【作者】 兰定筠；

【导师】 李世蓉；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 随着我国社会主义市场经济的发展,传统政府投资项目管理制度已经不适应社会主义市场经济发展的规律和要求,同时,我国已经加入WTO,对政府投资项目管理提出了与国际接轨的要求,在此背景下,我国政府投资体制改革明确提出了对非经营性政府投资项目推行代建制。因此,对代建制进行研究是非常必要的。首先,从业主工程项目管理理论的角度,分析了业主(政府业主)对工程项目采购模式的需求变化,包括对工程采购模式、对服务采购模式、对货物采购模式的要求,比较了中外业主(政府业主)工程项目采购模式,指出了现行我国工程项目采购模式的不足。研究了代建人项目管理的性质、内容,对比分析了代建人的项目管理与业主委托项目管理公司的项目管理、工程承包商的项目管理、发达国家管理承包商的项目管理、发达国家CM模式下CM单位的项目管理等的本质不同,指出现行代建制中的代建人的项目管理属于业主的项目管理,从而论证了代建制是我国政府投资项目管理制度创新。其次,针对现行代建制存在的诸多问题,分析了问题的根源是现行代建制的制度缺陷,因此,提出对现行代建制进行制度设计。从系统论出发,论文提出了代建制制度设计的总体框架,提出了代建制制度设计内容——体制、法制、运行机制和组织机构,并分析了它们的相互关系。第三,研究了代建制的法制设计内容,提出了代建制的法制体系,并提出代建制的立法原则。深入分析了现行国家投资、财政、建设、审计、稽查等法制情况,指出现行我国政府投资项目管理的法制建设的不足。指出代建制管理办法的法律基础应是《政府采购法》,并提出了设计内容;对代建人的选择管理办法进行了深入分析,从业主工程项目管理理论的角度,分析了业主(政府业主)服务采购的内容与特点,服务采购评审的特点,完善了对代建人选择的招标评审方法;对代建费(或项目管理费)进行了中外对比分析,指出现行代建费计费不合理,并提出了改进现行代建费计费的具体措施。第四,研究了代建合同中的双方责任与权利、风险分配、激励机制。对合同双方责任与权利,指出政府委托人应将大部分项目管理权转移给代建人,代建人应拥有工程采购决定权、货物采购决定权、服务采购决定权、资金支付控制权、工程变更核定权,合同管理权、项目“三控”的监督控制权、组织协调权等。对合同风险分配,从工程项目全寿命周期风险分析的角度,依据风险分配原则,得到了政府委托人与代建人之间的风险分配清单,从而科学、合理地划分了政府委托人与代建人各自应承担的风险。对激励机制,分析了成本激励、工期激励、质量激励的特点,并建立了成本激励的计算公式,运用合谋的博弈分析,确定了成本激励系数的范围,并指出成本激励应实施累计激励,该结论在实际代建制激励机制中得到了验证;建立了工期成本激励的计算公式,依据主从递阶决策模型,研究了政府委托人如何制定最优成本激励系数、最优工期激励系数,使政府委托人、代建人双方的决策达到一种均衡状态,从而双方的收益最大化。第五,从监督机制、市场机制和行业自律机制三个方面,研究了代建制的运行机制。依据国家监督的经济学理论、现代工程项目管理理论,建立了代建项目全寿命周期的国家监督模式;分析了政府监督机制、市场机制和行业自律机制之间的相互关系是互补的,指出它们是市场经济发育成熟的标志,系统地构建了代建制的市场机制的内容,并对行业自律机制的建设进行了较深入研究。最后,分析了代建制的组织机构,提出应建立代建制政策研究组织机构和代建制实施的组织机构。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of the socialist market economy in China, traditional government investment project management system can not meet the law and requirement of socialist market economy development already, meanwhile, as China enters into WTO, which requires the government investment project management to gear to international practice, therefore, it is clearly put forward in the government investment system reform that the agent construction institution is implemented in not-for-profit government investment projects. Thus, the study on the agent construction institution is necessary.This thesis discusses the demand variation in procurement modes, based on the comparative study on the foreign and domestic owner’s (government) project procurement modes. Moreover, a comparative analysis on project management of agent construction companies, owner-principal project management companies, construction contractors, management contractors in developed countries and CM companies under CM mode is carried on. Based on the difference study of characteristics among them, it illustrates that project management of agent construction companies should be categorized into owner’s project, which proves the agent construction institution is an innovation of government investment project management system.Secondly, it analyzes the institution defects are the origin cause of the problems in current agent construction institution which should be designed. It designs the general frame of the agent construction institution and constructs its contents based on the systematology, including the system, law, operation system and organization structure and analyzes the interrelation among them.Thirdly, this thesis studies the legal contents of agent construction institution, establishes the legal system and suggests the legislative principle. Based on the facts, such as investment, finance, construction, auditing and checking, the deficiency of legal construction in government investment project management in China is presented. It holds that the Government Procurement Law is the base of the agent construction management method and gives the design contents as well as deeply analyzes the selection management method of the agent.Fourthly, this thesis studies the responsibilities, rights, risk distribution and incentive system of both parties in agent contract. It points out that government should delivery most of project management rights to the agent who can decide the projects procurement, goods procurement and services procurement, etc. From the angle of project life cycle risk analysis, based on the risk distribution principle, obtaining the risk distribution list between the government and its agent, the risks undertook respectively by government and its agent is divided scientifically and reasonably. Moreover, it analyzes the characteristics of cost incentive, time incentive and quality incentive and designs the calculation formula, determines the cost inventive coefficient range based on the analysis of Game Theory and illustrates that the cost inventive should be accumulated incentive, which is verified in real agent construction incentive system. It forms the calculation formula of time cost incentive according to the model of stacklberg decision, studies how to balance the decision between government and its agent and maximize the profits of both through optimum cost incentive coefficient and optimum time incentive coefficient.Fifthly, from the angles of supervision system, market system and industry self-regulation system, it studies the operation system of agent construction institution. The national supervision mode of agent construction project life cycle is set up; based on analysis on the mutually complementary relationship among government supervision system, market system and industry self-regulation system, which symbolizes the maturity of the market economy, it systematically constructs the contents of the market system of agent construction institution and further studies the construction of industry self-regulation system.Finally, this thesis analyzes the organization structure of agent construction institution and suggests the establishment of organizations to study the policy and implement the agent construction institution.更多还原