【作者】 陈涛；

【导师】 韩毅；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 经济史， 2007， 博士

【副题名】历史的制度分析视角

【摘要】 食盐是人们日常生活中的必需品。由于食盐的生产受自然条件影响较大,只有少数地区如沿海或者一些拥有盐湖、盐井等自然资源的地区能够进行,所以极容易为垄断者所控制。古代中国的统治者通常将食盐专卖权掌握在自己手中,盐税也就成为国家财政的重要支柱。历史上存在着两类食盐专卖制度:一是直接专卖制,即由国家完全垄断食盐从生产到销售的全过程;二是间接专卖制,即国家垄断食盐的生产环节,而在食盐的销售上允许商人参与。明代的食盐专卖制度正是典型的间接食盐专卖制度。作为一项重要的经济制度,明代食盐专卖制度的运行效率好坏不但关系到明朝的财政收入,而且与明代商人的命运和商业的发展息息相关。同时,由于明朝将食盐专卖与边防建设联系起来,因此这项制度的运行效率不但对经济产生影响,而且对政治与国家安全也产生了影响。可见,明代食盐专卖制度已成为明代社会结构的一项基本经济制度,对整个明代社会产生了深远的影响。这项制度先后经过了开中法、开中折色制、纲法等具体形式的变化。这些变化彼此有着内在的逻辑关系,存在着路径依赖。对明代食盐专卖制度的影响以及变迁轨迹的研究,无论是新古典经济学还是演化经济学等方法都很难给出满意的解释,而历史的制度分析(Historical Institutional Analysis)能够融合二者的观点,将它们的分析方法统一在一个解释框架内,从而显示出极强的解释能力。本文使用HIA方法对明代食盐专卖制度进行了深入研究,得出如下结论:开中法是统治者与商人进行博弈产生的均衡结果,在外部参数(如偏好、技术、支付等)不发生变化时,这项制度是自我实施的,即商人以退出相威胁促使统治者遵守诺言;明代开始出现的商帮成为支持开中法自我实施的组织形式,它通过组织的规则和职能来影响人们预期支付和信念,强化了制度的自我实施;守支问题的产生最初只是导致开中法运行效率下降,并没有马上改变原来制度的参数条件;然而随着守支问题不断恶化,关键参数发生改变,新的均衡开始形成,开中折色制、纲法一一出现,新的制度生命周期又开始了。本文内容大致安排如下:第一章是本文的序论;第二章首先对新制度经济史学研究的发展做一个概览,然后给出本文的研究方法和分析框架;第三章对开中法的由来、本质进行理论和历史的探讨,并指出诞生于明代的商帮组织由于具有解决承诺问题的功能而有助于开中法的顺利实施;第四章指出守支问题是造成开中法发生变迁的直接原因,而守支问题产生并不断恶化是由统治者的动态不一致性、官僚和商人的寻租行为等三个方面共同作用所导致的;第五章主要探讨了明代食盐专卖制度的一次边际调整——开中折色制的制度特征、实施条件以及经济学涵义;第六章主要研究明代食盐专卖制度的第二次变革——纲法的合约性质及其治理机制;第七章是本文的结论部分。更多还原

【Abstract】 Salt is a necessary good in people’s life. It was easy to be controlled by some monopoly, because production of salt was limited by some natural resources, such as sea, salt-lake and salt-well, and so on. Old-Chinese monarchs always held the monopoly of salt in their hands, and the tax of salt became the important resource of country wealth. There were two kinds of monopolistic institutions about salt: one was the direct monopolistic institution that government controlled the whole process of salt from product to sale; the other was indirect monopolistic institution that government only controlled the product of salt and traders were with responsibility for sale. The salt-monopolistic institution of Ming Dynasty was of indirect monopolistic institution.As an important economic institution, the salt-monopolistic institution of Ming Dynasty not only affected the wealth of country, but also was closely linked with traders’business and fortune. While Ming dynasty linked salt-monopoly with frontier defence, the salt-monopolistic institution of Ming Dynasty not only affected economy of country, but also was relation with polity and national defence. So the institution was a part of the deep-level structure in Ming society. The institution changed in order with Kaizhong Law, Kaizhongzhese Law and Register Law, etc. There were inherent logic relation and path dependence in processes of changes that is very difficult to explain by New-classic Economics or Evolutional Economics. Historical Institutional Analysis can do it by bridge with NE to EE. In use of HIA, the thesis have concluded that: Kaizhong law was an equilibrium of game between the monarch and traders, when parameters(such as preference, technology and payoff etc.) didn’t change, it was self-enforcement, that is to say, traders could make the monarch to obey rules; the trader’s organization can support Kaizhong law to self-enforce through its rules and fuction that can affect people’s expect-payoff and belief; at first, the rise of Waiting Problem made Kaizhong Law inefficient, and didn’t change the parameters of game, while with the deterioration of Waiting Problem, the key parameters began to transform and the new equilibrium came into being, and Kaizhongzhese Law, Register Law began to rise one by one, and then the new institutional life-cycle had risen. The seven chapters of the thesis go as follows.Chapter 1 is Introduction. In this chapter, we present the motivation for writing the thesis and the evaluative survey of relevant literatures.Chapter 2 is the Theoretical Framework. In this chapter, at first, we present a survey toward New Institutional Economic History development, then build our analytic framework.Chapter 3 study the resource and essence of Kaizhong Law, and indicate that the trader’s organization in Ming Dynasty solve the commitment problem between the monarch and traders, so support self-enforcement of Kaizhong Law.Chapter 4 point that Waiting Problem is the direct cause that the salt-monopolistic institution change. The causes of Waiting Problem are the monarch’s dynamic inconsistency and rent-seeking of officials and traders.Chapter 5 mainly study that the institutional marginal change of the salt-monopolistic institution of Ming Dynasty. We study the institutional characters, enforcement conditions and the economic implications of Kaizhongzhese Law.Chapter 6 study that the institutional change of the salt-monopolistic institution of Ming Dynasty. In this chapter, we will study the contractual nature and the mechanism of governance of Register Law.Chapter 7 is Concluding Remarks. The concluding chapter summarizes the main results of the thesis, and presents some future research directions.更多还原