【作者】 葛军；

【导师】 褚保金；

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 目前我国资本市场正处于制度建设时期,上市公司高管的股权激励制度,作为最重要的长期激励机制已被提上日程,成为推进我国公司治理结构改善,促进我国资本市场与国民经济持续健康发展的重要机制之一。证监会于2006年1月6日发布《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行),指出已完成股权分置改革的上市公司,可按照本办法的要求实施股权激励,建立健全激励与约束机制。这就为我国上市公司实施股权激励改革提出了政策指导,使我国上市公司实施股权激励改革成为可能。国外对股权激励与公司绩效关系的研究比较早,也比较成熟,为本研究提供了一定的思路和理论基础。中国正处于经济转型期,虽然上市公司处于特殊环境和条件下,但是近几年来不少学者在这一领域也尝试着作了一些研究与探讨。只是国内在研究股权激励与公司绩效关系方面比较偏重于定性研究,观点差异较大,对于我国上市公司实施股权激励的适度持股比例的研究几乎没有。那么我国上市公司实施股权激励是否对公司绩效有影响?如果有,影响的方向与程度是否随股权激励程度的变化而相应变化?对于国有控股与非国有控股企业来说,股权激励对公司绩效的影响存在差别吗?我国上市公司实施股权激励,是否存在适度持股比例?这些问题的实证研究结论对于我国资本市场改革、制定相关股权激励政策以及我国上市公司实施股权激励等都具有重要的参考价值。本研究的总目标是股权激励与上市公司绩效的关系,具体包括股权激励对上市公司绩效的作用机理、股权激励与否对公司绩效的影响、股权激励程度对公司绩效的影响、国有控股与非国有控股公司股权激励作用有无差异以及股权激励适度规模分析等五方面;研究的主要内容包括股权激励的相关理论基础、股权激励对上市公司绩效作用的机理、我国股权激励制度的变化过程并比较分析国有控股与非国有控股企业机制等方面的差异、股权激励与上市公司绩效关系的模型建立、股权激励与上市公司绩效关系的实证分析、股权激励适度比例分析、国外股权激励制度的成功经验及启示等七个方面,其中:股权激励与上市公司绩效关系的模型是在提出的五个假说基础上构建的;股权激励与上市公司绩效关系的实证分析是通过选取部分上市公司数据,验证假说的真伪来剖析股权激励与绩效的关系;股权激励适度比例分析是在实证分析的基础上,提出了股权激励适度比例的理论模型,并通过数据验证,得出了适度比例的参考值;最后以实证分析结果为基础,通过研究国外股权激励的经验与教训、分析中国股权激励实施中存在的问题来探讨推进股权激励的有关政策建议。本研究主要按照提出问题,回顾相关理论基础、评述现有文献资料,选择经济学理论阐述股权激励的理论支撑以及股权激励对公司绩效作用的机理、演变的过程,建立假说,构建理论模型,通过回归分析与统计分析,对样本数据进行有效检验,并验证各项假说,最后得出结论和应采取的政策建议的思路进行的;对来自正态总体的两个样本进行均值比较采用T检验的方法,而对于某一政策变量的不同形式产生的影响或几个相关变量共同作用的显著性等则采用参数联合检验法。研究所采用的数据均来自国泰安数据库。在研究的时间范围上,本文将时间范围确定为1999-2005年,这样数据均来自东南亚金融危机以后,可以避免金融危机产生异常影响,同时又满足一定的时间跨度要求。在具体样本的选取上,将1999-2005年均实施股权激励的公司确定为样本,凡是先实施股权激励后又取消的或者1999年以后才实施股权激励的公司均不在考虑范围;对于作为比较对象的未实施股权激励的样本公司,采用等距随机抽样的方法确定。通过研究得出的主要结论有四点,即适当股权激励显著提高了公司绩效;股权激励与公司绩效关系不是呈线性关系,股权激励对公司绩效影响程度随股权激励比例变化而相应变动;股权激励对公司绩效的影响在国有控股和非国有控股公司间存在显著差异;股权激励存在一定的适度区间,应控制股权激励比例。最后,根据研究结论,结合国外股权激励的经验与教训、针对中国股权激励实施中存在的问题等,提出了相应的政策建议:宏观层面具体包括继续加强对资本市场的培育,加快实施、完善相关法规、政策,制定有关经理股票期权计划的规范制度并加强监督,加强国有上市公司股权激励制度的建设与完善等;微观层面具体包括上市公司要加快开展股权激励的步伐,建立一套行之有效的管理层股权激励机制,要科学、合理地确定股权激励的比例,重视不同所有制企业的差异,制定相应的股权激励配套政策,在对经理人进行有效激励的同时,还应当建立规范性的约束机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 Now China’s capital market is in a period of the system construction. The incentive system of the listed company’s executives, as the most important long-term incentive mechanism, has been put on the agenda as one of important mechanisms that promotes China’s corporate governance structure, improves the capital market and promotes the sustained and healthy development of China economy. "The Management Measures of the listed companies’ shares incentive " (for trial implementation) was issued by the SFC on January 6, 2006. It said that the listed companies having completed share reform can establish and improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms in accordance with the requirements of the implementation of these measures and equity incentives. It provided equity incentive reform policy guidance and the possibilities of the implementation of China’s listed companies’ equity incentive reform. The research about equity incentive in western countries was started relatively early provided some mature opinions. The economy of China is undergoing economic restructuring, although the listed companies are in special environment and conditions, but in recent years many scholars in this field also try to make some research and explore. They have different opions and seldem study the suitable ratio period of equity incentive. Is there any influence the equity incentive can make to the listed companies? If so, what direction and how does it go? Is there any difference about the role of equity incentive between state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies? The findings of these issues empirical research are very important on China’s capital market reform, development of relevant policies and incentive shares of listed companies.The overall objective of this study is the relations between the equity incentive and performance of the listed companies, including its stake in listed companies incentives to the performance of the mechanism of equity incentive or not the impact on corporate performance, stock incentive extent of the impact on company performance, the state-owned holding companies and non-state-controlled shareholding difference whether incentives equity Incentive and the appropriate scale of analysis. The main contents include the theoretical basis of equity incentives, the mechanism, of the listed companies’ incentive role, China’s stake in the incentive system and comparative analysis of changes in state-controlled enterprises