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我国商业银行公司治理问题研究

Research on Corporate Governance for China’s Commercial Banks

【作者】 陈潘武

【导师】 万解秋;

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 , 金融学, 2009, 博士

【摘要】 当前,全球金融危机还在蔓延,世界经济衰退和国内经济下行的风险加剧。商业银行这些年来完善公司治理和加强风险管理的成果,以及创新发展和可持续盈利能力正在经受着进入新世纪以来最为残酷的考验。纵观中国银行业改革开放的风雨历程,公司治理改革始终是“主旋律”和“关键词”之一,对银行业整体竞争力的提升起着决定性的作用。现阶段,与国际领先水平相比,我国商业银行在弥合公司治理差距方面还有许多工作要做。站在新的历史起点上,深入研究哪些因素决定和制约着我国商业银行的公司治理模式?什么样的商业银行治理理念更符合我国的国情、行情?怎样在较短时间内建立起能够与国际先进银行有效竞争的商业银行治理结构?以及如何在总结他人教训的基础上,借金融危机苦练治理内功等问题,都具有十分重要的理论意义和政策含义。首先,本文对公司治理、公司治理机制和公司治理结构的内涵,以及股东价值最大化论、投资者利益保护论和利益相关者保护论进行了比较和界定,结合银行公司治理的特殊性构建出银行公司治理的一般理论分析框架,强调银行公司治理应该从“单边治理模式”向“多边共同治理”模式发展。本文研究指出,银行的内在脆弱性、危机外部性、资本结构特殊性、资产交易非透明性、行业管制的严格性等行业特征,赋予经济主体的利益博弈更为复杂。所有权结构、激励约束机制以及组织结构共同构成了银行公司治理的内部治理机制。在外部治理机制中,政府监管、信用体系、法治环境、调控手段、资本市场等要素构成了公共治理的主体部分,而并购、经理、产品市场等市场治理机制的影响目前仍然有限。其次,本文认为,中国的银行体制改革长期滞后,其改革大体遵循了先市场结构改革后产权结构改革的思路。前一阶段在对四大国有商业银行商业化的同时,逐步设立全国性的股份制商业银行、城市商业银行和城市信用社、中外合资银行等。在市场结构改革进程推进到深化阶段后,产权的改革亦同步跟进,分重点、分步骤地对国有商业银行、中小股份制商业银行进行股份制改造和资产重组,并尝试引进国外战略投资者和公开上市融资。在中国的银行改革和制度变迁过程中,国家不仅扮演着“第一行动集团”的角色,而且国家的选择始终影响到下层结构的成本和收益预期,权利中心的制度创新能力和意愿决定制度变迁方向,影响到制度变迁的形态和过程。本质上讲,中国银行业从体制外改革到体制内改革的变迁轨迹,或者说从增量改革到存量改革的演进次序,合乎我国渐进式改革的总体思路,这一现实选择在理论逻辑上有着很好的契合。第三,本文选取2002-2007年在沪、深A股市场上市的14家商业银行的面板数据,实证检验了商业银行董事会治理与经营绩效的关系。研究结果表明:随着股改、上市工作的完成和经营管理机制的完善,董事会在履行上市银行发展战略和监督职能方面发挥了一定的作用。从具体特征来看,我国上市银行董事会规模略显庞大,各家银行独立董事比例基本呈现先“上升”后“平稳”的趋势,远低于发达国家的同业水平;大部分上市银行的会议频率呈现逐年递增的趋势,已经接近或超过美国上市公司的平均水平。ROA、EPS与某些变量的关系大相径庭,这反映出同一个因素对银行会计价值和市场价值的影响是不同的。回归结果证实,独立董事任职年限非但未能提高银行绩效,反而降低了银行绩效;而董事会年度会议次数能提高银行绩效,且控制时间效应后显著性增强,董事会人数、独立董事比例关系则与ROA、EPS的关系不甚明了。第四,本文指出,我国商业银行虽然已经逐步摈弃了计划经济时期集中统一的分配制度,却依然带有浓重的行政激励主导的色彩。本文选取2004-2007年间在沪、深A股上市的14家银行和其他3142家上市公司作为研究样本,来衡量上市公司(银行)高管薪酬与治理绩效的关系。实证分析显示,薪酬对上市银行和其他上市公司绩效的激励存在明显差别,前者高管薪水普遍较高,而后者持股比例更大。目前上市银行高管人员薪酬水平与规模业绩联系较为紧密,而与资产效率联系相对较弱。其他上市公司高管薪水和持股比例对企业绩效都有正面影响,而上市银行高管薪水对绩效的影响较为显著,其高管持股比例对绩效的影响则恰恰相反,这说明上市银行薪酬计划仍然偏重货币现金收入,长期激励方式受现有实施范围、实施办法等因素限制,并未发挥应有的效果。最后,本文通过对银行业监管、法制环境、信息披露、产品市场、控制权市场、经理人市场等因素的具体分析,区分了公共治理与市场治理的主要内容、作用原理与约束条件。在此基础上,提出了继续深化商业银行公司治理改革、继续完善银行业监管工作和继续营造良好的外部治理环境的具体思路和政策建议。

