基于商家、消费者和发行机构决策行为的电子货币研究

【作者】 张德成；

【导师】 欧阳令南；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 金融学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 随着电子商务的发展,传统货币支付结算体系面临着一场变革。在信息技术基础上发展起来的电子货币以其制作成本低、携带方便等优势,在支付领域上正在逐渐取代传统的银行券。随着电子货币安全性的不断提高,人们越来越意识到电子商务需要一种全新的支付手段——电子货币,另外电子货币也开始走向网下,执行传统商务交易和债权债务的货币清偿功能。美联储2004年的一份报告认为,电子货币取代传统的银行券和硬币作为主要的交易和支付工具已经成为一种不可逆转的世界性发展趋势。如同传统货币支付体系,电子货币作为21世纪金融技术和制度创新的主流,不可避免地冲击着政府、企业和消费者的经济决策行为。目前国内外经济学界对电子货币的研究集中在宏观经济领域,主要包括电子货币对中央银行的货币政策和政府财政政策的影响等,但是从微观经济学视角对电子货币进行研究的文献很少。电子货币的出现不仅冲击着政府的宏观经济政策,而且也影响到经济社会中各类主体的微观行为,包括商家、普通消费者、电子货币的发行机构以及提供结算服务和信息技术支持的中介机构。微观经济个体的决策行为包括竞争行为、支付工具选择行为、使用电子货币的商品交易定价、利用电子货币进行融资等方面。实施电子货币的成败取决于微观个体的接受意愿,微观个体行为在一定程度上决定了电子货币体系的运行特征,宏观政策的实行更要考虑到微观个体的行为。因此,对电子货币环境下的微观个体行为的研究不仅在理论上是一种具有前瞻性的探索性工作,同时也具有重要的现实意义。电子货币微观主体参与者:电子货币发行机构、商家和大众消费者,三者之间是一种相互制约又相互促进的体系。因此,对于电子货币微观个体行为的研究,就必须对电子货币微观参与主体的行为决策进行系统的研究。本文根据2004年美联储一份电子货币报告中提出的重要的微观个体行为决策来展开,研究所涉及到的微观个体行为决策包括如下内容:(1)在电子货币环境下,商家以利润最大化为目标,至少要做两项决策:①根据支付工具的成本结构和行业竞争等情况判断是否使用电子货币作为支付工具;②使用电子货币作为支付工具的商品价格如何确定。(2)普通消费者以个人消费效用最大化和投资收益最大化为目标,在微观层面上也至少面临着两项决策:①消费效用最大化。在消费中是否选择电子货币作为支付工具,如果选择电子货币,在总消费额中所占的比例应该为多大,这就是消费行为中的电子货币选择问题;②投资收益最大化。如何确定最优的持有比例,使持有包括电子货币在内的各种资金帐户的收益最大化,这就是投资行为中的电子货币选择行为。由于在某段时期内消费者的财富是固定的,消费和投资是使用财富的两种行为,因此消费者的两个决策事实上可以归结为一个问题,就是电子货币的选择问题。(3)发行公司作为电子货币支付体系的主体,它从事电子货币发行不外有两种目的:①给购买发行公司产品的顾客群提供结算便利,以增加销售并扩大市场份额,这个领域主要跟市场营销相关,不是本文所要研究的问题。②通过提供电子货币支付卡,获得手续费收入,以及无偿或低价占用消费者的预收款项余额,即一笔实质性的融资收益。本文对包括消费者、商家和电子货币发行公司在内的经济主体的决策行为的研究思路、过程及主要研究结论如下:首先,本文从电子货币支付体系的竞争分析出发,分析在商家完全垄断和商家寡头垄断两种市场结构下的电子货币竞争均衡格局。电子货币市场事实上是一个双边市场,它由发卡者和持卡消费者构成的发卡市场以及支付网点和商家构成的支付市场所组成的。交换费起到调节两个市场需求的作用,发卡机构可以通过调节交换费的大小平衡需求弹性不同的两个市场的需求量。当交换费大于占优均衡时的交换费水平时,即支付网点对商户收取的服务费大于消费者使用电子货币所带来的平均额外收益时,商家的利润下降,这时商家可能拒绝接受电子货币支付系统。因此,交换费水平的确定对解决商家“拒绝电子货币”有着一定的意义。当商家市场完全垄断时,满足社会福利最优的持卡人收费水平和满足电子货币发行机构利润最优的持卡人收费水平是相同的,也就是说,电子货币体系给社会带来的总收益等于电子货币体系的总成本。当电子货币的支付网点完全竞争时,均衡状态下,发卡者对持卡消费者收取的使用费用满足下列条件:持卡者的使用费等于电子货币系统成本扣除商家折扣剩下来的部分。因此,对消费者收取的电子货币服务费用仅能够补偿整个电子货币体系的成本。另外,当电子货币体系总成本固定时,商家所承担的成本和消费者所承担的成本有着此消彼长的关系。当商家市场寡头垄断时,商家之间存在着外部性影响:任何一方的决策都会影响双方的定价和市场份额。如果商家i拒绝接受电子货币支付,商家j接受电子货币支付的成本随之上升,商家j接受电子货币支付的意愿也下降了。这表明商家市场结构与服务费的高低有着直接的关系,商家市场力量强时,商家服务费就低,商家市场力量弱时,商家服务费就高。即:在商家寡头垄断市场结构下,其收取的服务费水平高于在商家完全垄断市场结构情况下收取的服务费水平。若商家之间串谋,则服务费与完全垄断市场结构的情况相同。其次,本文还从不同支付工具的成本结构出发,在包括人工成本、交易成本、利息成本等既定的各项支付工具成本条件下,分析消费者、商家、发卡机构如何选择电子货币,才能使得消费者、商家及发卡机构的效用或利润最大化。对商家来说,当在现金与电子货币之间进行选择时,如果电子货币发行机构取消所有的手续费,则现金和电子货币的交易区域的界限为0,即商家会完全偏好采用电子货币付款。当在信用卡与电子货币之间进行选择时,如果大额支付,则主要采用信用卡,如果是小额支付则使用电子货币,如果额度更小则使用现金。对消费者来说,当在现金与电子货币之间进行选择时,如果安全性风险可以进一步降低,消费者会偏好使用电子货币。当在信用卡与电子货币之间进行选择时,如果信用卡发卡银行取消所有的手续费,则小额度的支付使用电子货币,大额度的支付使用信用卡。对于在网上商店和实体商店两种情况下消费者对电子货币的选择问题,结论为大额交易使用信用卡,小额交易使用电子货币。当买卖双方无法达成一致的交易额,在实体商店可用现金。如果是网上商店的交易,由于买卖双方不能直接面对面,因此消费者只能选择电子货币或信用卡付费,而交易领域的界限,则由网上商店所主导。对于发卡机构来说,由于信用卡的变动成本大于电子现金的变动成本,因此信用卡的发卡银行不会与电子货币发卡机构在小额交易上竞争。此外,本文还对多次交易条件下的电子货币支付选择进行了研究,认为使用电子货币的区间上限(使用电子货币的额度范围)跟转换次数成正比,跟它的替代品——借记卡的交易次数相关成本成正比,但跟借记卡的利率水平成反比,跟电子货币交易成本成反比。第三,本文根据电子货币的成本和消费者的效用函数,提出一个使用电子货币的产品交易定价方程,为商家在电子货币环境下,正确制定面向使用电子货币消费者的产品价格提供依据。由于该模型是基于Logit模型,因此在实践中具有可计量性特点,有一定有实际意义。研究认为电子货币的市场份额和电子货币商品交易价格成反比关系,因此作为一种新推出的支付工具,如果使用电子货币的交易价格定得越高,那么其市场份额就越少。如果消费者对不同支付工具的认知能力越弱,也就是不确定性参数越大,那么价格的需求弹性越低,降低电子货币交易价格所带来的市场份额增加并不显著。而当市场逐渐趋向成熟,消费者对支付工具有很深的认识时,再将价格调低,才可以获取更多的市场份额。因此,当电子货币作为一种新型支付工具投放到一个消费者认知程度不高的市场上,为了吸引消费者使用电子货币,降低使用电子货币支付的商品价格的效果并不显著。因此与其把资金和精力放在降低售价上,不如把资金和精力投入到消费者宣传教育和培养消费者体验上面来,以改善消费者的认知程度。对于最优交易价格,本文证明了在一个新的支付工具入市的时候,如果消费者对这个支付工具的选择不确定性已经明确,而且之前市场上存在的各种支付工具的效用都已经确定的话,那么使用新支付工具时,存在且只存在一个最优的交易价格。