【作者】 张意如；

【导师】 朱宪辰；

【作者基本信息】 南京理工大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 鉴于团体贷款在世界范围内的广泛运用,以及其在消除贫困、促进落后地区经济发展方面可能发挥的重要作用,考查和研究团体贷款的具体效率和影响因素问题便具有重要的理论意义和实际运用价值。目前针对团体贷款的研究存在着如下一些不足。首先,现有大部分针对团体贷款的研究文献都揭示了团体贷款在解决金融部门“四大难题”上表现出的巨大的优越性,但却没有回答团体贷款与个体贷款相比,是否真的是一种“严格占优”模式的问题。其次,目前的研究没有解释为何目前团体贷款的应用绝大部分都集中在农村,没有回答团体贷款模式可否大规模应用于城市地区的问题。另外,由于现有研究假设上局限的限制,现有研究不能对团体贷款的实践提出有效见解。针对上述问题,本文通过理论与实证相结合的方式,在成员异质性的视角下探讨和研究了团体贷款与个体贷款的相对优势问题,以及农村与城市的区别问题,最后根据研究结果本文对金融业管理提出了部分建议。总结本文得到的研究结论如下:(1)通过对担保物效应、横向监督理论的分析考察,本文发现团体贷款与个体贷款之间不存在严格的优劣关系。横向监督与纵向监督在监督成本与可行性上面临的问题,是制约个体贷款与团体贷款效率差别的重要因素。(2)团体贷款中成员异质性的存存会对团体贷款的效率产生诸多影响。由于成员社会身份的不同可能导致调整成本,进而使得团体贷款中出现逆向选择:实行团体贷款区域的原有社会资本存量,社会关系的稳定程度等因素,会直接影响到团体组建成本的大小,以及团体组建发起者的积极性,进而影响团体贷款的效率;在团体贷款中实施动态激励,可以较好的抑制团体贷款中个体的策略性违约行为。(3)由于农村和城市地区的人们在生产生活交叉领域、行为间交互影响的纬度、非货币性影响的存在性与否等多方面存在不同,导致了农村和城市地区在社会链接和动态激励问题上出现重大差别,这些差别将在团体贷款的实施或成功产生重要影响。(4)在团体贷款中团体成员承担连带责任的概率由其投资成功的概率外生地决定,并且安全团体成员承担连带责任的概率未必小于风险团体成员承担连带责任的概率。贷款项目投资成功概率对团体贷款影响的大小与方向,受到贷款团体规模的作用。(5)团体成员的异质性程度,即团体成员的风险异质性会影响团体贷款的效率。当贷款团体内部成员具有很高的相似性时,银行能够通过提供契约组合的方式,让企业家自我选择契约,从而实现团体贷款信贷市场的效率。团体贷款的成功实施,可能并不是依赖某些单一的甄别机制就能够实现的。最后,本文通过实验验证并考察了上述因素的具体作用。实验对本文的上述研究成果提供了正面支持。更多还原

【Abstract】 For the widely use of group-lending in the world, and it’s important role in fighting against property, promoting the economic growth in developing countries, it’s very valuable for us to pay much attentions in group-lending in both theory and in practice. It is with great meaning to find out that to what content the efficiency can reach and what aspects can influence these efficiencies. However, it is a pity to see that there are many un-efficiencies in the study of group lending. Firstly, most of these studies have point out that group-lending has great power in solving the " Four Problems " in finance sector, but they have not answer the question that whether the group-lending is a strong dominant institution against personal lending? Secondly, the studies since now have not explain the fact that why most use of group-lending institution are in countries, why this "Excellent" institution can not be widely used in cities? Thirdly, for the restraints of default assumptions, normal studies can not give useful suggestions to the finance sector.Pointing at these questions, by using theoretical and practice methods, this issue studies the relative advantages of group-lending and personal lending under the angel of member heterogeneities, we also studied the difference of countries and cities, we give some advises to the finance sector at last.We conclude my studies as follows:(1)By studying the collateral effect, the peer monitoring theory, we find out that there is no absolute advantage relation between group-lending and personal lending. The problems of monitoring cost and possibilities of peer monitoring and direct monitoring, are the main aspects which influence the efficiencies of group-lending and personal lending.(2)Member heterogeneities will have many influences in the group-lending efficiency in group-lending institutions.The adjustment costs coming from the member social identities may cause adverse selections in group-lending. The social assets in societies, the stability of social ties will directly affect the costs of constructing a group, it will also influence the incentives of the leaders, and the efficiencies of group-lending. Creating dynamic incentives in group-lending will get many advantages, such as diminishing the strategic defaults in group-lending constructions.(3) Because there are many difference between countries and cities, such as the crossing areas in lives, the aspects that can be influenced together, the existing or not of the un-money punishment methods, make the big difference in social ties and dynamic incentives between countries and cities. Those difference will have great impact on the efficiency of group-lending.(4)The probabilities of liability that the members should take is determined by the probabilities of investment. It is not sure that the probabilities of safe-member will less than the risk-member.(5)The member heterogeneities ,especially the heterogeneities of risks will affect the efficiency of group-lending very much. If the heterogeneities in members is high enough, the bank can screening out the enterprises by offering different contracts. It will get a efficiency market. The successful use of group-lending can not rely on any single screening mechanism.At last ,this issue runs an experiment to study the aspects that mentioned above. All the conclusions are backed up by our experiment.更多还原