【作者】 张存彦；

【导师】 蔡春；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 我国资本市场建立十几年以来,审计行业作为企业财务信息的鉴证人是不可或缺的,为经济建设发挥了巨大的作用,同时也出现了很多震荡整个资本市场的财务欺诈与审计失败案件,投资者的信心为之一挫再挫,使审计质量和行业的信誉受到严重质疑。审计是保证受托经济责任有效履行的一种机制,它涉及对受托经济责任履行情况的确认与解除,是一种可以减少企业代理成本并通过减少代理成本提高企业价值的制度安排。只有在市场投资者预期审计师会报告已经发现的管理者的违约行为时,审计才具有价值,其报告已发现的违约行为的概率越高价值越大。究竟什么因素是决定审计质量的关键?迈考莱(Macaulay,1963)认为“相对非正式的、没有法律强制力的契约安排统治着市场中的商业关系,而对明确法律制裁的依赖是极为少见的。”因此市场的自我履约机制才是使交易顺利完成的决定因素,法律与制度规制的作用最终都要通过市场机制自身来体现。我国的资本市场脱胎于计划经济体制,但十几年来经过多项改革措施正在逐步走向市场化,这一趋势是不可逆转的。审计作为一种在资本市场中进行交易的服务,当前的市场是否已经显现出一些促进审计契约自我履行的功能?其作用发挥到了何种程度,是否已经可以激励和约束审计师使其自动履行审计契约,提供高质量服务?本研究根据一般产品市场交易契约自我履行机制理论构建了审计契约的自我履行机制理论,并对理论的相关命题在我国当前资本市场中的有效性进行了一系列的验证,在此基础上做出总结性的评价并提出了相应的政策建议。本研究分为八章共五部分,分别为导论、理论分析、制度背景分析、实证检验和结论。第一部分:第1章,导论。介绍了论文的研究背景、研究目的、相关的核心概念和基础理论、文献综述与本研究的视角、研究的意义、思路结构、方法、创新点和不足。第二部分:理论部分,本部分包括交易契约自我履行机制的一般理论和审计契约自我履行机制理论。第2章,审计契约的自我履行机制理论。本章以交易费用经济学为基础,对一般产品与服务交易契约的自我履行机制进行了系统梳理。首先,对于具有专用性投资特征的契约,一旦投资到位,就易于出现被对方挤占未来交易准租金的违约现象,市场是通过私人惩罚来解决此类问题的,即由于违约方的失信行为,一方面交易伙伴将终止与违约方的契约关系,另一方面市场中其他的参与者也会加大违约者未来的交易成本。私人惩罚导致违约者的损失大于违约收益并借此防止违约行为的发生。为了防止交易者的违约行为,除了在其违约后进行私人惩罚以外,为了增加交易者的个人履约资本,市场往往以“质量溢价”给高质量产品的提供者以激励,这一机制不仅会有效防止违约行为,还可以使交易者自觉提供高质量的产品。在无法区分产品提供者身份的市场中,企业为了得到溢价,会对声誉进行投资以将自己与其他产品提供者区分开来,这一投资在后期会以溢价的形式收回,在企业违约时可以作为产品质量的担保,一旦违约将无法收回,而且这一投资在竞争性的市场均衡状态下可以阻止竞争者进入市场。利用交易费用经济学契约自我履行机制理论对审计契约的自我履行机制进行了剖析和阐述。首先,从审计关系契约的构成入手,分别分析了受托经济责任契约、隐性审计契约和显性审计契约交易中的特征及审计契约自我履行的障碍。其次,构建审计契约自我履行机制理论框架,对审计契约的市场惩罚机制与溢价激励机制、声誉专用性投资的担保机制通过模型进行了分析。最后,从历史角度对审计契约的自我履行机制进行了考察。审计师在最初形态的公司中产生到股份公司中的普及,可以看出审计师这一角色产生于市场内部,其独立性也主要依靠契约各方的制约来维持,说明审计行业的质量问题主要应依靠市场自身的力量来解决。第三部分:第3章,制度背景部分,对我国资本市场中审计契约关系人的市场化改革及结果进行了分析,总结出我国当前资本市场虽然在向市场化过渡但由于某些市场化制度尚未到位及一些过度的监管措施构成了审计契约自我履行的市场机制的障碍。第四部分,实证检验部分,本部分包括三章,分别对我国资本市场中审计契约的私人惩罚机制、激励机制和专用性投资担保机制进行了检验。第4章,我国资本市场对审计师的惩罚机制研究。以2004-2005财政部对审计行业的质量检查及公告为背景,通过对受到批评的事务所客户市场价值、客户量和审计费用的变动进行检验,考察了审计师声誉下降的负面影响和审计师的执业质量问题被投资者察觉后的市场惩罚机制的有效性。发现市场的惩罚机制只对具有国际声誉的事务所产生了一些负面效果。第5章,我国资本市场对审计师的激励机制研究。按照声誉等级将我国的审计师分为国际所、国内大所和地方所,假设国际所和国内大所能够提升客户的市场价值,用多元回归分析方法考察了这两类审计师的声誉与企业价值之间的关系,发现国内大所未能提高企业价值,但国际所的声誉与企业价值具有显著的正相关关系。第6章,审计契约的担保机制研究――审计师的初期折价投资,兼论企业对审计师的溢价激励。本章的实证检验包括两个内容,企业对高声誉的审计师是否支付了费用溢价以及审计师在初期是否进行了折价投资。虽然第6章并未得到国内大所可以提升客户价值的证据,但本章的实证结果表明企业对国际所和国内大所都支付了溢价。同时发现,在进行初期折价投资方面,已经建立起市场声誉的国际所折价较少,而对于未建立起声誉的国内大所和地方所,竞争更为激烈,还主要以折价作为竞争手段。第五部分,第7章,主要结论和政策建议。本章对一系列的实证结论进行了总括分析,提出我国当前资本市场中三类审计契约自我履行机制对国际所而言具有激励和约束作用,这些机制成为国际所提供高质量审计服务的保证。但是对于本土的事务所而言,无论规模大小我们都难以观察到契约得到自我履行的证据,得出我国的资本市场制度存在较为严重的缺陷,不足以催生高质量的审计师等结论,认为市场本身不够完善,市场化改革还有待于深入和优化。基于此,本研究提出了两个改革的大方向,今后应主要处理好政府与市场、法律与市场两方面的关系。本研究主要的创新点在于:第一,本研究根据市场本身对交易的主导作用理论,以审计契约的自我履行机制为独特的研究视角,对当前我国资本市场对审计行业的制约与激励机制进行了系统研究。目前我国对于审计质量问题的研究有种种不同的研究角度,例如从审计需求、法律风险及审计契约的失衡等角度分析审计市场与行业存在的症结,提出不同的政策建议,但根据经济学理论,交易契约的顺利进行主要依赖于市场本身的激励和约束机制,本研究以此为切入点,探讨了我国资本市场对审计行业的激励与约束作用及作用程度,对我国资本市场的运行状况做出了客观的评价并提出了改革的政策建议。第二,根据交易费用经济学中契约自我履行机制理论,构建了审计契约自我履行机制理论。以受托经济责任契约为基点,将审计契约分为投资者与审计师之间的隐性契约和企业与审计师之间的显性契约,对各个契约关系人的利益特征及其对审计契约的自我履行构成的障碍进行了分析,提出保证契约自我履行的机制体系,包括私人惩罚的惩罚机制、质量溢价的激励机制和声誉专用性投资的担保机制,三种机制相辅相成,逻辑一致地结合起来,构成对审计师的履约和违约行为的约束机制,保证审计契约的自我履行。第三,以我国当前资本市场的市场化改革趋势为背景,以审计契约自我履行机制为实证命题,分别对三类机制进行了实证检验。对资本市场惩罚机制的检验,第一次用我国A股市场的数据对中国资本市场制度背景下的私人惩罚机制进行了实证考察,为资本市场中审计师的声誉下降研究增加了新的经验证据。将我国的审计师按照声誉分为三个不同的等级,对审计师与企业的价值关系进行了深入的考察,发现只有具有国际声誉的事务所可以增加企业的价值;对我国审计行业的专用性投资――初期折价投资,依据审计师变更的不同角度、不同层次分别进行了详细深入的验证,得出国际所的折价相对较少,而国内所的折价更加显著的结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 Auditing has played an tremendous and indispensable role to identify the corporation financial information in more than 10 years’history of China’s capital market. But at the same time, a series of financial fraud and audit failure cases extremely disappointed the investors, and the audit quality and the auditor reputation are seriously doubted.Auditing is a kind of mechanism which ensures the effective performance of accountability, involving the confirmation