基于供应链契约的物流服务供应链能力优化与协调研究

【作者】 崔爱平；

【导师】 刘伟；

【作者基本信息】 上海海事大学 ， 交通运输规划与管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 随着全球经济一体化趋势的加强,企业面临着不断急剧变化的市场需求和缩短交货期、提高质量、降低成本和改进服务的压力,供应链管理成为当今企业竞争的主要模式。同时,服务业的快速发展和在经济发展中扮演的角色越来越重要的趋势促使供应链管理研究已经从产品供应链扩展到服务供应链。本文以物流服务供应链(Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC)为研究对象,对其演化、构成、本质、能力获取、能力协调等有关问题进行深入系统研究。研究重点是以供应链契约为协调机制,通过物流能力优化实现LSSC协调的目标,为物流运作实践提供理论指导。本文主要研究内容及结论如下:(1)论文首先在服务供应链研究现状分析的基础上,对LSSC的演化机制、内涵特征、结构模型、基本管理理论与方法进行了较为系统的定性分析,为其深入研究提供了一个理论分析框架。研究结论表明:受社会分工与专业化、节约交易费用和聚焦核心竞争力的动力驱使,在企业物流与物流产业的双重演变下,LSSC形成了它独特的演化模式。LSSC以契约为主的形式整合链上物流资源,是一条能力供给链和增值服务链。只有通过物流能力与物流计划的调整来协调供应链,物流服务能力的获取与整合成为LSSC协调的关键。另外,LSSC管理通常采用供应链契约、激励机制和关系资产投资等基本方法,LSSC通过成员间基于核心能力的分工与合作来实现关系协调,这种协调需要专用性关系资产投资、知识共享惯例等机制来保障。(2)以报童模型为基础,采用经典供应链契约中的回购契约进行LSSC协调,研究物流分包商的物流能力供给无限制、面临随机的物流服务需求、契约双方均存在能力短缺损失情形下物流集成商与物流分包商之间的能力订购与供给的最优策略问题。根据契约决策权的分配不同导致的不同博弈结构,分别研究物流分包商主导与物流集成商主导的两种Stackelberg非合作博弈结构以及合作博弈结构下的基于能力回购契约的LSSC协调问题。在物流分包商主导的LSSC模式下,在物流分包商向物流集成商提供的传统回购契约机制下可以实现LSSC的完美协调,而在基于Stackelberg博弈的回购契约机制下只能实现LSSC的帕累托效率改进。然而,基于传统回购契约机制的最优均衡策略是不稳定的,作为主导者的物流分包商更倾向于在选择基于Stackelberg博弈回购契约进行协调,原因在于它可以利用先发优势以及最终决策权获取比传统回购契约协调时更高的收益。在物流集成商主导的LSSC模式下,物流集成商通过宣称潜在市场的物流能力订购量来影响物流分包商的能力转移价格而获得决策的主动权。在这种情况下,物流集成商以最大物流能力订购量作为决策变量,通过影响物流分包商的最优能力转移价格来实现自身的最优物流能力订购目标。物流集成商的最优初始最大物流能力订购量和最优实际物流能力订购量均随着物流集成商物流能力订购量对能力转移价格的敏感性的增强而增大。当物流集成商物流能力订购量对能力转移价格的敏感性处于较低水平区间时,随着敏感性的增强,物流集成商和物流分包商的期望利润均呈现增长态势。然而,当物流集成商物流能力订购量对能力转移价格的敏感性进入较高水平区间后,物流分包商的期望利润处于下降态势,而物流集成商的期望利润一直处于上升趋势。物流集成商的优势地位随着其物流能力订购量对能力转移价格的敏感性的增强而提升。在讨价还价合作博弈结构下,根据物流集成商和物流分包商按照对LSSC联盟的贡献大小进行收益分配的原则,论文采用改进的K-S解法,计算出物流集成商的最优能力订购策略和物流分包商的最优能力转移价格策略,使得两者愿意进行合作并且其合作能够实现LSSC协调。在合理范围内的收益分配取决于物流集成商和物流分包商的相对实力和谈判能力。(3)考虑包含一个物流集成商和一个物流分包商的LSSC系统、物流分包商的初始物流能力为零、双方均存在能力缺失损失的情形,论文针对LSSC中的物流能力预订与投资问题提出一种基于期权契约的协调机制。在信息对称情形下,提出的期权契约能够实现能力的优化,并能同时提高供应链系统和双方各自的期望利润,从而实现LSSC的完美协调。研究结论表明,LSSC实现协调时,期权契约参数——期权价格与期权执行价格之间存在负相关关系。而且,期权价格是实现供应链协调的决策核心,它决定了供应链系统额外利润在物流集成商和物流分包商之间的分配,并且必须在一个合理的范围内。在信息不对称情形下,论文考虑物流分包商的能力运作成本为私人信息,物流集成商通过控制最优初始能力订购量和期权能力订购量的决策权,利用信号博弈和Myerson信息揭示原理,激励物流分包商出于自身利益最大化而报告真实的能力运作成本信息,从而使自身利润达到最大。结果表明,在成本信息不对称情形下,集成商通过提供期权契约和利用信息揭示原理可以获取分包商的真实成本信息,供应链期权契约能够有效的改善LSSC的系统效率,从而实现供应链协调。在信息不对称的基础上,考虑物流集成商为风险规避者的情形,并采用均值.方差方法描述物流集成商的风险规避程度。建立激励真实信息揭示和规避风险的双效规划模型,通过优化方法和图解法求得物流集成商和物流分包商关于物流能力订购与投资的最优决策。研究表明:所设计的能力期权契约既能揭示物流分包商的真实成本信息,又能使物流集成商达到规避市场风险的目的,从而实现LSSC的帕累托效率改进。进一步发现,期权契约同时达到双效控制的效果取决于物流集成商抵抗市场风险的能力。随着物流集成商抗风险能力的提高,其物流能力订购量越来越接近于运作成本信息不对称时的水平。(4)利用不完全关系契约研究LSSC中专用性物流能力投资与订购问题,并提出有效激励机制以解决此类问题中的套牢问题和道德风险问题。首先考虑物流分包商单方面进行非专用性物流能力投资的情况,目的在于降低自身的物流服务成本。很显然,物流分包商的非专用性物流能力投资仅仅是为了自身利益考虑,并不能为物流集成商带来直接的经济利益。因此,在这种情况下,不存在专用性投资套牢问题以及带来的物流集成商机会主义行为。物流分包商与物流集成商进行主从(Leader-follower,LF)博弈的最优能力投资水平是两者合作博弈时最优能力投资水平的一半,即进行非合作博弈时,存在能力投资不足问题,不能实现供应链的协调。其次,考虑LSSC中只存在物流分包商的一次专用性物流能力投资,目的是为了提高物流服务质量的情形。在物流集成商针对物流分包商的专用性物流能力投资实行固定投资补贴政策时,专用性物流能力投资水平不能达到系统最优专用性物流能力投资水平。而在线性激励支付政策下,物流分包商的专用性物流能力投资水平相比实行固定投资补贴政策时得到提高,但依然不能实现系统最优。原因在于套牢问题导致物流集成商存在道德风险,因此,通过有效的激励机制来规避套牢问题的发生,从而使专用性物流能力投资水平达到系统最优状态。最后,考虑到线性激励支付契约不能有效解决“套牢问题”引发的专用性能力投资不足问题,论文引入一种不完全关系契约,分析了该关系契约的自执行条件,通过求解规划模型,设计的最优关系契约能在贴现因子满足一定范围取值的条件下实现系统最优的专用性物流能力投资水平,从而实现LSSC帕累托最优。(5)研究物流集成商和物流分包商在物流服务质量监督协调方面的博弈行为。一方面从物流服务质量投入产出角度,考虑物流分包商和物流集成商的质量投入努力共同创造一个质量产出由物流集成商拥有的情形下,为了激励物流分包商的质量投入积极性,从而使得质量均衡状态达到系统最优,论文通过设计一个线性的质量产出共享契约和建立委托代理模型,并求解最优的产出共享比例,得到物流集成商和物流分包商的最优质量投入水平,从而实现供应链质量协调。在Nash博弈结构下,物流集成商和物流分包商的最优质量投入水平与物流分包商的质量产出分享比例分别呈负、正相关关系。物流分包商的物流服务质量产出分享比例与它的风险规避程度呈负相关关系。当物流集成商和物流分包商均为风险中性者时,物流服务质量产出的分享取决于成本能力与产出效率。另一方面,论文从物流服务质量缺陷造成质量损失的角度出发,考虑由于物流分包商的质量预防水平缺陷和物流集成商的质量监督检查水平缺陷的不同组合导致LSSC的内部质量损失和外部质量损失,通过分析物流分包商和物流集成商在对称信息和不同非对称信息情形下对内外质量损失的不同承担比例来实现系统最优状态时的最优质量预防水平和质量监督检查水平。崔爱平指导老师:刘伟教授更多还原

