【作者】 王彦；

【导师】 傅有德；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 西方哲学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 在传统的犹太教中,并无教条一说。与基督教不同的是,犹太教中没有教会组织为信徒制定或颁布必须遵守的权威教义。主流拉比犹太教是一个以《塔木德》为核心的律法宗教,《塔木德》没有对犹太人的信仰做出明确规定。按照《塔木德》的说法,一个犹太人是一个犹太母亲所生的人。判定犹太人的首要标准是种族和血统,而不是信仰。拉比犹太教所要求于犹太人的不是对统一教义的认信,而是符合律法和道德标准的具体行动。在犹太教中,对一个伦理性上帝的信仰被当作不证自明的事实被接受下来,信仰和教义不是拉比犹太教的问题。到了中世纪,生活在伊斯兰教统治下的犹太民族深受其神学和哲学思想的影响。从公元9世纪起,犹太教中开始出现以哲学方法研究《圣经》的理性主义思潮,萨阿底高昂是这方面的典型代表。靠着萨阿底的理论贡献和权威,哲学的思维方式牢固地奠定了它在犹太教中的地位。在宗教理性主义思潮的影响下,犹太哲学家不但从律法的角度,也开始从信仰的角度看待传统的犹太教。公元12世纪,著名犹太哲学家和律法学家摩西·迈蒙尼德(1135-1204)在《评密西那》“法庭篇”中提出,《托拉》有13条基本原则。它们是:1、上帝存在:2、上帝的单一性;3、上帝的无形体性;4、上帝的永恒性;5、唯有上帝可受崇拜:6、先知预言;7、摩西预言高于其它先知预言;8、《托拉》启示来自上天;9、《托拉》不会增减;10、上帝明察每个人的行为;11、上帝奖善惩恶;12、弥赛亚将会到来;13、死者将会复活。迈蒙尼德声称,相信并理解这13条基本原则的就是犹太人,并在来世里有份;反之,就会失去犹太人的身份并与来世无缘。在犹太教历史上,迈蒙尼德第一次以正确的信仰而非血统关系界定犹太人的身份,《托拉》13条基本原则由此成为中世纪教条思想的滥觞。在犹太教历史上,迈蒙尼德第一次尝试为犹太教建立教条,这次尝试也是迄今为止最具影响的一次努力。与以前的犹太哲学家不同,迈蒙尼德13条基本原则具有律法上的后果,对这些信仰原则的遵守关系到犹太人能否获得拯救并进入来世。因此,迈蒙尼德13条基本原则具有宗教教条的性质。但令人疑惑的是,在以后的作品中,迈蒙尼德再没有提到这13条基本原则。如果13条基本原则是迈蒙尼德为犹太教建立的教条,为什么他没有在后期作品中提及它们?另外,如果《托拉》13条基本原则是迈蒙尼德为犹太教建立的教条,他为什么没有将犹太教的其他重要信仰包括在内?最明显的是,他不应该遗漏“创世”和“自由意志”这两条。还有,迈蒙尼德写作《评密西那》的时候,还只是一个默默无闻的年轻人,他凭什么权威为犹太教建立教条呢?为了证明13条基本原则是迈蒙尼德为犹太教建立的教条,学者们对于上述疑问提供了各种解释。有学者指出,《托拉》13条基本原则是作为对《密西那》的评论出现的,迈蒙尼德在这里主要是作为评论者,而不是作为独立作者表达自己的个人观点。由于这段《密西那》的内容与“创世”无关,因此,迈蒙尼德在这里没有理由提及“创世”等其它信仰。按照这种观点,既然13条基本原则是迈蒙尼德为犹太教建立的教条,而13条基本原则又受到了《密西那》文本的限制。我们是否可以进一步推论说,在迈蒙尼德看来,犹太教教条的内容就是由这段《密西那》所决定的呢?也就是说,迈蒙尼德早有打算为犹太教建立一套教条,并因此对犹太教进行了系统的考察。在对所有的《密西那》进行斟酌和比较之后,发现这一段谈论来世的《密西那》是建立教条最合适的地方。迈蒙尼德于是借评论这段《密西那》的机会,正式提出了他的犹太教教条。由于《密西那》文本的限制,他不得不牺牲一些犹太教的基本原则,如“创世”和“自由意志”等。我们认为,这样的推论是难以成立的。或许这段《密西那》为迈蒙尼德提供了讨论犹太教教条的好机会,但我们绝难以想象,迈蒙尼德会因为《密西那》的限制而牺牲犹太教教条的完整性。迈蒙尼德完全可以用另外的方式对犹太教教条进行专门的论述。既然犹太教教条是如此重要的一个问题,看不出有什么理由让迈蒙尼德必须将自己限定在一个评论者的地位上。因此,我们认为,在肯定13条基本原则具有教条性质的同时,还必须强调,在《评密西那》中为犹太教建立教条不是迈蒙尼德的主观意图。既然13条基本原则是以《密西那》评论的形式出现的,其内容受到了《密西那》文本的限制,那么,我们就可以得出结论说,13条基本原则不是迈蒙尼德有意识为犹太教建立的教条。这个新观点不但符合《评密西那》的文本内容,而且可以很好地解释13条基本原则面临的上述种种疑问。因为以13条基本原则作为犹太教教条不是迈蒙尼德的本意,因此他在后期的作品中没有提及它们,也没有考虑到它们作为犹太教教条的完整性和权威性。为《托拉》建立13条基本原则是拉比犹太教历史上的一个创举,从中世纪开始,学者们就对迈蒙尼德建立13条基本原则的原因进行了各种解释。15世纪末的犹太哲学家亚伯瓦纳认为,在亚里士多德哲学和基督教神学的影响下,迈蒙尼德将犹太教作为一种科学看待,《托拉》13条基本原则就是迈蒙尼德为犹太教这门学科建立的理论前提和公理。现代犹太学者们大多放弃了这个观点,转而从政治和宗教的角度解释建立13条基本原则的原因。一些学者指出,由于迈蒙尼德生活在伊斯兰教和基督教统治的环境中,迈蒙尼德建立《托拉》13条基本原则的目的是为了强调犹太教在教义上的优越性,反驳其他宗教从教义信仰上对犹太教的攻击。另有一种观点认为,由于哲学家意识到相信上帝存在和他对世界的统治有利于城邦政治秩序和道德风尚,迈蒙尼德要一般民众相信哲学化的上帝观,是出于哲学家对现实政治的考虑。还有人认为,迈蒙尼德为犹太教建立教条是出于一个宗教领袖对普通民众的责任。在迈蒙尼德看来,进入来世的前提条件是达到对上帝的理智理解。但迈蒙尼德也意识到,对上帝的理性化超出了一般大众的智力水平。为了使一般犹太人具有对上帝最低限度的知识,迈蒙尼德因此建立了13条基本原则,以便他们将来在来世里有份。最近的一个解释认为,迈蒙尼德为犹太教建立教条的原因是为了让犹太人更好地遵守律法。因为迈蒙尼德相信,只有正确的信仰才能导致正确的行动,正确的信仰是遵守律法的前提。我们认为,建立13条基本原则的目的是为了让犹太人得到关于上帝的理性观念,而不是为了让犹太人更好地遵守律法。在迈蒙尼德看来,正确的宗教观念本身就是终极目的,而律法不过是达到这个目的的途径和手段。迈蒙尼德认为关于上帝的正确观念就是《托拉》教导犹太人的真知,靠着这个真知犹太人就可以获得永生,迈蒙尼德不可能在这一目的之外另设其他目的。在迈蒙尼德发表13条基本原则之后的两百多年间,教条问题几乎没有受到犹太知识界的任何注意。迈蒙尼德去世后,随着基督教对伊比利亚半岛的“重新征服”,犹太民族开始生活在基督教的统治之下。与以前的伊斯兰教统治者相比,基督教是一个更加重视信仰的宗教。在基督教的改宗努力下,从14世纪末起,大批犹太人开始改宗基督教。犹太教中改宗基督教的热潮一直持续到15世纪末的西班牙大驱逐。大批犹太人的改宗和由此产生的马兰诺问题迫使犹太宗教领袖重视犹太教人的信仰,包括尝试从神学上对犹太教信仰进行界定。在这样的历史背景下,教条问题在15世纪犹太知识分子中引起了热烈的争议。15世纪初的杜安、克莱斯卡、阿尔伯对迈蒙尼德13条基本原则的正确性提出了质疑。