【作者】 杨红伟；

【导师】 林尚立；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治学理论， 2007， 博士

【副题名】以中国分税制的产生为对象

【摘要】 本文以分税制的产生为研究对象，探讨中央与地方关系中权力分散化与制度化的相关性。研究试图表明，在以高度中央集权为初始条件的改革中，央地权力关系的分散化构成了制度化的前提与基础。权力分散化从三个方面促进了制度化：(1)权力分散化提高了中央以政治集权约束财政分权的交易成本，从而产生了制度化的需求；(2)在分散化的权力关系中，央地之间逐渐形成了威权与协商、谈判共存的关系，这为制度生成提供了有利的角色互动模式；(3)在权力分散化的环境中，央地之间围绕财政问题长期互动，为制度生成提供了必要的知识与技能积累。这一结论表明，在威权政治的制度化转型中，权力分散化是一个有利条件。本文的各个部分以几个相互关联的理论或实证发现，来支撑上述核心观点：(1)改革以来的央地关系可界定为一种“威权—互动”结构。“威权—互动”结构是财政权力分散化的产物，是中央政治集权与地方财政自治的结合体。在此结构中，中央与地方的关系不再是单纯的命令与服从的关系，而是呈现出互动关系。(2)省级领导的政治流动与地方政府的财政表现存在明显的相关性。这表明在制度短缺的改革环境中，中央以政治集权来约束地方的财政自治，中央对财政资源丰富的地方比财政资源稀缺的地方施加了更多的人事控制，以此来保证它在财政管理中的贯通能力。干部控制的机制包括晋升、交流与政治吸纳等内容。(3)财政数据表明，中央施加人事控制越强的那些省份，对中央财政政策的偏离反而越严重。因为在制度短缺的环境中，中央以政治集权作为节制地方财政自治的主要手段，存在着高昂的交易成本。降低交易成本、克服财政衰弱的途径就在于制度化。因此，分税制改革不仅仅是中央偏好的结果，其深层动因是权力分散化所产生的制度化需求。(4)权力分散化不仅带来了制度化的需求，而且，还促进了制度生成所必需的知识与技能累积。因此，财政权力分散化的程度与制度化的进程直接相关。1986年财政制度化努力之所以受到挫折，1994年分税制改革之所以推行成功，其原因就在于后者所面对的权力分散化程度更高，因而制度需求也更紧迫，支持分税制的各种知识与技能累积也更丰富。(5)权力分散化还为制度生成提供了有利的角色互动模式。在“威权—互动”型央地关系中，制度生成过程不再是“零和博弈”模式，而是央地双方都能从制度生成中有所获益的互动与协商模式。这种互动模式为制度生成提供了“共识”达成机制，共识的达成是中央与地方的谈判与妥协的结果，它为新制度提供了合法性基础。分税制产生的政治含义表明，在中央与地方之间的权力结构已经高度分散化之后，央地关系的合理重构，必须从传统的控制型中央集权的旧思维中跳出来，将央地关系由一个控制问题，转化为一个秩序构建的问题。秩序构建的核心，就在于通过相互尊重、协商与讨价还价的过程，产生一个能容纳、规范地方分散化权力的制度空间。如果将以上结论加以扩展，还可以对威权政治制度化转型的一般理论有所启示。在经过长期以发展为导向的分权与市场化改革之后，原先高度集权的政治经济结构已经分化为不同的权力与权利主体，同时，交换、互惠和相互依赖构成不同主体间的主要互动方式。在这种已经分散化了的权力结构中，以组织性政治集权作为政治一体化的维系方式，存在着越来越高昂的交易成本，将不可避免地遭遇效能磨损的问题，并由此带来了紧迫的制度需求。因而，政治集权的效能磨损会成为促进国家政治转型的契机，即先前以组织性集权为中心的政治权力结构，逐渐转变为以理性化的现代国家制度为中心的政治权力结构。而这种转变的逻辑，在中央与地方的财政关系中已经得到体现。更多还原

【Abstract】 The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to an understanding of the institutionalized transformation of the central-provincial fiscal relationship. In particular, I look into the relevance between fiscal power fragmentation and fiscal institutionalization by analyzing the formation of the Tax-sharing system. I demonstrate that power fragmentation is positive to institutionalization. Firstly, high Transaction cost resulted from power fragmentation needs the institutionalization of central-local fiscal relationship; Secondly, power fragmentation provides sound actor-interactional conditions to the institutionalization; thirdly, power fragmentation prepares knowledge and technique accumulation for the institutionalization.My several interrelated findings can demonstrate the core view above:(1) I define the central-local fiscal relationship as "authoritative & interactional structure, which is an outcome of the fiscal power fragmentation and a production of the concurrence of political centralization and local fiscal autonomy. In the authoritative & interactional structure, central-local relationship is no long an order-obey pattern, but an interactional pattern.(2) Data of the provincial cadres’ turnover indicates that central personnel control has a high and direct interrelation with local governments’ fiscal contribution. In the authoritative & interactional structure, central government mainly wielded cadre management power to control local governments’ fiscal behavior. Cadre management usually includes promotion, rotation, assimilation, etc.(3) I also find that provinces, on which the central put more personnel control, should bear more responsibility for the fiscal decline of the central government. It indicates that in the context of power fragmentation, the effect of the centralization of political power will be eroded little by little because of the shortage of institutionalization. Then, the fiscal decline of central government brings forward the requirement of institutionalization.(4) Another finding is that the degree of power fragmentation relates directly to the course of institutionalization. Power fragmentation not only gives rise to requirement of institutionalization, but also advances the accumulation of necessary knowledge and technique. By means of the degree of the power fragmentation, I explain why the fiscal institutionalization in 1986 failed, and why the tax-sharing system reform can succeed.(5) The fragmentation of power provides an actor-interactional pattern for the formation of institution. In the authoritative & interactional central-local structure, the course of institution’s formation is not a pattern of "zero-game", but an interactional and deliberative pattern, from which both sides could benefit. The success of institutional creation depends both on the consensus within the central decision-makers and on the bargaining and compromise between the central and local governments.The political implication of Tax-sharing system’s formation indicates that the rational remaking of central-local relationship should transcend the traditional thinking of centralization. The central-local relationship should be translated from controlling to mutual respecting, deliberating and bargaining, so as to come up with an institution that can accommodate and regulate the local decentralization.If being extended, the above conclusion may contribute to the general theory of the authoritative politics’ institutionalized transformation. After a long period of development-oriented decentralization and market reform, the former highly centralized political-economical structure has been divided into different subjects of power and right, and exchanging, reciprocating and interdependence become the main way of interaction between different subjects. In the fragmental power structure, the traditional organized political centralization which used to be the main way of political integration, brought higher and higher transaction cost and eroded the political efficiency, which caused the urgent need of institution. So the erosion of political efficiency of centralization could promote the political transformation, i.e. the former political power structure focused on organized centralization gradually changed into one focused on modern state institution. The logic of institutionalized transformation has been reflected in the central-local fiscal relationship.更多还原