and release of accountability fulfilling. It is an institutional arrangement which can rise enterprise value through reducing agency costs. Auditing is valuable only when the investors expect that auditors would report violations of managers that have been found. The value of auditing increases as the probability of reproting the founded default behavior increases.What’s the key factor to determine the audit quality? Macaulay (1963) stated that“The comparative informal and non-legal coercive contractual arrangements dominates commercial relationships in the market, and it’s extremely rare to rely on the explicit legal sanctions" So the self-enforcing mechanism is the determining factor for successful completion of transactions. The legal system and regulations will ultimately work through the market mechanism itself. China’s capital market was born out of the planned economic system, but it is gradually moving towards to the market economy after a number of reformations during the recent years. This trend is inevitable. As a kind of service traded in the capital market, does the current market institutional background show some self-enforcing function for audit contracts? To hw much extent it can play its role? Has it already incented and restrained auditors to automatically perform audit contracts and provide high-quality service? This study constructs a self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts according to the self-enforcing mechanism theory of normal products transaction contracts and verifies the effectiveness of the relevant topics in China’s capital market. And on this basis it gives some summarized evaluation and corresponding policy recommendations. This study is divided into eight chapters of five parts, namely, introduction, theoretical analysis, and system background analysis, empirical tests and conclusions.Part I: Chapter 1, Introduction. This chapter introduces the background and purposes of the research, as well as the relevant core concepts, basic theories, literature review and the perspective, significance, structure, methods, innovation and inadequacy of this study.Part II: Theoretical analysis. This part includes self-enforcing mechanism theory of transaction contract and self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contacts.Chapter 2, self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contacts. This chapter is based on transaction cost economics and systematically goes through the self-enforcing mechanism theory of general product and service transaction contract. Firstly, for the specific investment contract, once the investment is in place, default behavior of appropriable quasi-rents may happen. This problem is solved by private punishment of the market, that is, on one hand, trading partners will terminate the contractual relationship with the violators, on the other hand, the private punishment will led to greater loss than benefits on the violators to prevent violations from occurring.In order to prevent the violation of the transaction, in addition to the private punishment after violation, the market tends to give a "quality premium" to the high-quality products providers in order to increase the personal private contractual enforcement capital. This mechanism will not only effectively prevent violations, but also enable traders consciously provide high-quality products.In the market where we are unable to distinguish the identity of the product providers, enterprises will invest in the reputation to separate their products from other providers’in order to receive premium. This investment will be recovered in the form of a premium in latter period and in the event of default, it can be a security of product quality, once non-compliance will not be able to recover. This investment