节点文献

中国国有金融资本出资人制度研究

Research on the Investor System of China’s State-owned Financial Capital

【作者】 李怀舟

【导师】 陈耀先;

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 , 金融学, 2007, 博士

【摘要】 国有金融企业改革伴随着经济体制改革已进行了二十几年,然而国有金融资本管理体制改革相对滞后,是金融体制改革的一个薄弱环节,成为制约国有金融企业改革成效的一个重要因素。建立有效的国有金融资本出资人制度应该被确立为国有金融资本管理体制改革的方向。国有金融资本出资人制度是国有金融资本的资本代表制度、经营管理、奖惩和收益等一系列制度安排的总和。它是一项复杂、艰难的系统工程,涉及到投融资体制、财税体制、人事体制及政府机构设置的改革等诸多方面,需要国有金融企业制度改革、政府机构改革及其它有个方面的改革相配套,因此对国有金融资本出资人制度进行深入的分析和研究,具有重要的理论和实践意义。以下简要地介绍一下本论文的内容:论文第一章从历史发展的视角入手,全面分析了我国国有金融机构的改革历程,从改革初期的下放与上收,改革开放后的扩大企业自主权、承包制、国有金融机构的公司制商业化,直到国有金融企业股份制改造,以建立现代金融企业制度的改革。每项改革措施的实施都取得了一定的成效,但也暴露出一些问题。由于改革基本是在企业层面,没有从根本上触及带有计划经济色彩的国有金融资本管理体制,因而,国有金融企业仍是整体效益不高、巨额不良资产频生、处境艰难的局面没有彻底改变。现代企业制度是经市场经济国家验证的有效的企业制度,建立现代企业制度且熔合国际金融企业运行规则特征的金融企业已被确定为国有金融企业改革的方向。现代企业制度的重要特征是出资者按投入企业的资本额享有所有者的权益,企业按照市场需求组织生产经营,政府不直接干预企业的生产经营活动。国有金融企业建立现代企业制度客观上要求政府以出资人代表的身份对国有金融企业进行管理,因此,国有金融资本出资人制度的提出是国有金融企业及国有金融资本管理体制改革历史发展的逻辑必然。第二章运用委托代理理论,对国有金融资本出资人制度进行深入的经济学理论分析,我国国有金融资本委托代理关系表现为两大等级体系:第一等级体系是从初始委托人(全民)到中央政府的自上而下的多级授权链,第二等级体系是从中央政府到最终代理人(国有金融企业内部成员)的自上而下的多级授权链,委托代理的链条长,且带有明显的行政性性质,由于缺乏有效监督制约机制,常常造成代理关系的非经济性失效;本章对第二等级体系的代理委托关系进行了重点分析,有比较大的篇幅对政府与国有金融企业的多任务委托代理关系问题和出资人控制权分割对国有金融企业效率影响问题进行了较为详细的分析,得出在国有金融资本管理体制改革中,政府的两权分离改革是国有金融资本管理改革的关键,当然当今国有金融资本出资人控制权分散,亦不利于国有金融企业效率的提高,从而提出建立一个统一的国有金融资本管理机构是必要的、是有利于国有金融企业效率改进的。第三章考察了外国国有金融资本管理体制。本章放眼全球从国外国有资本管理的基本框架入手,然后分析了建立在国有资本管理基本框架上的国有金融资本管理的制度安排,西方国家中的法国、瑞典、意大利、新西兰、新加坡、韩国的国有资本及国有金融资本管理体制比较有代表性。本文选取这5个国家为例进行了考察,给我们的经验是尽管不同国家对国有金融资本管理模式不同,但其制度都较好地解决了三个方面的问题:一是明确了谁代表国家履行出资人职责;二是明确了如何促进金融企业建立有效治理机制,以实现国有金融资本保值增值和资本回报最大化;三是明确了出资人以什么标准向金融企业选派代理人,以及如何约束和激励代理人等问题,从而我们可以获得重要的启示:国有金融企业是可以搞好的,建立有效的国有金融资本出资人制度是搞好国有金融企业的关键。第四章出资人制度基本框架是本文的核心部分。是在对国有金融企业改革的回顾中得出建立国有金融资本出资人制度是必然的,然后对如何构建国有金融资本出资制度进行理论分析得出政府必须两权分离、建立起统一行使出资人权利、加强监督力的国有金融资本管理机构,最后在借鉴国有金融资本管理制度的基础上,本文设计了新的国有金融资本管理体制框架,主要内容有:成立统一的国有金融资本管理机构;建立“四层次”的国有金融资本管理体系;制定和完善国有金融资本监督管理基本法律法规;建立一整套指标体系、考核评价和监督激励体系;完善建立出资人制度的外部环境。