而选择任何别的价格,都只会导致企业所获得的利润减少。最后,本文利用现金分析方法,对一种典型的储值型电子货币——储值卡的预收款余额进行分析,借以确定发行公司获得的实质性融资的数量大小。对发行公司的现金流有较大影响的因素,即影响融资数量的因素,包括四个:卡内储值金额的使用速度、收入的增长速度、储值卡金额是否被用尽、发行公司与服务提供机构间的资金清算方式。在分析中,本文考虑到储值卡的六种不同使用模式及这些模式的不同组合,并分别进行讨论分析。六种基本模式的解决方法奠定了进一步对更复杂的电子货币系统进行融资效应分析的基础。本文还对多服务提供机构模式下的融资数量进行了分析,如果服务提供机构不只一个,而且中介单位与各服务提供机构间的资金清算方式不尽相同,或是资金清算方式虽相同但清算日不尽相同时,则必须将每日储值卡销售额先按照服务提供机构进行分配,然后再分别根据它与各服务提供机构间的资金清算方式与资金清算日计算每期的预收款余额,最后再加总,即可得到多服务提供机构下的中介单位的每期预收款余额。综上所述,本文在电子货币环境下,分析了消费者、商家和发行公司三个微观经济主体的竞争行为、选择行为、交易定价和融资行为等,为今后电子货币在微观领域的研究作一些开创性或者铺垫性的工作。更多还原

【Abstract】 Along with the development of electronic commerce, the traditional payment and settlement system is facing a transformation. The electronic currency based on the information technology will gradually substitute for the traditional banknotes in payment systems due to its convenience and low cost in transaction and manufacturing. With the increasing security of electronic currency transaction, the E-commerce needs the kind of brand-new payment tool - electronic currency. Moreover, the electronic currency also started to move towards to the field of traditional business transactions and debt settlements. It was believed by one of Federal Reserve’s reports (2004) that the electronic currencies’substitution of tradition banknotes and the coins as the main payment tool already became one kind of irreversible tendencies of the 21st century. Similar to the traditional payment tools, the electronic currency, as the mainstream of 21st century’s payment system, is inevitably having a huge impact on the behaviors of governments, enterprises and consumers.At present, the researches of electronic currency both in domestic and foreign countries concentrated mostly on the domain of the macroeconomics, mainly included the electronic currencies’influence to Central Bank’s monetary policy and the government financial policy and so on. But the research literatures of electronic currency based on microeconomics were very few. The electronic currency was not only having an impact on government’s macroeconomic policies, but also affected the behaviors of each individual in economic society, including the merchants, the consumers, the electronic currency issuing company as well as other agencies providing the settlement services and the supporting information technology. The behaviors of individuals included competition, choice of payment tools, pricing for the user of electronic currency, financing by issuing electronic currencies and so on. The successful implementation of electronic currency system was decided by wish of acceptance of the individuals. The model of individuals’behaviors had a certain impact on the characteristics of electronic currency systems. The macroeconomic policy-making needs to consider the microeconomic individuals’behaviors. Therefore, the researches of microeconomic individuals’behaviors under the electronic currency systems have a theoretical sense as well as certain practical significance.Because the behaviors of each individual of electronic currency including the merchants, the consumers and the electronic currency issuing company promote as well as restrict each other. Then, to study the behaviors of individual, we must study them as a system. This article involves the following main behavior of microeconomic individuals based on a Federal Reserve’s reports (2004).Under the electronic currency system, the merchants