【作者】 石少颖；

【导师】 陈尚胜；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 专门史， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 明清鼎革一直是我国历史研究中的重要课题,在中韩关系史研究中亦占据着特殊地位。本文以朝鲜仁祖时代(1623-1649)为中心,按照朝鲜对后金交涉史发展的脉络,以丁卯之役、丙子之役作为朝鲜与后金关系发展不同阶段的分割点,具体考察仁祖时代朝鲜王朝对后金外交的阶段性特点。在考察之余,我们还将探讨下列问题:(1)通过对仁祖时代与光海君时代朝鲜对后金交涉的路线、策略进行历史性的对比分析,探讨两者对后金交涉中的相似点和不同点,进而理清仁祖在位二十六年间朝鲜对后金态度的变化和对后金政策的走向;(2)就朝鲜内部党争对于仁祖政权对后金交涉决策中的影响和作用进行初步探讨,揭示隐藏在其决策过程背后的朝鲜内政结构,并结合影响朝鲜对外决策的主观性因素,对朝鲜在丁卯之役和丙子之役中屡屡失利、双方之间谈判进程缓慢且曲折的原因,提供新的解释:(3)对仁祖本人在与后金交涉中体现出的政治性格进行具体分析,从而对朝鲜的外交理念、外交特征、乃至朝鲜的民族性问题,进行初步的分析和探讨。本文共分为六个部分。第一章导论阐述了选题的缘由及其学术价值,然后通过对相关领域学术史的回顾和对相关史料较全面的整理与综述,确定了本文的框架结构、研究思路和研究方法。中国的相关史料研究主要体现了从民族史及宏观角度研究历史的长处,而缺少了历史角色的换位思考和互动研究。韩国学者则由于受史料观点的影响,在研究中高扬了朝鲜时代外交的道德理想型特点,缺乏客观性分析。此外,以往研究侧重将朝鲜作为华夷秩序中的一个被动角色来看待,突显了外部因素对朝鲜的影响,从而使得朝鲜作为外交政策实施者的个性特点不够鲜明。因此,本文结合朝鲜王朝的政治、文化背景,对仁祖统治集团对后金交涉的特点、影响因素及外交理念进行分析和总结。第二章是仁祖时代朝鲜与后金交涉史的背景。光海君在助明伐金的过程中骑墙两端,与朝鲜“尊周”、“事大”的主流意识背道而驰。仁祖李倧的上台则恰恰受益于传统势力对光海君猛烈批判的政治氛围。仁祖打出亲明旗号,以颠覆式的姿态,欲全面否定光海君,重新回到以名分为本的“原则主义”外交路线上来。仁祖时代对光海君外交政策的批判,事实上是为了服从于其反正斗争的政治需要及舆论需要。因此,他们带着个人情绪和政治偏见来评价光海君外交,就很难做到公允。为了借明朝之力解决北疆危机,仁祖积极倡导“协力讨虏”。但是,统治集团利益的调整、客观国情的衰颓,使得国家状况没有重大起色。仁祖在高举“原则主义”的同时、最终落入光海君“现实主义”的窠臼。只不过,这要比光海君时代更隐蔽。名分与利益之间的利弊权衡,使得仁祖集团在对外决策中往往优柔寡断。对于名分的顾虑,是仁祖时代朝廷各派对外决策争执的焦点和出发点。第三章探讨丁卯之役的发生及朝鲜对后金的交涉。从丁卯之役的爆发到平壤盟誓的订立,朝鲜对后金的交涉经历了从顽强拒斥到妥协让步的过程,从而在根本上证明了朝鲜对光海君时代“现实主义”路线的回归。在强敌面前,意志薄弱的仁祖集团避战自保,抛弃了对国家的责任,仓皇避入江都。这与其标榜的“义理”截然相悖。名分论给朝鲜对后金决策带来了困惑,并且成为朝鲜迅速溃败的思想根源。有关“缓祸”与“斥和”的争辩,即朝鲜对后金交涉路线的论争,亦由丁卯之役而起。江都盟誓虽然有对朝鲜利益侵蚀的一面,但更主要体现了朝鲜与后金之间互相制约、互相防范的对等意识,这对战后的朝鲜是相对有利的。由于朝鲜拒绝承认平壤盟誓的真实性,江都盟誓从而成为朝鲜在丁卯之役后赖以维权的依据。围绕着国家安全、国家利益、国家尊严及荣誉等根本问题,朝鲜在催促后金撤兵、索要本国人口、抵制边境开市等问题上,进行了顽强抗争,展示了其外交性格刚烈而柔韧、灵活又不失原则的特点。在此过程中,朝鲜对待明朝与后金态度之悬殊,给后金造成心理上的巨大落差,这反而加深了后金对明朝和朝鲜的仇恨,并将朝鲜与后金的关系引向新的对抗和冲突。第四章以丙子之役作为分水岭,具体论述了朝鲜对后金交涉地位的变化。丁卯讲和之后,朝鲜的国情每况愈下,“缓祸论”不能拯救国家,“斥绝之声”呼之欲出。虽然斥绝振奋民心,但使两国关系破裂。虽然朝鲜要主动来“破冰”,但皇太极东征决心已定,丙子之役不久爆发。在各道援军皆被阻截的情况下,朝鲜君臣为重新和谈而做了一些试探性努力,但却避重就轻,导致谈判一再拖延。最终,朝鲜君臣不得不以投降来结束南汉山城危机。与丁卯之役相比,朝鲜的交涉地位更加被动。这表明了清朝的壮大,也预示了对传统明鲜之间宗藩关系的颠覆之势——虽然朝鲜人在思想上始终都不承认。由于失去了外交的主动权,斥和论只能流于空洞的呐喊,甚至被扣以“斥和误国”的罪名,这不能不说是朝鲜人的无奈和悲哀。“名分论”在国难之时考验了朝鲜人的民族意志,但也带来了愈演愈烈的虚浮之风,加剧了政见分化,掣肘了朝鲜人对战争的决策和判断。第五章分析三田渡盟约后朝鲜对清朝的交涉情况。三田渡盟约沿袭了中国古代传统宗藩关系的模式,从形式上规定了清朝与朝鲜之间的关系。但是,盟约订立的特殊环境也使得清朝与朝鲜宗藩关系的发展显示出许多非理性因素。尤其是以朝鲜世子等人被挟质沈阳,成为清朝控制朝鲜的根本手段。这也是丙子之役后十几年中影响仁祖对清决策的最重要因素。虽然朝鲜暗中发展了军事力量、横议呼声亦不曾停息,但朝廷从丙子之役中汲取了教训,对清交涉的锐气大有收敛,态度变得更为现实。清朝对朝鲜的利益侵夺和安全威胁是朝鲜难以容忍的,而且清朝的做法亵渎了朝鲜社会的礼法道德。朝鲜因此变得无比愤慨和绝望。这正是仁祖时代及以后朝鲜社会抗金、厌金情绪极度高涨的原因。从另一角度看,清朝屡屡向朝鲜示强,也反映出其胜利背后的自卑意识。他们希望用胜利和实力去赢得国际新秩序下的统治权威,但这种努力却始终不被朝鲜认同。朝鲜王朝更加基于现实主义的外交,但是他们尊周、朝宗的信条却始终没有被抛开。因此,朝鲜的复仇情绪迟早要爆发出来。第六章是全文的结论,通过史实的分析来提升对朝鲜王朝外交理念的认识。首先,“原则主义”与“现实主义”在仁祖时代并存且始终处于矛盾状态之中,一直是困扰朝鲜君臣的问题。尊周事大、名分至上,是朝鲜人对外交涉的“原则”。对明态度正是朝鲜与清人争执的焦点。朝鲜君臣在理念上“争强、争大”、不服于“蛮夷”的态度亦显而易见。名分论暴露出朝鲜人外强中干的现状。他们缺乏从敌我实力消长中认清形势的平和心态。当现实与原则想象不符时,他们往往措手不及。其次,朝鲜人的决策往往源自他们理念中的主观臆断,他们的外交策略受感情因素影响较大,如在仁祖的外交策略中其本人的宗社情结、个人情感都表现得淋漓尽致。仁祖及其拥护者的国家观是狭隘而自私的,所以他们才会抛开对国家的责任,避战自保。归结而论,仁祖及其拥护者们既追求名分与义理,又必须解惑于现实、保全自身安全。尤其在国难面前,他们更强调自己在对金(清)交涉中的主体意识、唯我的利益“本位主义”。虽然朝鲜君臣为名分论而困惑,但是他们对国家、宗社利益为本位的外交追求并不曾改变。一个已经把国家利益微缩为宗社利益、把“大国家”缩小到“小宗社”的朝廷,很难用心挽救衰退中的国家。仁祖时代朝鲜国家尊严的陨落、社会统治秩序的塌陷,加深了朝鲜社会的不满情绪。因此,孝宗时代,宋时烈等人才积极倡导对“王道论”、“名分论”再修补、再诠释,以期重朔社会对国家和王权的信任感。更多还原