本章最后还讨论了国有金融资本出资人制度的实现平台。以下几章是对国有金融资本出资人制度的分论,是对其内部机制进行详细阐述。第五章对国有金融金融资本出资人制度最重要的部分国有金融资本管理体制中的机构,本章从管理机构、营运机构再到经营单位对每一层次机构的性质和权利、特征进行了仔细的分析,其中对管理机构则从方案选择比较、性质、内部构成以及与外部关系几个方面展开,而对营运机构重点分析了国有金融企业控股公司,其中以汇金等三大公司为例。体制依赖于机构,机构是体制得以存在的基础,从而可以看出机构设置重要性,国有金融资本管理机构不管采用哪种模式设置,但有一点是必须注意的,那就是新设立的国有金融资本管理机构,必须转变以前那种行政式的管理方法和手段,作为一种尝试性的探索,本文也提出了一种目标模式。另外本章还对高层的选拔与激励机制进行了分析,主要采取历史分析与逻辑归纳相结合的方法,对出资人管理机构如何选择董事、董事长、监事、总经理(行长)、如何对其进行有效的激励,以达到国有金融资本的保值增值目标进行了分析,提出必须在党管干部的原则下进行制度创新,还出资人完整的人事权和建立以经济激励为主的激励机制。第六章主要对国有金融资本出资人制度安排进行中一个重要的环节国有金融资本考核指标、评价体制进行了分析,因为它是国有金融资本运行机构的目标,也是国有金融资本管理的手段,所以说它是一个工具,本章从重点是回顾了国有金融资本保值增值指标历史与现状,得出现阶段国有金融资本保值增值指标是缺失的,目前没有制定统一的指标来进行评价,从而在以往评价指标的基础上,本文以EVA理论对保值增值考核、评价指标进行再造,提出必须以考虑资本成本的经济利益来考察评价国有金融资本的保值增值才是合理的。第七章是对监督制度进行了分析,它是的国有金融资本出资人制度得以有效运行的保障机制,其核心是出资人的财务监督,本章重点引入了经营判断原则的一般框架和国有资本预算制度,得出当前出资人监督应该建立以出资人为中心(监事局为核心层次)的财务监督制度,将董事责任追究与经营判断原则相结合,以预算为手段来进行对国有金融资本的宏观控制和对国有金融资本运行进行有效监督。第八章对国有金融产权的转让与国有金融资本的有限退出制度进行了分析,主要首先从股权多元化对国有资本绩效、国家金融制度变迁与国家金融安全来分析得出国家绝对控股是强制性制度变迁的结果,在当前情势下也是必要的,实行国有资本的有限退出有利于国有金融资本的绩效的改进,达到以退为进的良好的结果,但必须借鉴国际经验,逐渐推进,最重要是合理地、以市场化的方式对转让的定价,最后重点分析当前引进战略投资者的相关问题,这一部分主要是综述,但后面从一个监督激励的视角对战略投资者的引进进行了一种全新的分析,得出战略投资者参与监督的激励只与他投入资本的绝对额有关,而与相对于总资本的比例关系不大,因此有限的退出必然带来监督资源丰富的供给,这对于理解国有金融资本的绝对控股政策就更为直观,同时得出只要有一名有效监督者的引进,那么其它股东们全都是些搭便车者,都没有多大关系,从而为那些不具有金融行业背景的战略投资者引入的铺平了道路。以上是本文大概的论述内容,国有金融资本出资人制度是一项宏大的系统工程,本文虽然只是粗糙地论述了它的主要内容和主要方面,但本人认为本文还是在研究对象和方法上,进行了一些探索性的工作,本文的主要创新之处可以作如下概括:(一)本文对国有金融资本出资人制度进行了比较全面、系统的分析。在前人的基础上,按照自己的思路对国有金融资本管理的相关方面进行了系统的梳理,并且大胆地设想、构建了一个国有金融资本出资人制度的基本框架,这可能是为国有金融资本管理研究进行了一次有意义的探索。(二)通过对国有金融企业改革历史发展进程的研究,得出建立国有金融资本出资人制度的提出是国有金融企业及国有金融资本管理体制改革的历史逻辑必然。(三)提出通过引入经营判断的原则,将董事责任追究与经营判断的原则相结合,同时引入资本预算制度,开展国有金融资本经营预算,以此来完善国有金融资本出资人监督制度。(四)从监督激励的视角对当前引进战略投资者进行分析,得出国有金融资本有限退出能带来战略投资者足够的监督激励,因此可以推及当前战略投资者的引进是对我国一贯以来国有金融资本行政代理带来的监督激励不足的一种有效补充,是在现有框架下对历来国有金融企业低效率情形的一次大胆的自新和扬弃,也为理解国家对金融业绝对控股政策提供一个新的视角。

