【作者】 刘启亮；

【导师】 陈汉文；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 会计学， 2006， 博士

【摘要】 本文基于不完全契约理论,通过拓展“自我履约范围”和对纵向一体化的重新解释,提出了履约范式的框架。进一步,通过分析作为公共契约会计制度的二元价值诉求,阐述了会计法律、会计技术规范和诚信的功能耦合关系,提出了会计履约范式理论。基于此,分析了盈余管理的性质、产生原因和寻租本质。本文认为,经过盈余管理的会计信息仍是真实的;盈余管理存在的原因是在作为公共契约的会计准则等技术规范存在公共领域的前提下,交易者个体的自我履约范围低于基于市场一般预期的自我履约范围所致,也即交易者个体诚信履约失范的结果;盈余管理实质上是公司管理当局、注册会计师、控股股东等的合谋寻租行为。接着,基于盈余管理的寻租本质,从客户重要性角度和事务所任期角度,为盈余管理寻租行为提供了经验证据。最后,基于前面的理论分析和实证检验,提出了盈余管理的治理建议。本文主要的创新之处在于:(1)通过拓展“自我履约范围”和对纵向一体化的重新解释,提出了履约范式的框架,并将其运用于会计领域,形成了会计履约范式理论;(2)分析发现会计制度是一个基于社会公正和公司效率的二元价值体系;(3)通过分解会计准则与会计事项,全新地提出了针对会计事项的会计准则配置格局及公共领域概念,据此分析了盈余管理的性质与原因;(3)基于会计履约范式理论,利用博弈论分析工具,从一个较新的角度分析了盈余管理的合谋寻租本质,扩大了盈余管理的研究视野;(4)在实证检验部分,本研究发现,审计师允许客户管理当局盈余管理的方向是不对称的,审计师能够注意管理当局操纵盈余减少(负向盈余管理)的行为,但却不能控制操纵盈余增加(正向盈余管理)的行为,从而发现了与国外盈余管理不一致的特有现象。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the incomplete-contract theory, this paper reconstructs a framework of contract-enforcement by extending‘self-enforcing scope’and re-explaining‘vertical integration’theories. The integration relations among accounting law, accounting technology norms and accountants’sincerity are discussed on the basis of dual values of accounting institutions as public contracts. Then contract-enforcement theory of accounting is raised. Furthermore, the author applies the contract-enforcement theory into accounting to discuss the nature of earnings management(EM), why earnings management exists and its essence. The following arguments are then developed. Firstly, the accounting information after EM is still true. Secondly, the reason why earning management exists is that self-enforcing scope of individual transactor is smaller than expected on the market, i.e. the lack of trust performing of individual transactor in case there exist some public domains of accounting technology norms as public contract. Thirdly, earnings management is actually a kind of rent-seeking game among managers, CPA firms and controlling shareholders et al.. Then, this paper provides some empirical evidences of EM based on rent-seeking argument from perspectives of client importance and audit tenure. Finally, this paper puts forward some proposals to restraining earnings management.The main innovations of this paper are presented as follows. Firstly, by extending‘self-enforcing scope’and re-explaining‘vertical integration’, this paper sets up a framework of contract-enforcement and applies it into accounting. Secondly, the author regards accounting system as a dual-value system which aims at both social justness and individual firm’s operation efficiency. Thirdly, by decomposing accounting standards and accounting events, this paper innovatively develops an allocation pattern of accounting standards for accounting events and analyzes the nature and causes of EM. Forth, based on the contract-enforcement theory and game theory, the author analyzes the rent-seeking essence for EM. Finally, in the empirical section, the author discovers an interesting phenomenon that auditors can constraint earnings-decreasing EM, but cannot constraint earnings-increasing EM, which is different from previous findings.更多还原