在批评迈蒙尼德教条的基础上,克莱斯卡建立了著名的犹太教6个支柱性信仰。阿尔伯进一步将犹太教信仰归纳为3个基本原则。15世纪末的彼瓦高和亚伯瓦纳则全力为迈蒙尼德辩护,试图证明迈蒙尼德13条基本原则是犹太教唯一正确的教条。在15世纪犹太教教条问题的讨论中,迈蒙尼德13条基本原则成为哲学家们争论的焦点。有学者认为,15世纪初的哲学家对迈蒙尼德提出批评的原因,是因为他们对《托拉》基本原则的理解与迈蒙尼德不同。迈蒙尼德将基本原则理解为犹太教的教条;而克莱斯卡和阿尔伯等人将犹太教作为一门学科看待,将基本原则看作是犹太教这门学科的公理和理论前提。我们认为,15世纪的教条思想主要强调了犹太教在信仰上的传统观念,强调“《托拉》来自上天”,而不是从科学的角度探寻犹太教的公理和前提。在基督教的改宗压力下,15世纪犹太教教条思想的主旨是回归传统,反对迈蒙尼德在信仰问题上的理性主义立场。从科学的角度理解15世纪初的教条思想,既不符合杜安、克莱斯卡和阿尔伯教条思想的主要内容,也不符合当时与基督教进行宗教论争的历史背景。为什么15世纪末的教条思想一反世纪初的倾向,开始为迈蒙尼德辩护了呢?我们认为,为迈蒙尼德辩护是出于15世纪末时代危机的迫切需要。彼瓦高生活在1942年西班牙大驱逐的前夜,他以迈蒙尼德13条作为犹太教的教条,为犹太民族在灾难来临前做信仰上的准备。亚伯瓦纳的教条思想产生于刚刚发生的大灾难之后,他对迈蒙尼德的辩护是为了结束犹太教在教条问题上的混乱,把犹太人的信仰统一到13条基本原则上来。亚伯瓦纳教条思想的现实目的是为了加强犹太民族的团结,重新树立犹太人的民族信心。但除了为迈蒙尼德辩护外,亚伯瓦纳同时保持了在信仰问题上的传统观点。亚伯瓦纳认为,所有的《托拉》律法和教导都是神圣的,犹太教里根本没有什么教条。由于理论观点和现实需要之间的矛盾冲突,亚伯瓦纳的教条思想存在着明显的不一致性。1492年之后,随着犹太民族西班牙时代的结束,教条问题再一次从犹太知识界消失了。但中世纪的教条思想给犹太教留下了永久的痕迹,深刻地影响了犹太教在未来的发展。经过中世纪的这个发展阶段,传统的拉比犹太教开始在律法之外,从信仰的角度理解祖先的宗教。随着时间的推移,迈蒙尼德13条基本原则逐渐在犹太人中获得广泛的接受。13条基本原则成为犹太教信仰最简单明确的表述形式,它的内容甚至被写进了犹太教的祈祷书中。到了18世纪民族解放和宗教改革的时代,在犹太教中又一次发生了教条问题的争论。近现代的教条争论已经有着完全不同的历史背景,但可以肯定的是,新的教条争论是和中世纪教条思想留给犹太教的精神遗产分不开的。更多还原

【Abstract】 The term "dogma" which is strictly defined by the Catholic Church as such has no place in the tradition of Judaism. Judaism is a national religion of the Israel people. Membership in this particular community does not depend on creedal affirmations of a formal character. Every Jew is born into God’s covenant with the chosen people by a Jewish mother, not by his confession of a fixed body of belief. Rabbinic Judaism is a legal religion, and its main concern is to do God’s commandments, not to speculate on the right beliefs. There is no fixation of Jewish beliefs in the Bible and the Talmud. Until its encounter with the Greek philosophy and influenced by its way of thinking, Judaism never lent itself to theological expositions.In Middle Ages, when the main body of the Jewish people lived under the rule of Islam, the spiritual life of Judaism was deeply influenced by Islamic theological thought, which was a second-hand Greek philosophy combined with Islamic religion. Nurtured in the Islamic culture and forced to combat various attacks within and without Rabbinic Judaism, Saadia Gaon was the first medieval Jewish philosopher to use philosophy to interpret Torah and clarify its basic beliefs. By his works and authority, Greek thinking gained a permanent place in Judaism after Saadia Gaon and religious rationalism set its foot henceforth. In view of religious rationalism, the community of Israel is not only a ethnic group all descended from the same forefathers, but a religious group based on the same faith, which is the prepositional truth taught by Torah. It is not all surprising that with the progressing of religious rationalism in Judaism, eventually some daring soul would break the ground and set a fixed form of articles of faith demanding every Israeli’s full conviction. The son of Maimon of Spanish Jewry lacked neither intellectual creativity nor brave personality to fulfill this mission. In his early works Mishnah Torah, commenting on Sanhedrin’s