively spur and restrict the party- government bureaucrats at all levels and ensure the strategy implementation of administrative reform,among which the government performance appraisal and power supervision are the two most elementary institutional approaches.But,because the current system of administrative performance appraisal and system of power supervision suffer from the systematic difficulty of "from the top to the bottom" operation,not only many behaviors of going after government performance maximization conducted by the government bureaucrats deviate from the fundamental direction of adaptive administrative reform and precursory administrative reform,but also the power abuse of bureaucrats and spread of corruption phenomenon do not obtain the fundamental containment,therefore the substantial transformation of government function still suffers from many difficulties and the actual outcome of adaptive administrative reform and precursory administrative reform remains less optimistic.Upon this,the questions on the "North Paradox" of party-led administrative reform and the way to cope with such paradox,as the closing lines for this article are concluded.One of the political premise and research assumption is that the central political authority of the CCP is a political enterpriser who supersedes the selfishness of ruler and undertakes the assignments such as developing the party and promoting the nation and choosing the establishment of a People First harmonious government as its assignment to simplify the overcoming of "North Paradox" as a bureaucrat-control question.From the angles on the lagging origin of adaptive administrative reform and the impelling obstacle of precursory administrative reform, without effective bottom-up supervision over the bureaucrats,it is difficult to effectively supervise the real administrative acts of the party-government officials solely upon the strong bottom-up driving and one sided supervision by the political authority of the CCP,therefore,it is hard to push the material transformation of Chinese administrative system(namely,the government in a narrow sense,the transformation from structure and function to way of act).Accordingly,even from a simplified angle of bureaucrats’ control,meeting the standards of material impulsion of party-led administrative reform in China still heavily depends on the further development of political system reform led by CCP.更多还原