【Abstract】 With the enhancement of economy globalization, enterprises is facing the pressure of the rapidly changing demands, shorter delivery lead-time, lower cost and better service, which develops the principal competition of enterprises nowadays—the supply chain management. Meanwhile, supply chain management research already expands from the product/material supply chain to the service supply chain due to rapid development of the service industry and its more and more important role in the growth of economy. Taking logistics service supply chain (LSSC) as research object, this dissertation studies its evolution mechanism, structural model, characteristics, gaining of logistics capability (LC) and coordination profoundly and systematically. Above all, the key point of this dissertation is how to coordinate LSSC through LC optimization with supply chain contracts as coordination mechanism and to provide the theoretical reference for logistics operation practice. Main research contents and conclusions of this dissertation are as following:(1) The evolution mechanism, characteristics, structural model, and basic management theories and methods of LSSC are firstly analyzed qualitatively and systematically on the basis of literatures review of service supply chain in this dissertation, which provides a theoretical framework for further study. Results show that LSSC presents its special double-evolution model driven by social division and specialization, transaction cost reduction and core-competence-refocused. LSSC is a capability chain and a value-added service chain, which integrates logistics resources mainly through supply contracts. Therefore, gaining and integrating of LC is the key to LSSC optimization. Furthermore, some basic methods of LSSC management such as supply contracts, incentive mechanism and relation-specific assets investment etc, are applied in practice. Coordination mechanisms are needed to ensure relational coordination based on core competence division and cooperation of members in LSSC such as relation-specific assets investment, knowledge-sharing routines.(2) The optimal capability reservation and investment strategy existing between logistics service integrator (LSI) and logistics service subcontractor (LSS) is studied in this dissertation by taking sufficient supply of LSS’s capability, random logistics service demand and suffering of both LSI and LSS for capability shortage into consideration. Return contract, as a classical supply contract, is applied to coordinate LSSC based on newsboy model and three different scenarios are considered including LSI-led non-cooperative Stackelberg game, LSS4ed non-cooperative Stackelberg game and cooperative game according to different allocation of contract decision-making power.Traditional return contract, which is provided by LSS to LSI, can make channel coordination come true in LSSC in non-cooperative LSS-led scenario, and that, LSSC only can be Pareto-improved if return contracts based on Stackelberg game model which is applied as another non-cooperative mechanism. But simulation result shows that the optimal strategies equilibrium is not stable just because LSS, as leader in LSSC, tends to apply return contracts based on Stackelberg game model to coordinate LSSC for he can seize more profit than that under traditional return contracts through first move advantage and ultimate decision-making power.In non-cooperative LSI-led scenario, LSI can obtain advantageous position through announcing the potential LC quantity which can give an impact on the capability sale price of LSS. That’s to say, LSI achieves the optimal LC reservation quantity through taking maximal LC reservation quantity as decision variable to influence the capability sale price of LSS. Both the optimal quantity of maximal LC reservation and the optimal