【Abstract】 The reform of the state-owned financial business enterprise has been carried on for more than 20 years, accompanied with the economic system reform, however, the reform of state-owned financial capital management system is lag behind, become an important restriction factor of the state-owned financial business enterprise reform result. Establish an effectively state-owned financial capital system behalf of establishment person should be formed the direction of financial capital management system reform. which contains the responsibilities of investor on behalf of the state ,the management and profit, rewards and punishment, it is a complicated and hard systems engineering, it refers to lots of system reformations, for example, the reform of the fiscal and taxation, investment and financing system government officers and institutions setting and personnel matters. so to analysis and research this problem have important meaning on the theories and practice .the following contents is an introduction of this paper.Chapter 1 commenced from the angle of history develop view, analyzed the process of the state-owned financing institution, from the initial stage of reform of bottom put and accept up, reform the independent power of extension business enterprise, contract system, commercialized the state-owned financing institution, until the state-owned financial business enterprise share reformation, to build up the modern and financial business enterprise system reform. Each reformation obtains certain result, also expose some problem. Reform is basic in the business enterprise level, not touch to the planned economy color of the state-owned financial capital management system by the root, the whole performance of state-owned financial business enterprise is not high, the bad huge sum property , the difficult situation not changing thoroughly. Modern business enterprise system is a valid business enterprise system of market economy country, building up modern business enterprise system and match the international financial business enterprise rule characteristic have already be the direction of the financial business enterprise reform .The important characteristic of the modern business enterprise system is the investor possess the rights of the proprietor presses based on the capital sum, business enterprise according to the market need to organize produce and management, the government does not interfere its activity directly. The state-owned financial business enterprise building on the modern business enterprise system objective request the government as a investor representative’s body to management, putting forward the ownership system of state-owned financial capital is inevitable logic of the state-owned financial business enterprise and the state-owned financial capital management systems reform.Chapter 2 commenced from the general theories of entrust and agency, carry on the thorough economics theories analysis the investor system of state-owned financial capital, our country and agency of the state-owned financial capital performances as two grade systems, The first class system starts the client( all the people) to central government from top to bottom many classes authorization chain, the second class system is many classes authorize the chain from central government to the end agent from top to bottom, the chain is specially long, and entrust to act have the obvious administration property, because of lacking the valid supervision mechanism, usually making not economic of act; This chapter carry on the point analysis to the agency of the second class system, have the ratio space to analyze the problem of the government and state-owned financial business enterprises of many mission entrust and control power partition affecting the state-owned financial business enterprise efficiency, thus we can find that two power separations of the government are the key of the state-owned financial capital management system reform, nowadays the control power of state-owned financial capital dispersion is unable to help the state-owned financial business enterprise efficiency, so establishing unify the organization is necessary and is advantageous to the state-owned financial business enterprise efficiency improvement.Chapter 3 investigated the foreign state-owned financial capital supervision system. This chapter scan widely the world from the foreign state-owned capital supervision of basic frame , then analyzed the state-owned financial capital management system , France, Sweden, Italy ,New Zealand, Singapore, Korea , the state-owned capital and the state-owned financial capital management systems of these western and developed countries have the representative. The paper selected these 5 nations to carry on the investigation, thus we can acquire the important apocalypse that the state-owned financial business enterprise can do good, and building the investor system of state-owned financial capital is a key.Chapter 4 put forward the basic frame of the investor system, it is the core part. These are based on forward analysis this paper designed a new frame of the state-owned financial capital supervision system, the main contents including establishing the state-owned financial capital supervision organization, establishing four layers entrust and agent of the state-owned financial capital, perfecting the basic supervision law of the state-owned financial capital ,Building up a set of index sign system to investigate and the system to encourage; Perfecting an exterior environment .Finally discussed the system terrace. Following