【作者】 王广凤；

【导师】 唐晓华；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 产业经济学， 2008， 博士

【副题名】基于系统软件市场的研究

【摘要】 开放源代码是软件产业20世纪90年代以来新兴的一种特殊现象,经过多年的发展,以其为基础的开源软件对传统软件产业的市场竞争格局、厂商竞争方式等都呈现出了巨大的冲击。这一方面对传统网络经济学“赢者通吃”的观点提出了挑战,另一方面也引发了发展中国家对软件产业发展模式和发展战略的思考。因此,研究开源软件和专有软件间竞争行为及其福利效应具有重要的理论和实践意义。论文以开源软件与专有软件的竞争行为为核心,综合运用产业组织理论、网络经济学理论和双边市场理论,采用博弈论、比较分析方法和案例分析方法,重点研究了开源软件对系统软件市场结构的影响、开源软件与专有软件的主要竞争行为及其经济效应、政府是否应该干预开源软件的发展等问题。主要研究内容与结论如下:(1)系统软件产业由垄断性市场转向竞争性市场是开源软件与专有软件竞争的现实基础,也是论文研究的前提条件。论文综合考虑网络外部性和源代码保护双重因素,从厂商供给和消费需求两个维度,探讨了在开源软件和专有软件共存的情况下,系统软件市场结构的变化趋势。由于供给和需求特征的不同,不同的细分系统软件市场将会出现不同的市场结构:在服务器操作系统市场,专有软件厂商很难阻止开源软件厂商的进入,并且开源软件厂商最终将会占据较大的市场份额,市场均衡表现为多寡头或双寡头结构;在嵌入式操作系统市场,开源软件厂商将有可能将专有软件厂商挤出,并最终将占据统治地位;在桌面操作系统市场,开源软件厂商的进入具有一定的难度,但如果开源软件厂商能够不断扩大消费群体仍能进入市场。(2)开源软件与专有软件的竞争具有不同于传统专有软件间竞争的特征,其主要竞争行为也表现出一定的独特性。论文在探讨开源软件与专有软件市场进入序贯性、产品价格和质量差异性等非对称竞争结构基础上,兼顾双边市场中的平台竞争特征,构建了两类软件竞争的主要行为框架,认为市场进入、商业模式和技术创新竞争是主要的竞争行为。其中,市场进入竞争是其他竞争行为发生的基础,技术创新竞争是竞争的最高形式,两种商业模式间的竞争是开源软件与专有软件竞争的本质。(3)开源软件与专有软件的市场进入竞争。考虑到消费者市场的动态变化,在开源软件与专有软件的市场进入竞争分析中,构建了一个两期的在位者-进入者模型,并引入了横向差异化Hotelling竞争框架。得出如下结论:在开源软件的市场进入中,网络外部性强度、产品差别化、转移成本和老用户市场规模是重要的影响因素,产品差别化越大、转移成本越小和老用户市场规模越小,开源软件厂商就越容易进入市场。这说明,在网络外部性较强的市场上,不一定必然会出现垄断的市场格局,从而对现有的相关网络经济理论进行了扩展和补充。(4)开源软件与专有软件的商业模式竞争。依据系统软件的双边市场特征,对Economides和Katsamakas(2005)模型进行了扩展,将消费者需求与应用软件商之间的交叉网络外部性因素引入商业模式竞争模型,在只存在一个专有应用软件厂商为系统软件提供支持的前提下,通过博弈分析,得出如下结论:①在产品价格方面,专有软件在双寡头市场上的价格要低于垄断时的价格,并且随着开源软件市场份额的扩大,专有软件将会加大降价幅度。②在产品销售数量方面,专有软件的销售量主要取决于消费者对专有和开源两种软件的偏好程度;开源软件的需求量主要受到交叉网络外部性和服务支持费用的影响,交叉网络外部性强度越小、服务支持费用越低,其需求量将会越大。③在厂商利润方面,当系统软件和专有软件的市场需求较大时,竞争性的市场降低了专有软件厂商的利润水平。④在消费者剩余方面,双寡头市场上专有软件购买者的消费者剩余大于垄断市场时的消费者剩余;购买开源软件的消费者剩余与其潜在市场和服务费用相关,当潜在市场扩大和服务费用降低时,开源软件购买者的消费者剩余将会增加。(5)开源软件与专有软件的技术创新竞争。在社会总体技术水平确定的情况下,将Bitzer和Schroder(2003)的静态模型扩展到动态策略博弈模型,探讨了软件产品创新竞争中的技术水平选择问题,并对垄断和双寡头市场的技术均衡进行了比较。得出如下结论:①在双寡头市场中,如果开源软件与专有软件的研发成本相同,最后市场均衡时,两类软件的技术水平也相同,并且这一技术水平随着研发成本的降低、软件间的替代性的增大和单位软件收益的提高而提高;但当研发成本不同时,研发成本较低的开源软件技术水平较高。②在社会总体技术水平既定的情况下,双寡头市场上无论是开源软件厂商还是专有软件厂商的技术水平都高于专有软件垄断市场时的技术水平。(6)政府在开源软件发展中的干预。从公共产品理论和网络型产业后入者劣势角度,论述了开源软件发展中存在的市场失灵问题。由于开源软件的公共产品性,其不能够像其他私人产品一样定价和出售,在供给方面存在一定的搭便车行为。另外,在网络型产业中,领先进入市场的厂商将会占领较大的市场份额,并利用对市场的控制能力,阻止后入者的发展。鉴于开源软件具有增强软件产业竞争性、提高消费者福利、推动产业技术进步的战略性意义,政府应对开源软件的发展进行适度干预,以为其提供良好的发展环境。(7)针对中国软件产业产品结构不合理、技术创新能力较低、自主知识产权核心产品较少等问题,探讨了中国推进开源软件发展的重大意义,在对中国开源软件发展现实条件的分析基础上,认为中国政府应把握开源软件的发展机遇,围绕降低开源软件的转移成本和激励开发者参与两方面,采取放松软件产业知识产权保护、阶段性政府采购、组建开源社区、加强开源培训、建立相关法律法规等政策手段,推动开源软件的发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since 1990s, Open Source has been an emerging special phenomenon in software industry. The Open Source Software has a great impact on marketing competition arrangement and competition mode of traditional software industry after many years’development. This, on one hand, has challenged the traditional network economics’idea of Winner-take-all, and on the other hand, it has triggered the thoughts of the developing countries on the developing mode and strategies of software industry. Therefore, it contains important theoretical and practical significance to research on the competitive behaviors between Open Source and Proprietary Software as well as their welfare effect. This dissertation mainly has a research on issues, such as the impact of Open Source Software on the market structure of system software, the principal competitive behaviors and economic effect between Open Source and Proprietary Software, and the issue whether government should interfere with the development of Open Source Software by taking the competitive behavior between Open Source and Proprietary Software as the core, comprehensively applying the Industrial Organization Theory, Network Economics Theory, and Two-Market Theory, as well as adopting Game Theory, Comparative Study, and Case Study. The principal contents and conclusions of the research are as follows:(1)The transformation of the system software industry from monopoly market to the competitive market is the realistic basis of the competitive behavior between the Open Source Software and the Proprietary Software, and is also the premise of this dissertation. The