quantity of actual capability reservation of LSI ascend with the reinforcement of the sensitivity of LSI’s LC reservation quantity to the capability sale price of LSS. The expected profit of LSI and LSS rises with the reinforcement of this sensitivity when it is at lower level. However, LSS’s expected profit descends when this sensitivity is at upper level, but LSI’s on the contrary. At the same time, the advantageous position of LSI is upgraded with the reinforcement of this sensitivityIn cooperative bargaining game scenario, K-S solution is applied to determine the optimal LC reservation strategy of LSI and the optimal LC sale price of LSS according to the benefit allocation principle of LSI’s and LSS’s contribution to LSSC alliance, which ensures that LSS and LSI are apt to cooperate with each other and thus helps LSSC reach the optimal situation. The benefit allocation within reasonable range between LSS and LSI depends on the bargaining power of each part.(3) Considering a LSSC system including one LSI and one LSS, zero original LC of LSS and suffering of both LSI and LSS for capability shortage, this dissertation proposes a kind of coordination mechanism based on options contract to solve LC reservation and investment problem in LSSC.In symmetric information scenario, LC in LSSC can be optimized perfectly and the expected profit of both LSSC system and the parties increases through options contract proposed in Stackelberg game model and thus LSSC is channel-coordinated. Results showthat the negative linear relationship exists between two option parameters——option priceand option execute price, and the value of option price, which determines the allocation of surplus system expected profit between LSI and LSS, must be located in a reasonable scope as the core element of contract parameters under channel coordination.In asymmetric information scenario, this dissertation assumes that capability operation cost of LSS is the private information for LSI. In the purpose of maximizing his expected profit, LSI tries to apply Myerson information revelation principle and signal game to stimulate LSS to show LSS’s true cost information for pursuit of optimal expected profit through controlling the decision-making power of optimal original LC reservation quantity and LC option quantity. Result shows that LSI can obtain true cost information of LSS through options contract and information revelation principle in this situation and options contract can coordinate LSSC just for it can improve the efficiency of LSSC system effectively.This dissertation considers further that LSI is a risk-averse party on the basis of asymmetric cost information of LSS, and applies mean-variance method to describe risk-averse degree of LSI. Two-constraint programming model is established in pursuit of simulating to reveal true cost information and control risk, and the optimal LC reservation and investment strategy for LSI and LSS can be given by optimization method and graphic solution. Result shows that not only true cost information of LSS can be revealed, but also demand risk of LSI can be controlled effectively through capability-option contract given by LSI as buyer and thus can help LSSC achieve a Pareto improvement subject to two constraints given above. However, the improvement efficiency depends on the anti-risk capability of LSI. That’s to say, the optimal LC reservation quantity increases with respect to the increase of LSI’s anti-risk capability, and even reaches the level of the situation only considered asymmetric information of LSS.