【作者】 谢小剑；

【导师】 左卫民；

【作者基本信息】 四川大学 ， 诉讼法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 研究公诉权制约制度对于保障犯罪嫌疑人权利，实现司法公正，推进我国的法治建设都具有非常重要的积极意义。在导论中，笔者对公诉权制约制度的研究范围进行了限制。制约不包括对侦查权的制约，不包括对支持公诉、变更公诉的制约，而只针对检察官行使起诉决定权的制约。另外，公诉权制约制度研究不是公诉权滥用防治论，并非所有防止公诉权滥用的制度都属于研究的范围。因此，制约制度是指能够对承办检察官的个案公诉决定产生“一定强制力或重大影响力”的法定“外部”“诉讼”程序。也就是说，非诉讼制度上的或者内部制度，包括不起诉决定的种类和范围、产生潜在影响的检察官任免制度、承办检察官的审查起诉程序、责任制约机制等不是独立的、主要的研究对象。全文共分五部分。第一部分探讨了公诉权制约的理论基础和现实依据，论证了为什么要对公诉权制约。权利制约理论以制约权力、保障人权为重要价值取向，是制约公诉权问题得以展开的理论基础。在当代社会，越来越多的社会关系适用刑法调整，自诉越来越少，公诉案件的范围在不断扩张；检察官的公诉裁量权也在不断拓展；公诉证明标准的模糊性与公诉权行使过程的封闭性；检察官具有主导侦查起诉的强大力量，在职务犯罪案件中特别如此，这些制度背景决定了公诉权具有易滥用的倾向。同时，犯罪嫌疑人具有免于不当起诉的利益，起诉给犯罪嫌疑人带来非常大的损害。特别是，犯罪嫌疑人的一些利益一旦因起诉受损，就无法通过无罪判决、国家赔偿来弥补，主要包括被错误定罪的损害、审前羁押、待审的社会、心理压力、社会歧视、犯罪嫌疑人的程序利益等。而且，公诉权滥用将对社会秩序造成巨大的破坏，甚至使国家从自由社会走向专制社会。所以，制约公诉权具有非常重大的现实必要性。第二部分研究了我国公诉权滥用的现状。目前，我国缺乏明确的、完整的公诉权滥用的判断标准，为此笔者考察了域外公诉权滥用的基本形态。域外已经引入宪法和正当程序作为判断公诉权滥用的标准，确定了许多新型的公诉权滥用形态，其中包括违反迅速审判原则的起诉、违反一事不再理原则的起诉、违法诱惑侦查的起诉、选择性起诉、报复性起诉等。以此为标准，我国公诉权滥用非常严重：许多案件在证据不足的条件下轻易起诉；重复起诉；超过法定审查起诉期限起诉；不公平地选择部分公民起诉；对举报人、新闻记者、律师等报复性起诉也非常严重；十分轻微的案件也起诉，犯罪嫌疑人基本得不到不起诉利益。这明确了我国公诉权制约的对象，进一步论证了我国制约公诉权的必要性，也预示着我国现有公诉权制约制度的不足。第三部分比较研究了域外对公诉权制约的制度经验。域外各国都规定了最高司法行政长官对公诉权进行制约。但是，为了防止对公诉权的政治、行政干预，域外各国都对制约权进行限制，保障制约主体相对于行政机关的相对独立性，其目标在于实现公诉权的公共责任与公诉权相对独立的平衡。在检察一体化理念下，上级检察官承担着对下级检察官行使公诉权制约的职能。但是，这种制约并非绝对，仍然必须保障下级检察官的相对独立。由法官对公诉权进行司法审查是对公诉权制约的最主要、最有效的手段，包括对不起诉的司法审查、预审程序等。预审程序即要防止预审走形式，又要防止预审异变成庭审程序，并通过撤销起诉与否实现对公诉权的程序性制裁。美国还通过大陪审团制度，日本也通过检察审查会制度，实现社会公众对公诉权的制约。但是，此制约受国内政治、经济、社会文化因素影响非常大。这些比较考察拓宽了视野，为我国的改革提供了全面的新思路。第四部分实证考察了我国公诉权制约的历史及现状。目前，我国制约公诉权的制度主要有政法委协调案件；人大个案监督；检察院内部对不起诉的复议、复核、审批，检察长、检察委员会对承办检察官意见的审查；人民监督员制度等。但这些制约出现了较大的问题，包括制约缺乏统一、明确的法律规范；作为制约权主体的政法委、人大、上级检察院、上级检察官权力过大，作为被监督者的检察院、检察官缺乏相对独立性；对不起诉的制约重重设置，而对起诉缺乏有效的制约，特别是缺乏对起诉的庭前司法审查；各种制约几乎都采取行政化方式，甚至对不起诉设置指标控制，不进行听证审查；制约更主要通过地方权力进行制约，上级检察机关对公诉权制约不足，结果导致检察机关成为地方的“服务机关”；犯罪嫌疑人没有参与制约程序的权利；制约过于强调社会因素，有时甚至违反法律追求社会效果。这种制约虽然一定程度上实现了对承办检察官的制约，但是剥夺了其办案的相对独立性；虽然实现了对不起诉的控制，但是以剥夺不起诉权行使为代价；虽然实现了对“普通案件”的制约，但是一旦案件中出现政治因素或者权力因素，则此类“特殊案件”往往受到外部干预而无法正当行使公诉权。我国目前对公诉权的制约以维护社会秩序为目标，忽视对犯罪嫌疑人权利的保护；以实体正义为目标，忽视程序正义，不能真正全面、充分发挥防止公诉权滥用的功能，导致了大量公诉权滥用现象。特别严重的是，一些制约甚至异化为干预公诉权正当行使，诱发公诉权滥用的因素。可见，我国即存在制约方式不当，又存在制约类型不够的问题。第五部分提出了我国公诉权制约制度改革的基本原则和具体制度建构。其一、我国公诉权制约制度改革应当遵循分权制衡原则，立法权不得参与、决定公诉权的行使；侦查权、公诉权与审判权实现分权，警察、法官不应当行使公诉权；上下级检察官分权，防止公诉权的决定权过分集中；公诉提起与公诉决定权的分离。其二、公诉权制约制度还应当保障公诉权行使相对独立原则，作为被制约者的检察机关对外部制约保持相对独立，承办检察官对上级保持相对独立，防止公诉权受到政治、行政权力的过度影响，成为权力的工具。为此，应当强调检察官的“司法化”，强化检察官独立行使职权的身份保障制度。其三、公诉权制约制度必须体现正当程序原则，明确犯罪嫌疑人免受不当起诉的权利，引入正当程序认定公诉权滥用，保障犯罪嫌疑人的程序启动、参与权，保持制约主体的中立性、程序的公开性，并确立程序性制裁制度。其四、制约公诉权不能过度，必须遵循适度平衡原则，包括公诉权制约与相对独立的平衡，司法公正与诉讼效率的平衡。具体的制度改革措施包括以下五个方面：逐步废除政法委协调案件制度；借鉴瑞典的议会监督员制度，在人大内设置专业化的相对独立的机构专门实施人大个案监督，个案监督限于作不起诉的案件，必须采取听证的方式，保障犯罪嫌疑人的参与权；重构检察机关的内部关系，强化承办检察官的公诉职责，并实行公诉一体化加强上级检察官对下级检察官行使公诉权的制约，明确上级检察官的指挥监督权、职务承继权、职务移转权，下级检察官办理特殊案件时的报告义务，制定统一的公诉政策，但是下级检察官具有相对独立性，服从法律与良心；人民监督员制度采取听证化的审查模式；建立预审制度，由法官庭前对公诉权进行审查，防止公诉权滥用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Research on refraining prosecutorial power is of great significance for safeguarding suspects’ rights, for practicing justice, for promoting the rule of law in China. In the introduction, the author confined his research within the provinces and responsibilities of prosecutors. Therefore, refrainment on investigation, on public prosecution supporting, or on public prosecution alteration will not be discussed in this thesis. Moreover, what the author wants to discuss herein is quite different from the prevention of abusing of prosecutorial power. In this thesis, measures or actions are those which could refrain prosecutors from misusing their powers to decide whether or not to accuse someone on some crime, and those which are some legal institutions with coercion and effect. That is to say, non-procedural or potential institutions, such as prosecutors’ appointment and removal, prosecution examination, and other restricting means, are not topics of the thesis. This thesis is composed of five chapters.In Chapter One, the theoretic and the factual reasons are given to justify that prosecutorial power should be refrained. While power refrainment and human rights protection are values underlining the rule of law, they just set the theoretic foundation for public prosecution refrainment. In modern society, with the social relations are increasingly Overcriminalized, the less private prosecution exist, and the more cases can be called criminal cases, the