【作者】 叶满城；

【导师】 李平；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 西方经济学， 2008， 博士

【副题名】基于混合寡头数量竞争框架

【摘要】 自1979年以来,中国就进入了改革与开放共同推进的阶段,中央政府更是将改革和开放称为基本国策的两个“基本点”。改革与开放在经济层面上就是经济改革与对外经济开放。当然,经济改革与经济开放各自又包含很多内容,比如,经济改革包括经济自由化、市场化改革和原国有企业的民营化等方面;而对外经济开放包括国际贸易的扩大、FDI的进入等具体内容。包括经济学家在内的很多人都认为,经济改革与对外经济开放具有互相促进、互为因果的关系。如果不考虑二者的双向关系,仅仅考虑单向的因果关系,那么经济的对外开放确实是经济改革的一个原因吗?更细致地说,如果以国有企业的民营化作为经济改革的指标,国外企业进入本国市场作为经济开放的一个指标,那么,国外企业进入本国市场时是否能促进国有企业的民营化?这需要用一个标准的经济框架来证明。从以往的文献来看,讨论国有企业民营化原因的文献集中在两条线索,一条线索是国有企业内部治理缺陷导致了国有企业的民营化,另一条线索是国有企业的外部竞争导致了国有企业的民营化。本文沿袭对外竞争这条线索,基本思路是,在开放条件下,国有企业的民营化比例受到国外企业进入的影响。因为国外企业的进入改变了国有企业的垄断地位,导致了市场结构发生了变化,这必然会使国有企业的利润与整个社会福利水平发生变化,从而改变了政府的国有企业民营化的比例。当由本国政府对国外企业所施加的非税收成本和税收成本的变动时,国外企业的成本将进一步变动,从而影响其供给数量,这进一步影响了政府的国有企业民营化比例。所以,本文在产业组织理论的混合寡头竞争模型框架下,分别探讨当国外企业的非税收成本和税收成本变动时,对进口企业、FDI企业行为的影响,进而对政府的国有企业民营化决策的影响,及一些相关问题。全文的安排如下:第一章提供了一个封闭经济情形下的基准模型,主要是提供一个简单的二阶段决策的古诺竞争框架。通过设定一些严格的条件,探讨了不允许民营企业进入和允许民营企业进入该行业时,政府的国有企业民营化决策。得到的结论是,如果不允许民营企业进入该行业,则政府不会对原国有企业进行民营化,即仍会保持100%的国有比例;但当允许民营企业进入时,在一定条件下,政府将对原国有企业进行部分民营化,并且,原国有企业的成本越高,即生产率越差,政府对国有企业进行民营化比例越高。最后,本章探讨了模型的其它相关问题,如市场容量、原国有企业成本系数、政府的政策性负担系数的变动对国有企业民营化的影响,得出了一些有益的结论。第二章对第一章的封闭模型进行扩展,引入进口企业的竞争,讨论了进口企业的非关税壁垒下降时,对政府的国有企业民营化决策的影响。得出的一般结论是,原国有企业的成本越低,即生产率越高,政府越倾向于增大原国有企业民营化的比例。并且,在国内完全民营企业存在时,国有企业的民营化比例更高。最后,本章讨论和总结了这一章模型的其它结论。第三章同样引入进口企业的竞争,但探讨进口企业的关税壁垒下降时,对政府的国有企业民营化决策的影响及相关问题。我们发现,在二部门模型中,政府若降低关税率,政府就会降低国有企业民营化的比例,这与上一章的结论不同,这主要源于对进口企业征收的关税收入进入政府的收益函数;而在三部门模型中,我们可以发现,在某些条件下,政府若降低关税率,会提高国有企业的民营化比例。得出的一般结论是,原国有企业的成本越低,即生产率越高,政府越倾向于增大原国有企业的比例。并且,在国内完全民营企业存在时,国有企业的民营化比例更高。最后,本章探讨了模型的其它问题,得出了一些有益的结论。第四章引入FDI,探讨了其面对的非税收成本下降时,对政府的国有企业民营化决策的影响。得出的一般结论是,原国有企业的成本越低,即国有企业越有效率,政府越倾向于增大原国有企业民营化的比例。并且,在国内完全民营企业存在时,国有企业的民营化比例更高。最后,本章讨论和总结了这一章模型的其它结论。第五章同样是引入FDI的竞争,但探讨了FDI在其所得税率下降时,对政府的国有企业民营化决策的影响。经过证明,我们发现,这个影响是不确定的,这依赖于初始的所得税率水平、政府的政策性负担系数及原国有企业的成本系数之间的相互关系。但一般来说,我们可以得出的结论是,相对而言,一个国家的市场容量越大,原国有企业的生产率越高,其国有企业民营化的比例越高。同时,我们也可以发现,在开放时允许国内民营企业进入该行业,将会提高原国有企业的民营化比例。最后,探讨了与模型相关的其它问题,得出了一些有益的结论。最后是本文的结论,对本文的主要结论做了一个简短的总结,并在此基础上,提出了作者本人所认识到的本文不足之处和需要进一步研究的方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the year of 1979, China began to enter the time of reform and opening, which are named as "two basic points" by central governments. In economics, reform and opening means economic reform and opening to the outside world. Of course, both of them include many specific aspects. For example, the former involves economic freedom, marketization reform and privatization of the state-owned enterprises; the latter involves extension of the international business and entry of FDI. A great many people, including many economists think that economic reform and opening to the outside world have the mutual influence; one is based on the other. If regarding opening to the outside world as the basis, shall we say it is the cause of economic reform? To be more specific, if privatization of the state-owned enterprises is regarded as the standard of economic reform, and entry of foreign enterprises is regarded as the standard opening to the outside world, then shall we say the latter can promote the former? A standard economic framework is needed to prove it.According to the previous literature, the reasons for privatization of the state-owned enterprises can be concluded into two: One is the limitation of inner-goverment within state-owned enterprises lead to privatization; the other is competition from the outside result in privatization. This thesis follows the latter reason, which is that privatization of state-owned enterprises may originate from entry of the foreign businesses. The monopolization of state-owned enterprises is altered by the entry, which causes the change of market structure, and thus inevitably cause the