【作者】 袁信；

【导师】 王国顺；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 从战略管理视角,整合运用技术标准化理论、技术兼容性理论、网络外部性理论、战略柔性理论、博弈论、实物期权定价等理论与方法,通过深入剖析高科技企业技术标准联盟的运行机理,重点研究技术标准联盟的专利开发战略选择机制、专利开发战略评估机制、专利开发战略控制机制,力争推动高科技企业技术标准联盟及其专利开发战略研究平台的形成与完善。在高科技企业技术标准联盟运行机理分析方面,通过探讨高科技企业技术标准联盟形成背景、形成动因、演进趋势,重点研究了高科技企业技术标准联盟中基础专利与从属专利、核心专利与外围专利,以及技术标准与技术专利的关系特征。指出了高科技企业融入技术标准联盟的基本战略是企业为降低技术风险与成本、控制市场而采取的一系列集“协作研发、技术专利战略、技术标准合作”为一体的长远规划。在高科技企业技术标准联盟专利开发战略选择方面,通过构建高科技企业技术标准联盟逆向选择模型与专利开发竞赛模型,分析了技术标准联盟组建决策的博弈过程。通过Cournot均衡、Bertrand均衡双重分析,探讨了高科技企业组建技术标准联盟及采取不同数量的技术标准对企业利润及社会福利的影响。引入相离度与风险因子,构建了技术标准联盟单一专利选择模型。将技术标准分解为多个相对独立完整的子模块,构建了技术标准联盟多专利选择模型,为每一个相对独立的子模块选择一个恰当的技术专利提供了基本思路。针对高科技行业技术标准体系中专利之间错综复杂的从属关系,而且,随着技术标准不断升级换代,专利之间先行后续的从属关系表现为一个基础专利统辖多个从属专利的复合关系,构建了技术标准联盟复合专利选择模型,为联盟选择关系复杂的复合专利提供了基本的决策依据。在高科技企业技术标准联盟专利开发战略评估方面,通过高科技企业技术标准联盟前后收益变动的比较分析,总结出了高科技企业联盟之前收益不足的基本成因。通过构建专利自主开发收益评估模型与专利协作开发收益评估模型,比较分析了技术标准联盟成员专利开发模式的收益差别。从投资收益评估角度,将技术标准联盟的技术专利划分为必要专利与外围专利两种基本类型,构建了技术标准联盟多专利开发的实物期权评估模型。考虑到基础专利开发后存在从属专利开发的可能,将从属专利开发机会视为基础专利开发机会的嵌入期权,通过构建技术标准联盟复合专利开发的实物期权评估模型,分析了从属专利开发的成本节约价值与需求拉动价值,以抓住高科技企业技术标准联盟复合专利开发过程的本质特征。在高科技企业技术标准联盟专利开发战略控制方面,将高科技企业技术标准联盟专利共享控制模式划分为单边控制、共同控制、共享控制三种基本类型,通过构建技术标准联盟专利共享博弈模型,探讨了联盟专利共享控制模式影响联盟企业知识披露与研发努力水平的内在机理。针对高科技领域技术标准联盟之中多个技术专利的差异化控制问题,通过构建技术标准联盟专利差异化博弈模型,探讨了不同网络外部性强度条件下,联盟企业实施专利交叉许可,从而实现专利差异化控制的基本策略。引入三阶段动态博弈模型,通过高科技企业技术标准联盟标准兼容性博弈路径分析,给出了弱势竞争企业存在联合可能性情况下,技术标准联盟对标准兼容性控制的基本策略。竞争企业通过在技术标准联盟所拥有的技术专利周围开发一些外围专利,实现与联盟技术专利相同或相近的功能,然后再通过与其他弱势企业联合起来实施技术标准兼容性战略,针对这种竞争威胁,从单位成本与技术含量两个视角给出了技术标准联盟专利许可控制的基本策略。在实证研究方面,采用算例分析方法,针对单一专利选择模型、多专利选择模型、专利选择扩展优序模型、专利开发收益比较模型、多专利开发实物期权评估模型展开模拟仿真分析,验证了本文构建的高科技企业技术标准联盟专利开发战略选择、战略评估、战略控制模型的科学性及适用性。同时,通过对AVS技术标准联盟、MPEG-2技术标准联盟、3G技术标准联盟、GSM技术标准联盟等典型的、代表性强、富有综合性的案例深入剖析研究,从整体上揭示和提炼出了高科技企业技术标准联盟专利开发战略的基本状况,验证了本文研究的主题及主要结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the view of strategy management, through technolgy standalization strategy theory, technolgy compatible theory, game theory and real option evluation theory, this dissertation analyzed the operation law of technology standard alliance of high-tech enterprise, and researched the patent development strategy of choice mechanism, evaluation mechanism and control mechanism to promote the formation and bettering of research platform of technology standard alliance of high-tech enterprise and its patent development strategy.As for the the operation law of technology standard alliance of high-tech enterprise, this dissertation researched the formation background, formation forces and evolution trends, and analyzed the relation characteristic between dominant patent and subservien patent, core patent and peripheral patent, technology standard and technology patent. The research shows that the basic strategy of technology standard alliance is a long plan with cooperative R&D, technolgy patent strategy and technolgy standard cooperation.As for the choice of patent development strategy of technology standard alliance of high-tech enterprise , this dissertation constructed adverse selection model and patent development competition model, and analyzed the game process of alliance constrution decision. Through analyzing the Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium, this dissertation explored the alliance constrution and the effect of adopting different technolgy stardards on the enterprise profit and society welfare. Introducing deviation