(4) An incomplete relational contract is introduced to analyze specific LC reservation and investment problem, and effective simulation mechanism is proposed to solve hold-up problem and moral hazard problem in LSSC in this dissertation. The situation of non-specific LC investment only by LSS in pursuit of decreasing logistics service cost is firstly considered. Not far to seek, this kind of investment just takes the benefit of LSS into account, but cannot bring direct benefit to LSI, which does not result in the appearance of specific investment hold-up problem and opportunism behavior of LSI. The optimal level of LC investment in leader-follower game between LSI and LSS is a half of the level in cooperative game between two parties, which means that LC underinvestment problem exists and LSSC cannot be channel-coordinated in non-cooperative game. Secondly, only one specific LC investment of LSS with the purpose of improving his logistics service quality is considered in LSSC. Specific LC investment level cannot reach the global optimization of LSSC when LSI provides fixed incentive contract to specific LC investment of LSS. The optimal specific LC investment level of LSS under linear incentive contract is higher than the level under fixed incentive contract in spite that it cannot be equal to the optimal level of LSSC system, which results from LSI’s moral hazard induced by hold-up problem. Therefore, only an effective incentive mechanism is designed to impel specific LC investment level to achieve the global optimization of LSSC through avoiding hold-up problem. At last, this dissertation introduces an incomplete relational contract to solve LC underinvestment problem induced by hold-up problem which cannot be solved effectively by linear incentive contract. The self-enforceability condition of the relational contract is analyzed and furthermore, the optimal relational contract designed can make LSS achieve the optimal specific LC investment level and LSSC is Pareto coordinated under the condition that the value of the discount factor is satisfied in certain range.(5)Game behavior about logistics service quality coordination between LSI and LSS is analyzed from two different perspectives. On one hand, considering a quality output owned by LSI but created jointly by the quality input of both LSI and LSS from the input-output point of logistics service quality, this dissertation designs a linear contract about quality output sharing and establishes principal-agent model to stimulate LSS’s enthusiasm for quality input and thus the quality input equilibrium of LSI an LSS to reach the global optimization of LSSC. The optimal quality input level of LSI and LSS can be given to coordinate LSSC through calculating the optimal proportion of quality output sharing. In Nash game, the negative linear relationship exists between the optimal quality input of LSI and the quality output sharing coefficient of LSS and for the optimal quality input of LSS on the contrary. At the same time, the negative linear relationship exists between the quality output sharing coefficient of LSS and the risk-averse degree of LSS. The quality output sharing coefficient depends on the cost capability and output efficiency when LSI and LSS are both risk-neutral parties.On the other hand, from the aspect of quality loss caused by logistics service quality failure, the external and internal quality failure between two parties caused by the different collocations of quality prevention failure of LSS and quality check failure of LSI, are considered in the dissertation. The optimal quality prevention level of LSS and the optimal quality check level of LSI under the global optimization of LSSC can be got through analyzing different external partition coefficient and internal partition coefficient by LSI and LSS under symmetric information and asymmetric information respectively.更多还原