changes in the profit of state-owned enterprises and the welfare level in the whole society. The final result is the change of the government decision in state-owned enterprises. While non-tax cost and tax cost are changed, the cost of foreign enterprises will be changed accordingly, therefore will affect supply quantity, then further to affect the proportion of privatization of state-owned enterprises.To conclude, under the framework of mixed oligopoly competition in industrial organizational theory, this thesis respectively discusses the influences of change of non-tax cost and the change of tax cost on foreign enterprises and FDI, government decision on privatization of state-owned enterprises, and issues concerned.The thesis is arranged as follows:Chapter one provides a norm framework under closed economic condition, most of which is a simple two-period decision Cournot competition model. Through setting some strict conditions, government decision on privatization of state-owned enterprises is discussed when private enterprises are allowed to enter the industry and when private enterprises are not allowed to enter the industry. The conclusion is that if private enterprises are not allowed to enter the industry, government will not privatize the state-owned enterprises, that is, keep 100% state-owned enterprises. However, if private enterprises are allowed to enter the industry, under certain conditions, government will private state-owned enterprises partly. Finally, this chapter discusses the issues and some results concerned in the model, such as the effects of market capability, cost coefficient in state-owned enterprises, and policy burden coefficient of government.Chapter two broadens the closed model in chapter one, and competition of import enterprises is added. This chapter discusses the effects on government decision on privatization of state-owned enterprises when non-tariff wall decreases. A general conclusion is that the lower cost of state-owned enterprises, the higher proportion of the privatization of state-owned enterprises.Chapter three also add import enterprise competition, but it discusses the effects on government decision on privatization of state-owned enterprises when tariff wall decreases. We find that in two department model, if government decreases tariff rate, government will increase the proportion of stat-owned enterprises, coming from the income of tariff levied on import enterprises into government, which is different from the conclusion in last chapter; while in three department model, we can find that under certain conditions, if government decreases tariff, the proportion of privatization of state-owned enterprises will be increased. General conclusion is that the lower cost of state-owned enterprises, the higher proportion of the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Chapter four adds FDI competition, and it discusses government decision on privatization of state-owned enterprises when facing non-tax cost decrease. Based on this model, concerned theories are discussed. General conclusion is that the lower cost of state-owned enterprises, the higher proportion of the privatization of state-owned enterprises.Chapter five also adds FDI competition, but it discusses government decision on privatization of state-owned enterprises when tax rate decreases in FDI. General conclusion is that the lower cost of state-owned enterprises, the higher proportion of state-owned enterprises. Besides, when private enterprises exist, the proportion of state-owned enterprises will be higher.Finally, a brief conclusion is made on main theories in the thesis. Further research direction is lead in the last part as well.更多还原