more powerful prosecutors’ discretion there is. In the meanwhile, prosecutors have great power to lead investigation due to the vagueness of standards of proof and the occlusion of prosecutorial power, in particular the official offences. The entire above makes prosecutorial power inclined to being misused. Furthermore, suspects shall enjoy the benefits from unlawful prosecution, not being charged. Under this condition, if a suspect is accused, his interests is harmed, and these harms, including wrongful conviction, custody before the trial, social and psychological pressure when waiting for trail, discrimination, and procedural interests for suspects, will not be relived through impeccability judgment or state compensation. Besides, the abuse of prosecutorial power can make huge damages to social orders; even change a state of freedom into one of tyranny. Thus, public prosecution refrainment is of great necessity.Actuality of public prosecution misuse is presented in Chapter Two. China has no unambiguous and integrated criterion to judge theabuse of prosecutorial power, and this is the reason why the author reviewed other countries’ experience in this field. Based on constitutions and due process of law, many new-type public prosecution misuses have been exposed, prosecutions against speedy trial, against double jeopardy, from leading interrogation, and selective prosecution, and prosecution for revenge, just name a few. If we use the same criterion as our foreign counterparts, we can say safely that misuse of the public prosecution right is very severe and pressing in China. For example, suspects were accused on scarce evidence, or were accused again and again on similar or the same evidence, or were accused even the lawful period of limitation had been over; some suspects were selected with bias to charge, in joint offence, while the others were released without any punishment; sometimes prosecutions were brought against informers, news reports, lawyers and such, only to make revenge; and there are also many prosecutions against misdemeanors. Under these circumstances benefits from nonprosecution can hardly be enjoyed by suspects. Through counting these facts, the author disclosed the deficiency of present refrainment institutions on the public prosecution right, thus clarified the objects of the refrainment, and pushed the justification of it further.Overseas experience in refraining prosecutorial power is introduced and compared in Chapter Three. One important and common rule in all the researched countries is that Head of Judiciary has the power and authority to condition the public prosecution right. However, these Heads of Judiciary must keep their own independence through some restrictive institutions in order to protect prosecutorial power from being controlled by politics or administration. The purpose of this independence is to practice the balance between the public responsibility of public prosecution and the public prosecution right itself. Superior prosecutors should supervise the work done by their inferiors, and this kind of "supervision" is not absolute and must safeguard the independence of inferior prosecutors. The most effective measure to refrain prosecutorial power is judicial review presided by judges, such as judicial review on nonprosecution, or judicial review on preliminary trial. As far as the judicial review on preliminary trial is concerned, it should prevent preliminary trial not only from being inane, but also from transformed into a real trial, and could put procedural punishment on the public prosecution right through withdrawing accusation. The people also can supervise prosecutorial power by the grand jury in the United States, or by checkup committee in Japan. All the four measures discussed in the chapter are affected by politics, economy, and culture in a country. Anyway, all the efforts the author made are to put forward new perspectives for China’s judicial reforms.The past and status in quo of the public prosecution refrainment is recorded in Chapter Four. At present, the refrainment is fulfilled via following ways: regulation from politics and law committee, case supervision from people’s congress, reconsideration and double check and approval from procuratorate, examination from chief procurator or procuratorial committee, and opinions from people’s