Perek Helek, Maimonides expounded on 13 "Principles of Torah" for anyone to confirm if he wanted to have a share in the world to come. These 13 principles are: 1. that God exists;2. that God is one;3. that God is incorporeal;4. that God is ontologically prior to the cosmos;5. that God alone may be worshipped;6. that prophecy occurs;7. that Mosaic prophecy is superior to all others;8. that the Torah was given from heaven;9. that the Torah will never change nor be exchanged;10. that God knows individuals;11. that the righteous will be rewarded and the evil punished;12. that the Messiah will come;13. that the dead will be resurrected.After giving each of this foundation a detailed explanation, Maimonides claimed that when a man believed in all these fundamental principles, and his faith was thus clarified, he was then part of the Israel community and one was obliged to love and pity him according to the laws set in Torah. But if a man doubted any of these principles, he has left the community of Israel, and was called sectarians. One was required to hate him and destroy him. This articulation of Jewish creed was the first of its kind in the history of Rabbinic Judaism. Contrary to its tradition, not only a Jew’s membership in the Israel community, but his salvation in the afterworld is dependent on the affirmation of these 13 principles. Their dogmatic elements notwithstanding, certain questions need to be addressed. Just to mention a few: Firstly, why Maimonides never mentioned 13 principles in his later works, for example, in his great code Mishneh Torah and his philosophical work Guide for the Perplexed? Secondly, why didn’t he include "free choice" and "creation" in his 13 principles, since he stressed these two mostly in his later works? Thirdly, when he wrote his Commentary he was an unknown young man, by what authority did he think he could set up a Jewish dogma for the whole people of Israel?To solve these problems properly, I suggest that one must distinguish two different questions. One, are 13 principles Jewish dogma by nature? Two, is it Maimonides’ intention to expound Jewish dogma in his Commentary? To the first question the answer is yes; to the second, no. Just as Athur Hyman rightly points out that Maimonides’ 13 principles are structured and restricted by the Mishnah text, and his status as a commentator does not allow him to give an independent opinion and to articulate a comprehensive list of Jewish beliefs. Does this mean that Maimonides intentionally sacrificed some articles of Jewish dogma just to fit into the Mishnah context? Of course not. The solemnity and seriousness of the nature of a religious dogma can hardly permit Maimonides such freedom. Hence, one must conclude that Maimonides did not intend a formal fixation of Jewish dogma in this circumstance. The 13 principles of Maimonides is not a product of a systematic study of the whole body of Jewish faith by him.By our former distinction, the dogmatic character of the 13 principles holds regardless of its author’s intention. Still the question remains: why