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政治控制、市场竞争与中国地方党报的影响力(1978-2009)
【作者】 刘伟伟;
【导师】 张光;
【作者基本信息】 南开大学 , 政治学理论, 2009, 博士
【摘要】 开风气、“敢为天下先”的党报,为什么总在广东,而不是其他地方?同样是党报,为什么各地党报的影响力差别这么大?不同的“政治控制-市场竞争”的结构组合(自变量),是导致各地党报影响力差异(因变量)的主要原因。“政治控制”用“对财政供养的依赖程度”、“从业人员由地方党委直接任命的比例”、“当地宣传部的限制性规定”、“转载新华社、人民日报通稿的比例”和“批评报道的数量”来操作化。“市场竞争”用“本地报业集团的数量”、“本地出版报纸的数量”、“本地电视频道的数量”、“本地广播电台的数量”和“本地门户网站的数量”来测量。“党报的影响力”用“党报的全国市场占有率”、“党报的本地市场占有率”、“报道的媒体转载率”和“受到中央领导的视察、题词和表扬的次数”来测量。在大部分地区,政治控制都强;但在广东,政治自由度高些(与改革开放有关)。在大部分地区,市场竞争都弱;但在广东,市场竞争最激烈(5家报业集团,均为全国最强列)。或者政治控制比广东强,或者市场竞争比广东弱;所以,相比大部分地方党报影响力式微(主要体现为发行量和媒体转载率下降)而言,广东党报的一枝独秀就可以理解了。对报纸的政治控制,有三种形式:“权力的代言人”、“媒体即意识形态”和“沉默的螺旋”。政治控制主要有两种途径:以组织和宣传部门为典型的政工系统,覆盖公务员和企事业单位工作人员的单位体制。报纸的市场竞争分为异质媒体竞争和同质媒体竞争。异质媒体竞争是与电视、广播、网络等竞争,同质媒体竞争就是同业竞争。竞争的目标,一是读者,二是广告。报业集团的集中程度在提高,越来越多的报纸控制在越来越少的报业集团手中。中国报业的发展趋势,可以归结为:从党报完全垄断,到党报行政垄断下的报业竞争。党报的市场化生存有两条路径:一是组建报业集团,二是在报纸之外进行投资和多元化经营。党报的影响力在于,作为党的喉舌,向党员进行思想政治教育,对公众进行宣传和动员;同时,也通过“读者来信”和写作“内参”的方式,向决策层“献言献策”。世界报业发展的一般趋势是:政治控制逐渐减弱,市场竞争逐渐增强。1978年改革前后的中国党报,大趋势是:政治控制稍稍减弱,市场竞争逐渐增强。党报正面临着意识形态与逐利的角色冲突:既要继续发挥“党的喉舌”的宣传功能,又被推向市场“企业化经营”。从地域上看,广东党报改革的步伐比其他地方大些,影响力更大。从行政层级上看,地市级党报比省级党报的自由度大些,市场化的程度更高些。子报养母报,母报保护子报,是大部分报业集团的共性。广州日报和深圳特区报只是特例,大部分地方党报仍然主要依赖机关单位公款订阅的状态。党报的性质决定了它永远不可能真正市场化,改革是有限度的。
【Abstract】 Why party organs of Guangdong are always bellwether in the Chinese local party organs in the media reform since 1978? Why party organs of Guangdong are more influential then other local party organs? Different structures of ’political control - market competition’ result in different party organs’ influence.The index of political control is: dependent extent on public finance, party committee’s personnel patronage, propaganda discipline, transshipment of reports from Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily, and criticism report. The index of market competition is: number of local newspaper chain, newspaper, TV channel, radio station, and news website. The index of party organs’ influence is: circulation, market share, reports transshipped by other media, official authorization from leaders.Most Chinese local party organs’ influence descends. Guangdong has political privilege and flourishing economics. Compared with other party organs, party organs of Guangdong face a unique circumstance: more free in politics, more competitors in market.There are three forms of political control over newspapers: ’agent of power’, ’medium is ideology’, and ’spiral of silence’. There are two kinds of political control in China: ideology persuasion by Party’s personnel and propaganda sector, and units’ control which coverage state-owned enterprises and public service units. Newspapers have to compete with TV, broadcast and internet for consumers and advertisement. More and more newspapers are controlled by less and less newspaper chains. The development trend of Chinese newspapers is from party organs’ monopoly to monopolistic competition. Some party organs become the lead of newspaper chains; some other organs invest and operate business besides media industry.Party organs’ influence is propaganda, mobilization, organization, education and criticism. They also propose to the leading-groups in the decision-making process.The international trend of newspaper is: less political control and more market competition. Party organs have to balance the relationship between ideology and profits. Party organs both are Party’s propaganda sector in politics and enterprises in market. Party organs of Guangdong always blaze a way in the newspaper reform. Civic party organs have more political and economic free choice than provincial party organs.In most newspaper chains, party organs keep correct stand, sub-newspapers make profits. Guangzhou Daily and Shenzhen Daily are unique, because most other local party organs still depend on public finance and official subscription. The reform of party organs is determinate restricted and will never total participate in market competition.
【Key words】 political control; market competition; party organs’ influence; political economy of communication;