【Abstract】 The dynastic change from Ming to Qing is one of the most important topics in historic studies in China and abroad. It also takes a special role in the research field of history of Sino-Korean relationship. This dissertation addresses the staggered characteristic of Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomacy towards Houjin(Qing) during the period of King Injo’s reign (1623-1649), which follows the rule of historic development and divides the relationship between them into different phases by Dingmao War and Bingzi War. During analyzing the characteristic in each phase, the following methods is adopted: (1) According to historical comparison of Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomatic guidelines and policies towards Houjin during the period of King Gwanghaegun’s and Injo’s reign, similarity and differentia are discussed. Then the change of Chos(o|ˇ)n’s attitude and diplomatic policies towards Houjin during 26 years of King Injo’s reign are obtained. (2) The influence and effect of struggle in different parties of Chos(o|ˇ)n on Gwanghaegun’s diplomatic decision-making are analyzed. The contradiction that hides behind the decision-making are also showed up. With the subjective influential factors, a new explanation to Chos(o|ˇ)n’s loss in Dingmao War and Bingzi War and the slowness of the negotiation between Chos(o|ˇ)n and Houjin are proposed. (3) King Injo’s character in politics, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomatic concept, diplomatic character and ethnic character are discussed.The dissertation includes six chapters. The introduction in chapter one illustrates the reason for choosing the research task and its academic value. The frame of the dissertation, research clue and research method are determined by organizing, analyzing and making literature review for historic materials that relating to this historic period. Generally, domestic scholars have showed their trait in the history study from the points of view of folk and macro-scope. However, there is a lack of transposition thinking and interactive research of historic roles. Meanwhile, Korean scholars uplifted ideal character of the diplomacy of Chos(o|ˇ)n due to affection of the ideas in historical materials. The objective of their studies are inadequate. Additionally, past studies were inclined to takes Chos(o|ˇ)n as a passive role in the Chinese-barbarism system and stress the exterior factors that influenced Chos(o|ˇ)n. Its personality as a body who implemented the policy had been neglected. Therefore, the dissertation analyzes and summarizes the characteristics, influencing factors and concepts of Injo’s diplomacy with Houjin by combination political and cultural background of Chos(o|ˇ)n. Chapter two provides background for the history of King Injo’s diplomacy towards Houjin. King Gwanghaegun took fence-sitting policy during Chos(o|ˇ)n helped Ming Dynasty to attack Houjin. Gwanghaegun’s policy was opposite to Chos(o|ˇ)n’s mainstream as Zunzhou and Shida(respecting Ming Dynasty and following the great power). King Injo assumed its reins by taking benefits from the politic atmosphere that traditional politic power criticized King Gwanghaegun fiercely. King Injo played under the banner of the pro-Ming and negated Gwanghaegun completely. He returned to ’principle’ diplomatic guideline. King Injo’s criticism on King Gwanghaegun was out of political and public need for his struggle. Therefore, it was difficult to evaluate Gwanghaegun’s diplomacy fairly as they were accompanied by personal emotions and political bias. In order to make full use of Ming Dynasty’s power to solve Chos(o|ˇ)n’s frontier crisis in the north, King Injo protested actively to cooperate Ming Dynasty to attack Houjin. However, due to benefit adjustment among the reigning group and decay of Chos(o|ˇ)n, the nation’s status had not been improved from King Injo’s government. King Injo regressed to King Gwanghaegun’s realism diplomatic policy. Their activities were more secluded than that of King Gwanghaegun. The balance between fame and benefits led to King Injo’s hesitation in diplomatic decision-making. Their worry about fame was the focus and start point of the political conflicts among different parties in the government.Chapter three inspects outbreak of the Dingmao War and the bargaining between the two countries after the war. From the beginning of war to making pledge in Pyongyang, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s attitude was changed from adamancy to compromise. This change thoroughly demonstrated that King Injo’s diplomatic guideline had been regressed to Gwanghaegun’s realism. In the front of powerful enemy, frailty King Injo evaded the conjuncture and dodged into Jiangdu hurriedly to protect their lives and benefits. They abandoned on the responsibility of the nation. This was opposite to their ’obligation’ completely. Fame puzzled Chos(o|ˇ)n and this could be considered as the ideological roots that led to Chos(o|ˇ)n’s quickly loss in the war with Houjin. Controversy about Huanhuo (solve the war by peaceful way) and Chihe (oppositional standpoint towards the way by using peace talks with Houjin), i.e., argument about Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomatic guideline, was also aroused by the war. As to egotistic King Injo who took the benefit of imperial clansman on the first place, principle had to obey realism. Though the pledge made by Chos(o|ˇ)n and Houjin in Jiangdu had the aspect of encroaching Chos(o|ˇ)n’s national benefits, much more showed the significance that Houjin and Chos(o|ˇ)n restricted kept away from each other, which was good for Chos(o|ˇ)n. Because Chos(o|ˇ)n refused to admit the facticity of Pyongyang pledge, Jiangdu pledge was considered as the warranty by Chos(o|ˇ)n to maintain their right and benefits after the war. In order to protect Chos(o|ˇ)n’s security, benefits and dignity, Chos(o|ˇ)n stalwartly struggled with Houjin in the aspects of hastening to withdraw troops of Houjin from Yizhou, requesting captives from Houjin coming into being by the war, rejecting Houjin’s request for commerce on Chos(o|ˇ)n’s frontier. They showed their strong but flexible character in diplomacy. During these diplomatic struggle, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s different attitudes toward Ming Dynasty and Houjin caused tremendous psychological gap to Houjin. This had deepened Houjin’s hostility to Ming Dynasty and Chos(o|ˇ)n and led the Chos(o|ˇ)n-Houjin’s relationship to new conflicts.Chapter four took the Bingzi War between Chos(o|ˇ)n and Houjin as a watershed to narrate the change of Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomatic status towards Houjin. After the Dingmao War, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s domestic situation went from bad to worse. ’Huanhuo’ contention which was deemed could solve the problem now could not rescue their country and a new contention of strugglling for revenge appeared. Although this excited their people, the relationship between the two countries had broken down. Chos(o|ˇ)n took the initiative to ease their relationships, Huangtaiji decided to declare the war towards Chos(o|ˇ)n and so called Bingzi War broke out. Under the situation that Chos(o|ˇ)n’s reinforcement was blocked by Houjin, Injo and his liegeman re-considered peace talks and re-done some exploratory efforts. Negotiation was delayed as Chos(o|ˇ)n government avoided the important things and dwelled on the trivial ones. Finally, Injo had to surrender to end the war. Compared with Dingmao War, Chos(o|ˇ)n became more passive and this change showed growth of Qing Dynasty. This also indicated that Qing Dynasty will overthrow traditional Chinese-barbarism system, though Chos(o|ˇ)n refused to admit ideologically. Without realistic victory, ’Chijue’ contention became barren and even was thought to be the reason for damaging the nation. This was thought to be great sorriness for the nation. Fame contention tested the nation’s willing in hard times, led to molder atmosphere, exacerbated the political differentiation and impeded Chos(o|ˇ)n’s decision-making and judgment to the war.Chapter five analyzes the diplomatic situation between Chos(o|ˇ)n and Houjin after Santiandu covenant was made. Santiandu covenant followed the model of traditional Chinese-barbarism system, which formally prescribed the relationship between Qing Dynasty and Chos(o|ˇ)n. Because Santiandu covenant was made with special wartime background so that there were many non-rational factors in the development of the relationship. Especially, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s prince was taken to Shenyang as hostage for many years, which was considered as the basic mean to control Chos(o|ˇ)n government. This was the most important factor that influenced the Injo’s diplomatic decision-making of towards Qing Dynasty for more than ten years after the Bingzi War. Though Chos(o|ˇ)n developed it military power secretly and the action that Chos(o|ˇ)n deprecated the control of Qing Dynasty never stopped, Chos(o|ˇ)n government learnt from the Bingzi War. Its attitudes towards Houjin became more realistic than before. Chos(o|ˇ)n could not tolerate Qing Dynasty’s encroachment on its benefits and threat on its national safety, which desecrated Chos(o|ˇ)n’s manners and morality. Chos(o|ˇ)n people became quite indignant and despaired, which just was the main reason that Chos(o|ˇ)n’s society from the period of King Injo’s reign surged the ideaistic and political tide that Chos(o|ˇ)n contradicted Qing Dynasty and disrelish Qing Dynasty for a long time. On the other hand, Qing Dynasty often showed its power to Chos6n, which just indicated Qing Dynasty’s inferiority behind its victory in military affairs. Houjin hoped to win the authority in new Chinese-barbarism system through its victory and strength, but these efforts were not acknowledged by Chos(o|ˇ)n. Chos(o|ˇ)n was good at realistic and flexible diplomacy, but its credendum that kept nation’s independence and recognized the cultural authority of Ming Dynasty was never given up. Therefore, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s emotion of revenge would break out sooner or later.Chapter six draws the conclusion of this dissertation. The understanding of Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomatic guideline is promoted by analyzing the historic facts. Firstly, principle and realism diplomatic policy co-existed and conflicted in King Injo’s reign period, which puzzled King Injo and his supporters for a long time. Zunzhou, Shida and fame are uppermost principle of Chos(o|ˇ)n’s diplomacy. Chos6n’s attitude towards Ming Dynasty was the focus of the argument between Chos(o|ˇ)n and Qing Dynasty. Qing Dynasty detested the fact that Chos(o|ˇ)n depended on Ming Dynasty’s power and showed boastful gesture in diplomatic affairs. Chos(o|ˇ)n’s arrogance and disobedience could been easily seen in its activities. Fame contention divulged Chos(o|ˇ)n’s outwardly strong and inwardly weak status. They lacked placid mentality to recognize the situation and were unprepared for the situation that reality was inconsistent with their imagination. Secondly, Chos(o|ˇ)n’s decision-making was usually based on their idealistic judgment and their diplomacy was influenced by emotion. King Injo’s love knot to gens and his personal emotion completely exhibited in his diplomatic policy. Injo and his supporter’s nation concept was narrow and selfish, so that they abandoned their responsibility on the whole nation and escaped to protect their own’s benefits. Finally, in conclusion, Injo and his supporters not only pursued fame and ’obligation’, but also protect their own benefits, which especially emphasized their egotistic attitude in diplomacy. Especially, in front of disaster of the nation, they even emphasized their principal ideology and solipsism. Though Chos(o|ˇ)n people puzzled by fame contention, their diplomatic pursuit for nation’s and gens’ benefit was unchanged. For one government who reduced the nation’s benefits to gens’ benefits and reduced the nation to gens, it was difficult to rescue the decaying nation. The fact that Chos(o|ˇ)n’s national dignity fell down and the reign order of society subsided, the dissatisfaction emotion of the society grew on. Therefore, during the period of King Hyojong, in order to figure Chos(o|ˇ)n society’s relief on the nation and the kingship, Confucian scholar Song Shilie actively sparkpluged to repair and explain Wangdao and fame contention again.更多还原