【Abstract】 At present, the global financial crisis is still spreading, the risk of the world economic recession and the domestic economy downlink increased. Over the years, the China’s commercial banks have improved corporate governance, strengthened risk management, as well as innovation and development and sustainable profitability, all of them are experiencing the most brutal test since the beginning of the new century. Taking an overview of China’s banking sector reform, corporate governance reform is still the“main theme”and“keywords”. This stage, compared with the international leading level, China’s commercial banks to bridge the gap between corporate governance there is still much work to be done. Standing at a new historical starting point, we should take an in-depth study of factors and constraints which commercial banks corporate governance model. For example, what kind of commercial banks more in line with the concept of governance in our national conditions and market? How to be able to establish effective competition on the advanced international banking management structure of the commercial banks in a relatively short time? How to sum up the lessons on the financial crisis and to strength training and other issues of governance? It is a very important theoretical and policy implication on these researches.First of all, the paper made a comparison and definition on the corporate governance, corporate governance mechanisms and corporate governance structure of the content, as well as maximizes shareholder value theory, to protect the interests of investors and stakeholders. Combining with the particularity of bank corporate governance, the paper built a general theoretical analysis framework, emphasized the development that "multilateral co-governance" model. In this paper, we pointed out the particularity of the banking makes the events of economic entities more complex. Ownership structure, incentive mechanisms, and organizational structure of banks together constituted the internal governance mechanisms of corporate governance. In the external governance mechanism, government regulation, credit system, law environment, regulation and control means, capital market constituted the main part of public governance. However, mergers and acquisitions, managers, product marketing, such as the impact of market governance mechanisms is still limited.Secondly, this paper argued that China’s banking reform has made a long time lag, and its reform generally follows the idea that reform the market structure in the beginning. After the market structure to promote the deepening of the reform process, the reform of property rights also sync follow-up. At China’s banking reform and institutional change process, the country is not only playing a "first action group" role, but also affects the costs and benefits expected of the lower structure. Essentially, changes in trajectory of China’s banking sector are well in line with the overall logic of ideas and theories.Third, the paper selected for 2002-2007 at the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market listing of 14 commercial banks′panel data, empirically test the relationship of the commercial bank board of directors governance and the business performance Due to the particularity of the commercial banks, the firm governance of its board is not simply the matter of using governance theory. As results showed that, the board has played a certain role in fulfilling the development strategy and supervisory functions of China’s listed banks in recent years. The practice effect of independent director’s serving life has different from the annual meeting, a relationship between the number of the board of directors, the proportion of independent directors and the bank operating performance is less clear. This reflects the same factors on bank accounting value and market value of the impact is different.Fourth, the paper pointed out that although China’s commercial banks have been gradually abandoning the planned economy era centralized distribution system, but still with a strong incentive-led administration colors. Recently, the executive compensation of listed banks triggered a public debate and government’s concern. This paper used the research samples of 2004-2007 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed the 14 banks and other listed companies in 3142, to measure the relationship between listed companies executive pay and performance. As results showed that, the current compensation level of bank executives has a more closely linked with bank-scale, comparing to its assets efficiency. The compensation incentive of listed banks pays a significant role in promoting performance. This shows listed banks still pay more money in cash income, long-term incentive approach has not play its due effect. Finally, the paper analysis the distinction between public governance and market governance on the role of principles and constraints, through studying the banking Supervision, legal environment, information disclosure, product markets, the control over market, the manager market and other factors. On this basis, the paper proposed specific ideas and policy recommendations for commercial banks continue to deepen the reform of corporate governance, to improve banking supervision work and to create a good external governance environment.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 苏州大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2010年 05期
  • 【分类号】F276.6;F832.33
  • 【被引频次】8
  • 【下载频次】1736
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