who take the profit maximization as a goal, at least must make two decisions. (1) Whether did they choose the electronic currency as the payment tool, according to estimates of the cost structure and competition of each payment tool. (2) How to price the products for the users of electronic currency. The consumers whose goals are maximization of their utilities and the return of investment, at least must make two following decisions: (1) whether did they choose the electronic currency as the payment tool? What is the proportion for the electronic currency if they choose it. This is consumers’behavior of choice for electronic currency. (2) How to determine the optimal holding ratio of electronic currency in order to yield a maximal returns from the portfolios of each money account. This is investors’behavior of choice for electronic currency. Because consumer’s wealth is fixed in a long period, the consumption and the investment are two kinds of uses of the wealth. Therefore two decision problems could be summed up to one problem -- choice decision of electronic currencyThe issuing company acted as main role of electronic currency payment system, it is engaged in two goals: (1) Provides the convenience in payment to the customers who will purchase its products in order to increase the sale volume and market share. This is mainly related with the decision of marketing, is not the topic of this article. (2) Through providing the payment card of electronic currency, the issuing company can obtain the income of commission charge, as well as a free or low cost finance from card users’balance of electronic currency accounts.This article would analyze electronic currency’s influence on microeconomic individuals, which include consumers, merchant and issuing company, as well as their decisions-making behaviors on the basis of microeconomics. The study process and main results as follows:Firstly, this article made a competitive analysis of the electronic currency payment system in the market condition of both oligopoly and monopoly of merchant. Actually, the market of electronic currency is characterized as Two-sided. it is composed by cards-issuing market and cards-payment market. The interchange Fees balance the two markets. As the cards-issue institutes could balance the demand of the two markets of different demand elasticity through changing the quantity of interchange Fees. When the interchange Fees is higher than Fees of predominant equalization, the profit of merchants decline, and the merchants will not accept the electronic currency payment system. So, the interchange Fees has a significance for merchants to decline the electronic currency.When the merchant market is monopoly, the charge level with cards-holder is same when the condition satisfied with superior social welfare and with maximization the profits of issuing-organization. In another word, the benefits brought by the electronic currency payment system are equal to the total cost of the system itself. When the payment branches are completely competitive, in the condition of equilibrium, the charge of cards-holders is equal to the cost of electronic currency system subtracting the discounts of merchants. Therefore, service fee charged with the consumer can compensate the cost of the whole electronic currency payment system only. Moreover, when the total cost of electronic currency payment system is fixed, the changing direction