several chapters is a cent talk, is a detailed elaborate of its internal mechanism.Chapter 5 analyzed the organization that is most important part of state-owned financial capitals in the investor system. Careful analysis the each property of layer organization and right, characteristic from supervision organization, operation the organization to the carrying unit, among them relating to analyze the supervision organization with exterior, the project choice compare, property, inner part constitute and, and point analyzed the operation organization the state-owned financial business enterprise holding company, among them to take remit three companies (Huai Jing) as an example. Because the system is depending on in organization, the organization is the foundation of the system’s existence. Thus find out the constitution of the organization very important, the new establishing state-owned financial capital supervision organization, must change its past method and means of the administration type. This paper also put forward own standpoint.Moreover this chapter also analyzed the encouraging mechanism and selection of the key leader, mainly adopt the history analysis and game analysis to manages how the organization choose the board director, president, supervisor, general manager, how to encourage effectively, so as to attain protecting and increasing value of the state-owned financial capital, we find that we must innovate the system under the party rule, return the investor complete personnel power and build up with the economy encourage mechanism.Chapter 6 mainly investigates the index sign and evaluation system that is an important link of the system arrangement. Because it is the target of the state-owned financial capital operation organization, is also a means of state-owned financial capital supervision, so it is a tool. This chapter looked back index sign’s history and present of the state-owned financial capital; found the index sign is imperfect. Currently the united index sign of evaluation is not exist, as the former evaluation index sign a foundation, this paper give a new life of the evaluation index sign with the EVA theories, and find that considering the economic benefits of the capital cost is just reasonable in evaluating protecting and increasing in the state-owned financial capital value.Chapter 7 analyzed the supervision system that is the guarantee mechanism; its core is the finance supervision of investor. This chapter adopted general frame of the management judgment principle and the state-owned capital budget systems, we found we should build up a finance supervision system as investor the center (the supervisor bureau for the core layer), pursue the responsibility with the management judge principle to combine, among them take budget as the control and directs on the macro view, so as to carry on the valid supervising to the state-owned financial capital.Chapter 8 analyzed the turnout and withdraw system of the state-owned financial capital, first share diversified ownership of state-owned capitals results more efficiency, national financial system changes and national risk ,we find absolutely control is viable, also is necessary. The government-owned capital withdrawing improved the state-owned financial capital income, attain to take back as step forward, but must draw lessons from the international experience, gradual propulsion. Among them the most important is reasonably and by market to decide price. At the end, analyzing related problem of the strategic investor at present, this part is mainly overview, the behind is from the angle of view that a supervision encourage to carry on a kind of new analysis of the strategic investor, we find that inspect of encourage is something doing with his absolute sum capital only, but not with comparison sum in its ,so limited of withdraw to bring the resources of inspect enrich supply, this is more absolutely for comprehend the state-owned financial capital controlling policy .Moreover as long as we have a valid inspector to usher in, all of other shareholders are hitch a ride, did not more affect, thus not having financial profession’s strategic investor can also lead to usher in.Above those is probably including this paper contents, the investor system of state-owned financial capital is great system engineering, this paper just discussed coarsely its main contents and main aspects, this paper have achieved some creative points:(1)This paper carried on more overall, system of analysis of the state-owned financial capital management ,based on the fore research, according to own way of thinking, and conceive, constructed a whole set investor system of the state-owned financial capital, this may be a beneficial research of the financial capital management.(2)Through the research of reforms history development progress of the state-owned financial business enterprise, we find that putting forward of system is the inevitable logic of the state-owned financial business enterprise and the state-owned financial capital management system reform history development.(3)Put forward the management judgment principle, lead board director’s responsibility pursue with the management the principle of judgment together, at the same time ushering in the capital budget system to perfect the supervision system.(4)End, angle of supervision encourage view, ushering in the strategic investor at present and capital limit to withdraw, it can bring inspect resources to enrich supply, thus for comprehend the nation to absolutely control providing a new visual field.

节点文献中: