现象学视野下的移情问题

【作者】 牟春；

【导师】 张庆熊；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 外国哲学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 移情这一概念的兴起可以上溯到19世纪末20世纪初,它首先出现在德国审美心理学研究中。随后,在美学、心理学、现象学哲学,有时是三者的交叉领域,移情概念被广泛地论述和频繁地使用。虽然移情的意义具体到各个领域会稍有不同,不同的理论家在使用这一概念时其指向也略有差异,但大体而言,移情概念的核心意义并没有太大改变。它乃是指一个人把他自己感入到或是投射到他者那里,以经验他者的意识或主体性。在大多数情况下,这个“他者”是指他人,不过有时也包括他物。因此,移情现象既可以发生在一个人所感知到的社会对象中,也可以发生在他所感知到的非社会对象中。本文将主要追溯利普斯(TheodorLipps)、胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl)、施坦因(Edith Stein)、舍勒(Max Sheler)以及海德格尔(Martin Heidegger)等人对移情问题的讨论以展示他们围绕移情问题所展开的有关自我、他者、世界的实质性争论。移情概念之所以能存当时的学术圈里具有广泛的影响力乃是由于浪漫主义思潮的影响。受浪漫主义影响的哲人自认为他们完全站在了古典主义的对立面,特别是17世纪以来认识论传统的对立面。比如,他们不同意古典认识论高标认知活动的地位以及把理性作为人性的根本。与之相反,他们强调感情、意志甚至里比多在人类活动中的力量。总之,这些和浪漫主义相互伴随的观念促发和推动了哲学家们对移情概念的讨论。许多美学家、哲学心理学家和现象学家把移情看作是自我理解他者的有效甚至唯一途径。随着20世纪现象学的兴起,胡塞尔、施坦因、舍勒、海德格尔等众多现象学家开始反思浪漫主义、心理主义甚至整个西方认识论传统。而他们对利普斯移情论的批评正是坐落在对这些传统的反思之中。不过,他们给出的移情方案却有实质性差别。虽然胡塞尔对移情的叙述总是伴随着他对利普斯移情论的批评,但他还是接过了利普斯移情概念的自我论起点,而且其移情叙述细节也和利普斯有诸多相似之处。胡塞尔极力要避免利普斯移情论所携带的“唯我论”的消极影响,但“唯我论”的种子已经深深地埋在了移情这个概念之中。跟随自己的老师,施坦因也主张以“自我论”为起点用移情建构出他者。然而她的具体论述却暗中解构了胡塞尔“自我论”的前提。因为在施坦因看来,移情不仅仅参与自我对他者的构造,也参与他者对自我的构造。并且,只有通过反复移情,我身体的完整性才能被构造出来,即我才能意识到我的身体乃是众多身体之中的一个身体。和利普斯、胡塞尔、施坦因不同,舍勒和海德格尔反对使用移情这个概念。虽然他们是从不同的角度批评心理学和现象学移情论的,但其构想和目标却非常接近,二者都揭示了他者相对于自我的优先性。而移情论背后的难题正是自我如何一来就可以理解他者的问题。通过对众多移情理论的考察,我想揭示的是——我们对他者的理解并不需要移情,我们在最为普遍的状况下本就理解他者。同样地,主体间性也不需要移情来建构,它本就是需要被揭示的源始现象。更多还原

【Abstract】 The concept of empathy （Einfuhlung） can be traced in the end of 19th century to the beginning of 20th century. At first, it was used in the field of German Aesthetics. Then it was treated as a very important concept and was widely used in Aesthetics, psychology and phenomenology, sometimes the intersecting fields of them. Although empathy was given different senses in different fields, topics especially contexts, the core meaning of it never changed. Empathy always means someone （self or ego） feels himself in or projects himself into other objects which he perceived. These objects altogether can be called ’others’ and they could be both the non-social things and the social things. My dissertation would focus on introducing the discussion of empathy by some brilliant phenomenologist including Theodor Lipps, Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Max Sheler, and Martin Heidegger. What I want to show through the introduction is their intensely disputation about self, others, the world, and the relationship of three of them.The reason why empathy had great influence and became very popular in academia at that time is that it was in accordance with romanticism. Philosophers who believed in romanticism thought they had completely different views which were opposed to Classicalism especially Cognition since 17th. For example, philosophers who influenced by romanticism don’t agree the idea of regarding reason as resources of human nature and emphasizing the activity of cognition. On the contrary, they emphasized the power of emotion and volition even libido. All in all, this kind of ideas companied with romanticism gave birth and energy to empathy. It was used by many estheticians, psychologists, and phenomelogoists as a way to understand others from myself or ego.With the emergence of phenomenology in the early 20^th century, many phenomenology philosophers such as E. Husserl, Edith Stein, M. Heiddeger and M. Scheler had profound comments on Lipps’ empathy in the background of their critiques on romanticism and psychologism. But their inclinations and purposes are very different. Although at the beginning, Husserl described empathy always accompanied with his critiques to Lipps, the methods they used and the questions they thought are very similar. After all, on the one hand, Husserl accepted the main senses of empathy （Einfuhlung） founded by Lipps. On the other hand, the question Husserl dealt with and even some details Husserl endowed with empathy are similar to Lipps. Husserl tried his best to avoid the negative influence of empathy, but the solipsism had already deeply been implanted in it since Lipps clarified it.Following her own master, Edith Stein also claims that empathy which someone understands others from my self could construct the real others. However, her account about empathy itself disconstructs her master’s standpoint. Because according to her account empathy is not only the way my self constructs others but others construct my self. Furthermore, only by the repeated empathy I could construct my own body completely, because in that case I could aware that my body is one of many bodies.Different from Lipps, Husserl, and Stein, Scheler and Heiddeger criticize the concept of empathy although in different ways. I think their projects are very similar, because they both reveal and emphasize the primacy of others. In fact, the difficult problem behind empathy is the question how my self understands others. By introducing different kind of empathy theories, what I want to clarify is that we don’t need empathy to understand others because we have already understood others generally. Likewise, we don’t need empathy to construct intersubjectivity, because intersubjectivity is the truth which needn’t construct but to reveal.更多还原