of cost that the consumers undertaking is totally contrary to the direction of cost that the merchants undertaking.When the merchant market is oligopoly, there exists exterior influence between the merchants: the decisions of one party will influence both parties’ price-making decisions and the market-share. If merchant i refuse to accept the electronic currency payment system, the cost of merchant j that accepts the electronic currency payment system will increase, and then the willingness of merchant j accepts the electronic currency payment system will decrease. It demonstrates that there is direct relationship between the structure of merchant market and the quantity of charging fees. Namely, when the strength of merchants markets is strong, the service charge will be lower than the strength of merchants markets is weak. If the two merchants collaborated, then service charge when the merchant market is oligopoly is equal to that when the merchant market is monopoly.Secondly, this article also proposed a model for consumer’s choice behavior of electronic currency based on the different costs of payment tools including the labor cost, the transaction cost and the opportunity cost and so on, for the purpose of maximization the consumer’s utility, the merchants’profits, and cards-issuing company’s profits. For the merchants, when the decisions are between cash and electronic currency, if the cards-issue companies cancel all service charge, then, the bargain boundary between cash and electronic currency is zero, namely, the merchants will totally accept the electronic currency. When the decisions are between electronic currency and credit card, if the payment is high, then the credit card will be accepted; if the payment is a little lower, then the electronic currency will be accepted, and if the payment is still lower, then the cash will be accepted.For the consumers, when the decisions are between cash and electronic currency, if safety risk could lower further, consumers will chose the electronic currency. When the decisions are between electronic currency and credit card, if credit cards-issue organization cancels service charge all, while the payment is high, then the credit card will be accepted; while the payment is lower, then the electronic currency will be accepted. For the internet-store and entity store, the conclusion of the decisions for consumers are the same, namely, while the payment is high, then the credit card will be accepted; while the payment is lower, then the electronic currency will be accepted. If the seller and buyer can’t reach a consistent bargain sum, the buyer can use the cash in entity store. For the internet-store, consumers can only chose the electronic currency or credit cards, and the bargain boundary between credit cards and electronic currency is dominated by internet-store.For the cards-issue company, because the variety cost of credit cards is larger than that of electronic currency, then the cards-issue companies don’t compete with electronic currency-issue organizations.In addition, this paper also studied the choice of electronic currency payment under the condition of multi-bargain. The conclusions are that the upper limits of using electronic currency has direct proportion with the conversion times and bargain times of credit cards, and has inverse direct proportion with the interest of credit cards and bargain cost.Thirdly, this article