can stop competitors to enter the market in the equilibrium state of a competitive market. The chapter also analysis and illustrates self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts using self-enforcing mechanism theory of transaction cost economics. Firstly, it begins with the construction of audit relationship contract, analyzing the characteristics of implicit and explicit accountability audit contracts separately and the obstacles of audit contracts self-enforcing.Secondly, it constructs the theoretical framework of audit contracts self-enforcing mechanism theory, and analyzes the penalties mechanism, premium incentive mechanism and the reputation specific investment collateral mechanism of audit contracts market through the model.Finally, it studies the self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts from a historical perspective. Auditor was produced in the initial form of corporation and becomes universal in joint-stock companies. Auditor is produce inside the market and its independence is maintained by constraints of contract parties. So the quality problem of the audit industry major problem can be solved mainly by own strength of the market.Part III: Chapter 3, the system background. This chapter analyses the market-oriented reforms and the results of audit contracts relations in China’s capital market. The conclusion are as follows: China’s current capital market is on transition to market-oriented, however, there are obstacles on market mechanism for the self-enforcing mechanism of audit contracts due to the incompleteness of market-oriented system and some excessive supervision measures.Part IV, empirical testing. This part includes three chapters, and it tests the private punishment mechanism of audit contracts, incentive mechanism and specific investment collateral mechanism in China’s capital market separately.Chapter 4, it studies the punishment mechanism for auditors in China’s capital market. Based on the 2004-2005 bulletin of quality inspection to audit industry of the Finance Ministry, this chapter analyzes the impact of auditors reputation declining and the effectiveness of the market punishment mechanism after investor aware of the quality problem through testing the changes of corporation’s market value whose auditor has been criticized, numbers of clients and audit fees. Evidences indicate that market punishment mechanism only have some negative effects on world reputation audit firms.Chapter 5, it tests the incentive mechanisms for auditors in China’s capital market. Audit firms are divided into international, large domestic and local ones in accordance with the reputation hierarchy. We assume that the international and domestic large ones can increase customers’market value, and we analyze the relationship between the reputation of audit firms and corporations’market value using multiple regression analysis method. We find that large domestic audit firms don’t increase corporations’market value but the reputation of international firms and corporations’market value have a significant positive correlation.Chapter 6, it test the collateral system of audit contracts, including auditors initial discount investments and the corporate premium motivation to auditors. The empirical testing of this chapter includes two elements, whether corporations pay premium costs to high reputation auditors and whether auditors have a discount investment in initial period. Though from Chapter 6 we don’t get evidence that large domestic audit firms don’t increase corporations’market value, the empirical results from this chapter show that most corporations pay premium to international firms and large domestic firms . At the same time we found that the international firms already establishing a reputation get less