degree and risk factor, the model of single patent choice was constructed. By deviding technolgy standard into many dependent complete modules, this dissertation constructed many patents choice model, which could provide a basic ways to choose a property technolgy patent for every dependent module. As for the complex relation among the patents in the technolgy standards, this dissertation construted the choice model of compound patents, which provieded a decision basis for alliance.As for the evaluation of patent development strategy of technology standard alliance of high-tech enterprises, through compared the return change of technology standard alliance, this dissertation summarized the reasons that alliance had a enough return. Through construting the two return evaluation model of developing patent independently and cooperatively, this dissertation analyzed the return difference of patent development patterns for the alliance enperises. From the view of investment-return evluation, this dissertation classified the technolgy patents into essential patents and peripheral patents, and constructed real option evaluation model of multi-patent development. After dominant patent development, subservien patents must be developed. Therefore, regarding the subservien patent development as the embedded option of dominant patent development option, through constructing real option evaluation model of compound patent development, this dissertation analyzed the cost economic value and demand pull value of subservien patent.As for the control of patent development strategy of technology standard alliance of high-tech enterprise , classfying the patent share control patterns into one-side control, multi-sides control and sharing control, through constructing the patent share game model of alliance, this dissertation explored the effect of patent share control pattern on the level of knowledge disclose and R&D effort. As for the different control of multi-patent of alliance, through constructing the different game model of patent, this dissertation explored the the basic strategy of patent cross-licensing of alliance enterprises and different control in the different network externality. Introducing three stage dynamic game model, through analyzing the game path of technolgy standard compatibility, this dissertation provided the basic compatibility control strategy in the condition of disadvantaged competition enterprise combined. Competition enterprise could develop some peripheral patents on the basis of the technology patent the alliance owned, which could realize the same or familiar funtion with alliance patents. And then the competition enterprise could combined other disadvantaged enterprises to implement technology standard compatibility strategy. As for the above competition threat, this dissertation provided a basic control strategy of patent licensing from the view of per-unit cost and technolgy content.As for the empirical study, this dissertation testified the scientific and applicability of patent development strategy choice, evaluation and control. Meanwhile, through the case study of AVS alliance, MPEG-2 alliance, 3G alliance and GSM alliance, this dissertation revealed the patent development strategy of technolgy standard alliance of high-tech enterprises and testified the topic and main conclusions.更多还原