dissertation has discussed the developing tendacy of the system software market structure under the circumstance of co-existence of Open Source Software and Proprietary Software from two dimensions--firm supply and consumer demand by comprehensively considering dual factors with respect of network externalities and open source protection. Different market structures will emerge in subdivision system software market due to different characteristics of supply and demand: in the market of server operating system, it is very hard for Proprietary Software firm to prevent the entry of Open Source Software firm. Since the intension of network externalities is relatively weak, Open Source Software firm will take a higher market share, and finally the market balance exists in forms of multi-oligarch or duopoly structure. In the flush bonding market operating system market, the Open Source Software firm may kick Proprietary Software firm out of the market and finally takes the dominant position. It is kind of difficult for the Open Source Software firm to enter into the desktop operating system market. However, if it can expand consuming group it can still enter this market.(2)The character of the competition between Open Source and Proprietary Software differs from character among traditional software competitions and the principal competitive behavior has certain uniqueness as well. On considering the platform competition of two-market, the dissertation constructs the principal behavior framework of the competition between the above mentioned two kinds of software on the basis of discussing the asymmetric competitive structure, such as the market entry sequence, price of product and quality differentiation. This dissertation believes that competitions of market entry, business model and technological innovation are the principal competitive behaviors. Among the above competition, market entry is the basis of other competitive behaviors, the competition of technological innovation is the highest situation of the competition and the competition between two business models is the nature of the competition between Open Source and Proprietary Software.(3)The market entry competition between Open Source and Proprietary Software. Considering the dynamic change of the consumer market, the dissertation constructs a reigning-entering model in analyzing the market entry competition and introduces the horizontal differentiation Hotelling competitive framework. The dissertation concludes as the following: in the market entry of the Open Source Software, the intension of the network externalities, the differentiation of products, the switching cost and the market scale of old customers are important factors. The easier for the Open Source Software firm to enter into the market if the intension of the network externalities is weak enough, or the differentiation of products is large, the switching cost and the market scale of old users are small. All of the above demonstrate that there will not always appear the monopolistic market arrangement in the market where the network externalities is strong, which expands and supplement the existing pertinent network economic theories.(4)The business model competition between Open Source and Proprietary Software. In accordance with the two-market characteristic of system software, the dissertation makes an expansion of the model of Economides and Katsamakas (2005), that is introducing the cross network externalities factor of consumer demand and application software firm into the business competitive model. With one premise that a proprietary application software firm provides support for system software, the dissertation educes the following conclusions by using Game Theory analysis:①in the respect of price, the price of proprietary software in the duopoly market is lower than that when it monopolized. Moreover, Proprietary Software will widen its depreciation as the market share expansion of Open Source Software.