discount, but for large domestic and local firms which haven’t established reputation, the competition is more severe and discount is the main mean of competition.Part V, Chapter 7, the main conclusions and policy recommendations. This chapter is a conclusion of series of empirical analysis .It brings forward that the three kinds of self-enforcing mechanisms theory of audit contracts in China’s current capital market play an incentive and restrictive role for international audit firms and they are the guarantees of their high-quality audit services. But for local firms, regardless of their size, we find it difficult to find the mechanisms have been self-enforced. This conclusion shows that China’s capital market system has some serious defects, hardly to give birth to high quality auditors, and the market itself is not perfect enough, the market-oriented reform have yet to be thoroughly and optimization. According to these, this research proposes two reform aspects on the proper relationship management between government and market, laws and market.The major innovations of this research:First, the paper systematically studies the constraints and incentive mechanism of audit industry in China’s current capital market in perspective of the self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contractsThere are several research aspects on audit quality, such as from the perspective of audit requirements, legal risks and imbalances of audit contractss, we analyze the problems of audit market and audit industry, giving different policy suggestions. But according to economic theories, the smooth progress of transaction contracts mainly depends on incentive and restraint mechanisms of market itself. So this study take it as a starting point to explore the incentive and restraint to audit industry by China’s capital market and gives objective evaluation and policy recommendation for reformation about the operation of China’s capital market.Secondly, this paper constructs a self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts according to the self-enforcing mechanism theory of product market transaction contract. Based on accountability contract, audit contracts are divided into implicit contracts between investors and auditors and explicit contracts between enterprises and auditors. It analyzes the interest characters of each contractor and the obstacles to self-enforcing mechanism of audit contracts. It then gives forward a self-enforcing mechanism system including private punishment mechanism, quality premium incentive mechanism and specific investment collateral mechanism. The three mechanisms complete each other, consisting in logic, and constitute a restraining mechanism on auditors’contracts compliance and violations behaviors, in order to ensure the self-implementation of audit contracts.Thirdly, based on the market-oriented reform background and self-enforcing mechanism theory of audit contracts as the empirical proposition, this paper tests these three mechanisms. In the test of punishment mechanism in capital market, the A class share market data was first used to investigate the self-enforcing mechanism theory, providing new empirical evidence for the studies on the degrading of the auditor’reputation. Our country’s auditors were divided into three classes based on their reputation. After an in-depth analysis, it was found that only the auditing firms with international reputation can add value to the enterprise. The investment specialized for auditing industry, the discount investment in initial period, was tested from the perspectives of the change of auditor and different levels. The results indicate that the discount of the international auditing firm was smaller, and the discount of the domestic auditing firm is more significant.更多还原