and non-state-controlled mechanism of the difference, stock incentive and the performance of listed companies model, stock incentives and the performance of listed companies Empirical Analysis, stock incentive modest proportion of the equity incentive system and the successful experience of enlightenment, and so on. Among them, the model of equity incentive and the performance is based on the basis of the hypothesis; equity incentive and the performance of listed companies through the Empirical Analysis of the listed companies selected data to verify the authenticity of the hypothesis equity incentive and performance analysis of the relationship; equity incentive modest proportion in the empirical analysis is based on the analysis of the proposed equity incentive modest proportion of the rationale. On the model, the modest proportion of the reference value is verified through data obtained; the final stake through the encouragement of study abroad experiences and lessons, analysis of China’s stake in the implementation of the incentive to explore the problems of promoting equity incentive and some suggestins.According to this study, first review the theoretical basis, review of existing literature, choose economic theory expounded equity incentive theoretical support and equity incentive mechanism, evolving process, the establishment of hypothesis, construction of theoretical models, through regression analysis and statistical analysis, sample data for effective testing and validation of the hypothesis, and finally conclusion to be taken by the policy recommendations of thinking from Normality overall average of the two samples T-test comparison of the methods used, but a policy variable for the different forms or the impact of several related variables with the significant role of such parameters are used jointly test. The data used in this study is from the database of Guo Taian. This paper will set time-frame for the 1999-2005 years, and this data is after the Southeast Asian financial crisis, the financial crisis could have been avoided abnormal impact at the same time, meet the requirements of a certain time span. In specific sample selection, 1999-2005 average annual equity incentive companies are identified as samples, all to the implementation of equity incentive first then canceled after the 1999 implementation are not considered; As a comparison than for the implementation of equity incentive of a sample of companies, mining use isometric random sampling method to determine.The main conclusions drawn through research are: appropriate equity incentive significantly improve the performance of the company; the relationship between the equity incentive and corporate performance is not a linear, the impact on corporate performance of incentive equity ratio changes with consequential changes; equity incentive impact on the performance of companies in the state-controlled non-state-owned holding company have a significant difference, There is a certain equity incentive appropriate interval, the incentive should be controlled equity ratio. Finally, in accordance with the conclusion of the study, the combination of foreign equity incentive experiences and lessons, equity incentive against China in the implementation of the existing problems, and so on, the corresponding policy recommendations: the macro level, including specific to continue to strengthen the development of capital markets, speed up the implementation, and improve relevant laws and regulations, policies and strengthen supervision, and strengthen the incentive system of state-owned shares of listed companies and improve the building and perfection of the system of company remuneration committee; specific including at the micro level is not all companies are suitable for the implementation of equity incentive, stock incentive from the implementation of long-term and recent enterprises will increase the burden on enterprises in the inner strength of inspection and internal governance which also deal with the policy aspect of the industry, the micro-face, the rapid development of stockholders’ inspiring in the listed companies and the construction of management inspiring system, determination of the suitable period between the stocks holded by the managements, paying more attention the difference between the state-controlled and non-state-controlled companies, establishing a standard of restraint mechanism to those managers holding the stocks.更多还原