②in the respect of the quantity of product selling, the selling quantity of proprietary software mainly lies on consumers’preference degree of Proprietary Software and Open Source Software; the demand for Open Source Software is mainly affected by cross network externalities and service supporting expense. The weaker the intension of cross network externalities and the lower the service supporting expense are, the larger the demand is.③in the respect of manufacture’s profit, the manufacturer’s profit margin of Proprietary Software will be lower due to market competition when there is a larger demand of system software and proprietary software.④in the respect of consumer surplus, the consumer surplus of proprietary software purchasers in the duopoly market is larger than that in the monopolizing market; for open source software, whose consumer surplus is relevant to its potential market and service expense, its consumer surplus will increase when expend the potential market and decrease the service expense.(5)The competition of technological innovation between open source and proprietary software. When the social total technology level is certain, the dissertation expands the static model of the Bitzer and Schroder(2003)to the dynamic Game Theory model, probes into the issue of choosing technological level in the innovative competition of software products, and then compares the technology equilibrium within monopoly and duopoly markets. Conclusions are as following:①in the duopoly market, if open source and Proprietary Software have the same researching cost, these two kinds of software will have the same technological level when market reaches equilibrium, and this technological level will be improved as the decrease of the researching cost, the enhancement of software’s substitute and the increase of unit software income; However, when researching cost is not same, open source software who has the lower researching cost has a higher technological level.②When society total technological level is certain, the technological level of both open source and proprietary software firms in the duopoly market is higher than that when proprietary software monopolizing the market.(6)Government’s interference in the development of open source software. From the angle that public good theory and network industry incomer later who has the inferior position in the market, the dissertation dissertate the issue of market failure in the development of open source software. Open source software has some pick-up behaviors in supplying due to its characteristic of public good, which can not make a price and sell as other private goods. In addition, in the network industry, the firm who entered the market earlier will take a larger market share, and prevent those entered later from developing using its controlling ability of the market. Whereas open source software has the significance of enhancing the competition of software industry, raising consumer’s welfare, and propelling industrial technology progress, government should interfere in the development of open source software appropriately in order to provide a good developing environment for it.(7)Regarding issues such as unreasonable product structure of China software industry, lower technological innovation ability, lack of core products with proprietary intellectually property rights, the dissertation probes into the great significance of China propelling the development of Open Source Software, besides, on the realistic basis of developing open source software for China, the dissertation puts forth that China government should grasp the developing opportunity of open source software, focusing on two aspects—reducing the switching cost of open source software and inspiring developers to participate, as well as taking policies and measures, such as loosening the protection of intellectually property rights for software industry, staggered purchase by government, then establish Open Source community, improving Open Source training, and constituting pertinent laws and regulations, in order to propel the development of Open Source Software.更多还原