Jewish dogma? Why 13 principles at all? Some explain that because Maimonides lived in the Middle Ages when Islam and Christianity claimed that they had superceded its mother religion, Maimomides was somehow compelled to stress the superiority of some of the beliefs of Judaism. Others interpret from a political perspective that, as a philosopher, Maimonides never believes that by vocal repeating of these 13 principles, one could perfect his intellect and gain a share in the afterworld. These fixations of Jewish belief are only for the consumption of the mass and stability of the state, since a believer in God and his providence tends to be obedient to law and strict on his moral.By criticizing these and other former explanations, Menachem Kellner offered the latest one. He argues that Maimonides’ aim is to strengthen his people’s observing of Jewish law, because Maimonides believes that right deed is preconditioned by right belief. This is hardly so. Maimonides is a rationalist, and his very radicalism in this regard leads him to the conviction that there is a reason behind every piece of law, and Torah’s aim is to teach the right opinion and belief. These convictions make every law only secondary to the opinion behind it and ladder to the higher intellectual perfection. My critique is that Keller’s explanation runs counter to Maimonides’ religious rationalism, which is the main thrust of all his legal and philosophical works, and could not stand. It is reasonable to contend that the dogmatic character of the 13 principles is an outgrowth of Maimonides’ religious intellectualism. The first 5 principles, which define the philosophical understanding of the monotheistic God, are the ultimate goal by themselves. The last 8 principles are more practical and aim to encourage all Jews to observe the law, which in turn serve the ultimate goal of the first 5 principles.Maimonides’ 13 principles were totally ignored by the Jewish academic circle in the next two hundred years. The topic of Jewish dogma only resurged in 15^th century as a major discussion under Christian church’s proselytizing efforts. The church’s strengthened effort to convert Jews yielded great success. It led many Jews forfeit their ancestors’ religion and embrace the Christian faith. Under the pressure of Christian missionary duress, the religious leaders of Judaism were forced to defend its teachings, including clarifying the main principles of Jewish faith. Thus Maimonides’ 13 principles re-entered the spotlight of the often heated and acrimonious dogmatic debate.Among the major medieval Jewish philosophers who took part in the discussion, 5 figures stood up. They are Duran, Crescas, and Albo in early 15^th century, and Bibago and Abravanel in the end.The main tendency of Jewish dogmatic thought in the early 15^th century is anti-Maimonidian. Duran, Crescas, and Albo all criticized Maimonides’ formation of 13 principles. Crescas and Albo, especially, created their own dogmatic system to replace Maimonides’. Crescas listed 6 cornerstones （pinnot） of Torah, which are:1. God’s knowledge