我国证券公司经营困境之制度经济学研究

【作者】 王岸欣；

【导师】 许少强；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 金融学， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 在我国证券市场14年的发展历史中，证券公司曾经经历过暴利时代。但从2001年下半年开始，随着股市的严重不景气，市场制度上的缺陷开始不断暴露出来，证券公司经营陷入一蹶不振的状态。到目前为止，证券公司已经经历了四年的低迷状态。证券市场作为以私有产权为基础的市场经济发展的最高阶段产物，其本质上与国有产权及计划经济是格格不入的。在国有产权结构下，政府同时扮演了博弈的规则制定者和博弈参与者的双重身份。这构成了证券公司外部环境的根本性缺陷。证券公司一方面以政府为其产权主体，另一方面又以投资者为其主要客户对象和利润来源，这种双重性决定了当政府与投资者的利益之间发生冲突时，证券公司必然会陷于制度困境。由于外部母系统对内部子系统有着决定性影响，证券公司内部的组织结构具有一般国有企业的通病，官本位、人浮于事、盲目扩张、无视风险等等。内外制度缺陷在证券经纪业务、投资银行业务和创新业务上都有具体反映。经纪业务的经营模式过分陈旧，靠天吃饭弊端突出，同质化竞争和强烈的投机环境使经纪业务举步唯艰；投资银行业务的最后审批权限完全为政府所垄断，使得投行竞争异化为寻租竞争：创新业务由于需要获得政府的试点许可，使得市场为少数被政府扶持的证券公司所把持，造成事实上的不平等。证券公司制度困境的解决是一个系统工程，笔者针对其外部制度、内部制度、经纪、投行和创新业务各方面的问题，提出了自己的应对策略。大致思路是通过外部产权制度和交易制度的改善，以及证券公司自身产权结构的多元化、经营结构的改善和创新，网络经纪业务的发展、国际化开拓等来实现经营效益的提高。更多还原

【Abstract】 Among the 14-year developing history of China’s stock market, the securities cor-poration had enjoyed a golden time. But with a sharp pludging of the market from the second half of 2001, the institutional defect of securities market system has come to exposure, securities corporation has fallen to a more than 3-year running dilemma. As an ultra product of the market economy developing based on private property, se-curities market is incompatible with the state-own right and planning economy. Based on the state-own right, the government playes as both rule-maker and participant in a game, which leads to the substancial defect of outer institutional environment sur-round the securities corporation. Securities corporation is owned by government, but at service for the investors, the benefit conflict of the two would certainly push it into a institutional dilemma. Because the outer mother system has decisive influence over the inner subsidiary system, the inner organization structure of securities corporation has common failing as other state-own enterprises, such as bureaucratism, over-staffing, expanding blindly and reckless, etc. Outer and inner institutional defects were both reflected in securities brokerage, in-vestment banking and innovation field. The running mode of brokerage is too old-fashioned, resulting in a predicament of homogeneous competition. The financing permission right is monoplied by government, forcing the investment banking to turn into a rent-seeking competition. The experiment citing of securities innovation is con-trolled by government, making the innovation market is unfairly divided up by few securities corporations which are supplied by government. The solving of instituional dilemma of securities corporation is a systemetical work. The writer believes, through transformation of outer property system and exchang system, diversification of inner stock structure, innovation of running mode, develop-ment of net brokerage and international expanding, the running benefit of securities corporation could be improved.更多还原