ombudsman. Nothing is perfect. All the above actions have their own defects. First, no uniform or clear codes or articles can be used as justification. Second, anyone in "politics and law committee" or "people’s congress" or superior procuratorate or superior prosecutors has great powers and is inclined to misuse them. Third, the supervised procuratorate and prosecutors lack the independence to carry out their duties. Fourth, much restrict has been put on nonprosecutions while little on prosecutions. Fifth,’the majority of restriction on prosecutorial power is administrative. Sixth, there even are some firm requirements for nonprosecution with only the hearing for suspects excluded. Seventh, regional authorities play significant role in the supervision and procuratorate serve on the regional interests as the result. Eighth, suspects have no access to take part in the procedure which is designed to supervise the public prosecution. The last but not the least important, social factors are overly emphasized to practice particular effects.All the measures mentioned above, in some degree, make the refrainment on the public prosecution right reality, but theindependence of prosecutors is deprived; ensure the supervision and control on nonprosecutions, but the right of not being prosecuted itself is sacrificed; practice the control over normal cases, but prosecutorial power is surrendered to political and such powers. The focus of China’s present pursuit in prosecutorial power is to maintain social order, not to safeguard suspects’ rights and interests; is to realize essential justice, not to practice procedural justice. Therefore, the misuse of the public prosecution right can be found easily and frequently. The worst of it is that some measures have dissimilated into blocks against implementing prosecutors’ responsibilities and duties. In a word, there are two main problems exist in the refrainment on prosecutorial power in present China, one is unsuitable means, and the other is exiguous actions.In the Chapter Five, the author listed principles and rules concerning how to constitute a whole new system to refrain prosecutorial power in China. First of all, division of powers, and checks and balances. That means legislature shall not participate in or determine the implementation of the public prosecution right; the power of investigation, the power of prosecution, and the power of judgment shall be separated; the authority and power shall be divided betweensuperior and inferior prosecutors; and the power to bring a prosecution and the power to approve the prosecution shall be separated. Secondly, keeping the independence of the implementation, and avoiding the interference from politics and from the superior. Thirdly, due process of law. Suspects’ right to release from unjust prosecution shall be clarified and protected. And this right shall cover startup and participation the criminal procedure, the neutrality and detachedness of the refrainers, the openness of the procedure, and shall set up a procedural punishment system. Fourthly, moderation and balance. The balance between the responsibility and independence of the public prosecution shall be kept, and the balance between justice and efficiency shall be maintained.For rules, there are five. At first, we should abolish the mediating power of the politics and laws committees. Then, we should set a specific and independent organ within the people’s congress to supervise by case. There shall be a required hearing for every nonprosecution case. Moreover, we should reconstruct the relationship inside the prosecuratorate to give prosecutorial power down to every separate and independent prosecutor. The superior prosecutors shall only have the rights to supervise, to succeed, and to transfer the duty or work assumed by their inferiors. The inferior prosecutors shall report to their superiors about complex cases, and shall apply the just and consistent policies to all the case within their domain, and shall keep fair and independent, and shall only obey laws and conscience. Furthermore, hearing shall be the only way that people’s ombudsmen exert their power and authority. At last, we should construct preliminary trial machinery. Judges shall be given the power and authority to review the prosecution so as to prevent the misuse of the public prosecution right.更多还原