策略互动、协调与区域经济发展

【作者】 张熇铭；

【导师】 谢思全；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 政治经济学， 2009， 博士

【副题名】基于地方政府博弈行为的分析

【摘要】 经济发展的历史证明,经济资源配置与利用的有效性与经济发展的协调程度呈正相关关系。一个区域内提高经济活动的协调程度有利于生产要素的自由流动和优化配置,有利于全面提升该区域的核心竞争力和综合实力。改革开放以来,我国经济逐渐形成了以增长极带动区域经济发展的新格局。珠三角、长三角、京津冀等地区区域经济一体化发展问题均已列入国家“十一五”发展规划。然而,在现实的区域经济发展中,我们仍然可以看到地方政府画地为牢、各自为政、内耗不止、过度竞争的种种现象。因此,实现区域经济协调发展必须改善和解决诸侯经济等地方政府策略不协调现象。面对上述我国区域经济发展中的“顽疾”,许多学者已经作了大量的研究工作。在前人研究的基础上,本文试图从经济学的视角出发,探索区域内经济主体之间协调失败的成因、如何克服协调失败、如何使区域经济走出协调失败的困境并进走上协调发展之路。本文首先对区域经济发展与地方政府行为的相互关系及互动机理进行了比较全面的研究并提出了较新颖的研究视角。从现有研究成果看,有关我国区域经济问题文献的大体可以分为两类,一类是对各区域板块间经济发展绩效的比较及差异动因分析,一类是对各区域板块内部经济问题的研究。本文则是基于地方政府协调合作在经济发展中的积极作用,试图通过建立一个协调博弈的分析框架,考察区域内不同地区代理人之间的协调博弈过程及其均衡,在此基础上探索区域协调发展的契机、途径与激励机制。其次,在文献梳理与总结的基础上,本文阐述了地方政府策略互动与区域经济协调发展的相关理论基础并总结了理论分析框架。之后,本文在一个基本的协调博弈分析框架中,考察了区域内参与协调博弈的地方政府主体的偏好、策略互动过程和策略选择行为,分析了区域内地方政府之间协调博弈的均衡条件、协调问题的基本类型以及协调失败的原因。在此基础上,本文对解决协调失败问题进行了理论分析与对策建议:如建立基于地方收益增大的合作动力机制,加强地方主体之间协调互动的互惠机制,以及中央政府政府促进区域一体化发展的政策机制等等。在博弈模型分析的基础上,本文进一步考察了我国三大经济圈改进协调失败问题并取得阶段性成果的案例,对博弈模型进行了实证的与经验性的研究,力图寻求地方政府策略互动实现区域经济高水平均衡发展的可行途径。最后,本文基于中国转型时期市场经济建设的国情和实践经验,对区域经济协调发展中的地方政府治理问题提供了具有现实意义的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The history of Economic development proves that there is a positive relationship between effectiveness of allocation and utilization of economic resources and the coordination of economic development which contributes to the free flow and optimized allocation of production factors, and the promotion of regional competitiveness and strengths. Since reform and opening-up, a pattern that regional economy driven by growth pole has formed in China gradually. The economic developments of Peer River delta, Yangtze River delta, and Bohai Rim have already been put on the national 11th Five Year Plan agenda. However, over competition and other isolation strategies still obstructing regional development. Thus to achieve the goal of coordination development of regional economy, we must improve and solve the discoordination between local governments.Facing the above issues, many researches have already provided lots of work. Basing on the former academic results, this article tried to probe the causes of coordination failure between regional actors, how to overcome coordination failures and then enhance regional development level.Firstly, this paper did full scale investigation about the correlation between regional economic development and local governments’ behaviors, as well as their mechanism of interaction. Current studies can be mainly classified into two categories. One is focuses on the comparison of economic performances between regions as well as the causes of their differences. The other is focuses on the intraregional study about each economic region. In the paper, the author studied the process of coordination games and its equilibriums between different local agents by building a coordination game analytical framework. Then the author investigated the ways and incentive mechanisms of coordination development.Basing on reviewing existing researches, this thesis expatiated the theoretical foundation and analytical framework about the strategic interaction of local government and regional economic development. Then in the coordination game framework, the author analyzed the preferences of local governments, the process of strategic interaction, and choices of strategies. This paper discussed the equilibrium conditions, major types of coordination game, and then causes of coordination failure. After this, this paper discussed about how to solve coordination failures theoretically and provide corresponding suggestions, such as strengthening the reciprocal mechanisms for local actors’ strategic interactions, policies from central government to promote regional integration, and so on.Basing on game theory model, this thesis did empirical investigation about three economic regions on solving coordination failures, which tried to seek practical ways of enhancing regional economic development through strategic interaction among local behaviors.Finally, this paper provided realistic suggestions according to the transition process of market economy construction in China.更多还原