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内部人交易、信息获利动机与制衡因素

【作者】 高垚

【导师】 李若山;

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 , 会计学, 2008, 博士

【副题名】基于沪市A股上市公司的经验证据

【摘要】 内部人交易是我国股权分制改革后,随着新《公司法》和《证券法》的实施而出现的一个新现象。一般来说,内部人交易并不一定是内幕交易,然而由于公司内部人所处的信息地位优势,他们往往具有市场还不知晓的公司的重要内部信息,并很容易利用这些信息进行市场获利。因此,市场对内部人交易充满了争议,并已引起了监管机构的高度重视。要合理有效的规范内部人交易,首先就必须认清内部人交易的现状到底如何?他们是否利用了公司的私有信息进行了获利交易?进而,有哪些因素可以防范内部人的这一信息获利交易?这些正是本文试图去回答和解决的问题。本文所称的“内部人交易”是指公司董事、监事和高管通过二级市场买卖自己公司股票的行为;“信息获利动机”指内部人利用公司尚未公开的信息进行市场获利的动机;“制衡因素”是指市场在限制内部人的信息获利行为上可以采取的制约机制。本文首先辨析了内部人交易与内幕交易的差别,对我国内部人交易的制度背景做了全面的介绍和分析,并对内部人交易的现状作了系统的描述,展现了我国内部人交易的特性;随后,通过理论和市场环境的分析,指出了在我国,内部人会利用公司尚未公布的信息进行交易的必然性,并通过验证内部人交易的规模与其后财报的盈余信息之间的关联关系,发现了内部人信息获利动机的存在性。继而,本文从公司治理和个人薪酬等视角,对制衡内部人信息获利动机的因素进行了探讨。我们认为:公司治理水平越高、个人薪酬越高,内部人利用私有信息进行交易的意愿就越低,本文的实证结果也证明了这些假设。本文的研究首次全面直接地验证了在我国资本市场上内部人信息获利动机的普遍性和严重性,并系统地研究了影响信息获利动机的因素,其结论为公司其他投资者和市场监管部门规范和规避内部人交易有着重要的指导意义。

【Abstract】 Insider trading is a new phenomenon from 2006, the year in which the new "Company Law" and "Securities Law" are implemented. Generally, not all insider trading is illegal, but because of their superior status on firm’s information, the corporate insiders can easily earn abnormal returns through the transactions based on such information. Therefor the insider trading is a controversial issue in the market and has raised the regulatory agency’s high degree of attention. However, in order to regulate the insider trading effectively, we have to answer the three questions below: what is the situation of the insider trading? Whether the insider transactions are based on the inside information? And which mechanisms can reduce the insider’s illegal transactions.In this paper, we have three terms. The insider trading refers to the stock transactions of officers, directors and supervisors of the firm. The information-based motivation is the insiders’ incentives to earn abnormal stock returns from the insider information. The market restrictions mean the mechanisms that the market implementing to regulate and reduce the illegal insider trading.This paper firstly tells the difference between the legal insider tradings and illegal insider tradings. Then I give a comprehensive introduction on the regulations of the insider trading and a systematical description on the situation of the insider trading. After that, through the analysis of the theory and market environment, I conclude that the insiders will inescapably transact on the insider information in recent Chinese market. My judgement is then confirmed by the empirical evidence based on the relationship between the insiders’ transaction scale and the quarterly earnings report. At last this paper discusses the market restrictions that can regulate and reduce the illegal insider tradings. I think the corporate governance and individual pay are two important mechanisms. The empirical evidences support my assumptions that the insider’s tradings are less related with the insider information under the higher corporate governance and with the more individual pays.This paper is a frontier research on the insider trading in China. I find that the insiders in Chinese listed companies are mostly transacted on the insider information because of the relax regulation. I also point out the effective mechanisms to reduce the illegal insider tardings besides the laws and regulations. These findings are useful for the shareholders, other investors and regulatory agncies to regulate the insider tradings.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 复旦大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2009年 08期
  • 【分类号】F832.51;F224
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】964
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