【作者】 秦耀林；

【导师】 张新；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文从我国上市公司股权集中和一股独大的特殊公司治理结构出发,研究了掌握公司控制权的大股东从追求控制权的私有收益出发,在控制权转移前进行的盈余管理行为,并深入探讨了控制权转移前的盈余管理行为对控制权转移前后业绩变化的影响。本文首先从我国特殊公司治理结构出发,指出控制权转让的对价收益是大股东获取私有收益的“最后机会”,提出了我国控制权转移前上市公司的大股东有谋取私有收益的盈余管理动机。本文的盈余管理动机模型表明,大股东是否进行盈余管理取决于盈余管理行为是否能够带来正的净收益,盈余管理的方向则取决于盈余与价值之间的相关性。而亏损公司的盈余价值相关性与盈利公司的盈余价值相关性有着性质上的差别,盈利公司调增盈余可以使大股东获得更多的转让溢价,而亏损公司则可以通过大幅调减盈余提升“壳”价值而使大股东获益。本文的实证也证实了盈利公司与亏损公司的不同盈余管理方向,同时实证结果还表明国家控股公司的盈余管理的程度要明显大于法人控股公司,持股高于30%的上市公司的盈余管理程度要高于持股低于30%的上市公司,上述结论为本文提出的大股东为谋取私有收益而进行盈余管理提供了证据支持。而通过控制权溢价与操纵性应计关系的考察显示收购者对盈利公司和亏损公司的盈余管理行为的识别能力都有限。盈余管理的存在导致使用会计业绩变化作为衡量经营效率的改善与否的指标的有效性值得怀疑。本文考察的样本中,全部样本在控制权转移前经行业中值调整的业绩出现下降,在控制权转移后有所改善,而分组统计结果表明,亏损公司控制权转移后经行业中值调整的业绩不断得到改善,但是盈利公司控制权转移后经行业中值调整的其业绩略有恶化的迹象。进一步的分析表明,亏损公司在t-1年的操纵性应计在控制权转移后发生明显反转,多因素分析也表明亏损公司的操纵性应计对其控制权转移前后业绩变化具有显著的解释力,剔除盈余管理影响的经济绩效表明亏损公司的业绩在控制权转移后并非持续改善但是操纵性应计对盈利公司的业绩变化的解释力则较弱。上述研究结果表明,我国控制权转移公司在控制权转移后以披露的盈余数字反映的业绩变化的原因部分在于盈余被管理了,因此,通过盈余数字(例如资产回报率等财务指标)评价控制权转移公司的业绩变化可能不是最佳选择。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation studies the earnings management behaviors which were carried on by large shareholders to pursue private benefits of control before the corporate controls were transferred.This dissertation also discusses the relationship between earnings management and performance change of listed companies whose controls had been transferred.Based on the special corporate governance structure,this dissertation puts forward that large shareholders have motives to manage reported earnings before the corporate controls are transferred,because that they are the last opportunities for large shareholders to obtain private benefits from considerations of controls.The motive model of this dissertation indicates that whether large shareholders manage reported eamings or not depends on whether the eamings management behaviors can bring positive profits.The model also indicates that direction of earnings management depends on the value relevance of earnings.However,price-eamings relation may not be homogeneous across profit and loss companies.We hypothesize that high earnings for profit companies can bring more premiums to large shareholders.We also hypothesize that loss companies’ large shareholders can benefit from the value increment of shell resources after the reported earning were managed downward. Empirical research of this dissertation proves these two hypotheses.Moreover,this dissertation also finds that the magnitude of earnings management of state-controlled companies is larger than that of legal-person-controlled companies and that the magnitude of earnings management of companies whose large shareholders hold more than thirty percent of the outstanding shares is larger than that of companies whose large shareholders hold less than thirty percent of the outstanding shares.These results support the conclusion that large shareholders have motives to manage reported earnings before the corporate controls were transferred.We also investigate the relationship between discretionary accruals and premiums of control.The result shows that acquirers can not recognize the earnings management behaviors for both profit and loss companies.It is questionable whether the change of accounting performance can represent the change of operational efficiency.Empirical research of this dissertation finds that the performance adjusted by median performance of industry decrease before the transfer of control and increase after the transfer of control in some extent.The statistics in group show that the adjusted performance for loss companies have been improved significantly after the transfer of control,and the adjusted performance for profit companies decrease after the transfer of control.The further analysises show that the discretionary accruals of loss companies at t-1 years reverse after the transfer.The regression result confirms that one of the reasons of the performance change is that reported earnings are managed.The results metioned above show that the performance changes after the transfer of control were caused partly by earnings management.So, when the control has been transferred,it is not the best choice to evaluate the operational efficiency of such companies using earning numbers,such as return on assets,return on equity,and so on.更多还原