of particulars;2. Providence; 3. God’s power;4. Prophecy;5. Choice;6. Purposefulness of the Torah;Albo further deduced Jewish fundamentals to three: the existence of God, Torah from heaven, and reward and punishment. Kellner explains that, the disagreements between Maimonides and the philosophers in the early 15^th century arose primarily from their different definitions of the principles of Torah: Maimonides uses the term "principle" in a strict dogmatic sense, while Duran, Crescas, and Albo see Judaism as a certain kind of science and take the principles of Torah as the premises and axioms of this particular science. By analyzing the content of their dogmatic works, one could find that Kellner’s explanation is hardly the case. All the Jewish philosophers in the early 15^th century, Duran, Crescas, and Albo, stressed that ’Torah from heaven" was the center of Jewish belief, and all the teachings and commandments are equal in their divinity. To return to the traditional view on Jewish faith is consistent with Duran, Crescas, and Albo’s anti-Maimonidian stand, and also fit into the anti-Christian spirit in the Jewish intellectual circle, while Kellner’s scientific explanation missed the point.At the end of 15^th century, the anti-Maimonidian tendency of the Jewish dogmatic thought changed dramatically. Bibago was such an admirer of Maimonides that he could not tolerate any opposition to his dogmatic formulation. Abravanel himself belonged to the anti-Maimonidian camp; nevertheless, he defended 13 principles even more thoroughly and effectively than Bibago. Strangely enough, at the end of his major dogmatic works, Rosh Amanah, which claimed to defend Maimonides’ dogmatic formulation at the beginning, Abravanel emphasized that all the teachings and laws in Torah were equal, and Judaism had no principles at all. One may wonder, why does he contradict himself in such an obvious way? The reason lies in the fact that all the dogmatic thought at the end of the 15^th century was largely determined by the 1492 Spanish Expulsion. To defend Maimonides’ dogmatic formulation as the Jewish dogma is a necessity by the historical crisis, and not a theoretical speculation by its own right.The dogmatic topic dropped entirely from the Jewish academic agenda as the Jewish people’s Spanish era ended with the 1492 Expulsion. Yet the dogmatic movement in the medieval period had a lasting effect on Jewish thought and self-consciousness. As time passed, Maimonides’ 13 principles had been well received by almost all Jewish communities and even found a place in the Jewish liturgy. Not only so, Judaism greatly enriched itself by going through this period of dogmatic formulation and debate. Since this Spanish era, Jewish people not only understand their ancestors’ religion from a legal point of view, but from the perspective of religious beliefs. When the Jewish Liberation and Reform Movement began in 18^th century, the dogmatic issue reappeared in Judaism and sparkled new debate. The new discussion surely has its origins in and resources from medieval period.更多还原