proposed a pricing equation for those who paid the product by electronic currency according to the cost structure of electronic currency and consumer’s utility function. The pricing equation provided the basis for the issuing company and merchant to set the price for user of electronic currency. Because this equation is based on the Logit Model, it is practical and calculable. This paper concludes that the market share of electronic currency has inverse relationship with exchange price of products. So, as a new payment tool, if the bargain price is much higher, the market share of electronic currency will be much lower. If the cognition ability of consumers is much lower, price-demand flexibility will be much lower, so, if the merchants lower the price of products, there will not be much bigger market share of electronic currency. When the market inclines to gradually mature, and the cognition ability of consumers is higher than before, there will be bigger market share of electronic currency if the price of products is lowered. For the new payment tool, the result of attracting the consumers through lowering the bargain price is not very good. Therefore, would rather improve the cognition degree of the consumer through educating and promoting than lower the bargain price with quantity of energy and money.For the most superior bargain price, this paper concludes when a new payment tool joins the payment market, and all the indefinites are clear, and the utilities of other payment tools existed are definite also, then there exists only one most superior bargain price. If the merchants chose another price, the profits of the merchants will decrease. Finally, this article analyzed the balance of the electronic currency accounts by the cash flow analysis method for one kind of typical electronic currency– stored value card, in order to the determine the size of finance for the issuing company.Factors influence the cash flow of issuing company are using speed of the cash inside of stored value card, and growth speed of income, and whether the money inside the stored value card is run out, and settlement method between issuing company and service providing organizations. This paper considers six different basic patterns and the combinations of the six basic patterns of stored value card. The settlement methods of the six different basic patterns could establish the foundation of analyzing the size of finance of more complicated electronic currency payment system.This paper also studied the size of finance with multi-service providing organization. If there are more than one service providing organization, and the clearing settlements between agents and service providing organizations are different, or the clearing settlements are same but clearing date is different, the issuing company must allocate the sale according service providing organizations first, then the issuing company could analyze the size of finance according the clearing settlements and clearing date.In summary, this paper analyzed the decision-making and behaviors of three microeconomic individuals, including the consumer, the merchant and the issuing company on a microeconomic basis, which included subjects of competitive analysis, the behavior of choice, the pricing for E-currency user and the financing analysis. All the conclusions will be useful for the further study of electronic currency in the view of microeconomic.更多还原