【作者】 付明明；

【导师】 金雪军；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 本文是对关系型融资效率问题的研究。论文分四部分共七章展开论述。 第一部分共两章,提出论文要研究的主要问题。第一章是导论,主要阐述了论文的研究背景与主题、研究的意义,并对论文的研究方法、研究框架和研究的创新点做了说明。第二章在以往文献相关观点的基础上,对关系型融资效率的概念作了详细的分析;研究了融资关系的决定因素及关系强度的测量;并介绍了国外对关系型融资价值的一些实证研究,以及国内对关系型融资研究的现状。 第二部分包括第三章和第四章,从理论上研究了关系型融资的效率。第三章是从微观的角度研究关系型融资的效率。我们首先分析了关系型融资的微观价值。它可较好地解决信息不对称问题,有利于控制企业的机会主义行为,并能创造声誉价值,还可获得政策诱导租金。然后,我们从嵌入性的视角对关系型融资可能存在的问题做了分析,并构建出理论模型。第四章是从宏观的角度对关系型融资效率做出分析。我们先分析了关系型融资的市场效率。市场竞争虽然可能对关系型融资的某些方面造成影响,但是,激烈的竞争对关系型融资制度的影响不一定就是消极的,实际上,竞争也有可能加强银行和企业的关系。关系可能是市场进入的障碍,银行的信息垄断地位可能阻碍新银行的进入。但银行关系对关系银行的市场退出效应则正好相反。如果银行关系为银行创造的价值越多,银行越不可能退出或违约。其次,我们分析了关系型融资的过度投资问题及其对货币政策传递机制的影响。中小企业由于自身原因及外部原因等,融资比较困难。而关系型融资在帮助中小企业解决融资困难问题的同时,又会矫枉过正,给中小企业带来过度投资的问题。文章构建了一个理论模型,从静态和动态两个方面分析了中小企业过度投资的原因,并分析了它对货币政策传递机制的影响。最后我们分析了关系型融资对经济增长的推动作用。 第三部分包括第五章和第六章,是对关系型融资实践的分析,其中第五章是运用我国及东亚四国的数据对关系型融资的实证研究,第六章则是对我国及其他国家的关系性融资实践的制度分析。在第五章,我们首先分析了在发生金融危机时关系的作用。通过对印尼的研究,我们发现,关系对企业贷款的利率影响并不更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation studies the efficiency of relationship financing. This paper includes four sections and seven chapters.The first section includes two chapters. It presents the main problems that will be studied in this paper. The first chapter is introduction. It mainly elaborates the background, topics and meaning of this study, also explaining the methods, frame and originalities of this study. The second chapter analyses the concept of relationship financing efficiency in detail on the basis of relative previous literature, studying the determining factors of financing relationship and the measurements of relationship strength, also introducing empirical studies of relationship financing’s values conducted by foreign scholars and the status quo of domestic study of relationship financing.The second section includes the third and forth chapters, studying the efficiency of relationship financing theoretically. The third chapter studies the efficiency of relationship financing from micro angle. We first analyze the micro values of relationship financing. It can settle the problem of information asymmetry, controlling the enterprises’ opportunistic behaviors, creating reputation values and policy-induced rents. Then we analyse the efficiency of relationship financing from embedment point of view, constructing a theoretical model. The forth chapter analyses the efficiency of relationship financing from macro angle. We first analyse the market efficiency of relationship financing. Although market competition may have some effects on relationship financing, they are not always negative. In fact, market competition may enforce the relationship of banks and enterprises. Relationship may be an obstacle to market entry because relationship bank’s position of information monopoly can block new bank’s entry. However, bank relationship’s effect on relationship bank’s market exit is the opposite. The more values bank relationship creates for the bank, the less possibility the bank will exit. Secondly, we analyse relationship financing’soverinvestment problem and its influence on monetary transmission mechanism. Small enterprises are difficult to finance for their own and outside reasons. Relationship financing can settle this problem, but at the same time, it goes further, causing an overinvestment problem. This paper constructs a theoretical model to analyze the reasons of overinvestment from static and dynamic aspects, also analyzing its influence on monetary policy transmission mechanism. Finally, we analyse bank relationship’s driving force for economic growth.The third section includes the fifth and sixth chapter. It is an empirical analysis of relationship financing. The fifth chapter studies relationship financing empirically by the use of our country and another four Asian countries’ data. The sixth chapter conducts an institutional analysis of our country and other countries’ relationship financing practice. In the fifth chapter, we first analyse the function of relationship when in financial crisis. By the study of Indonesia, we find that relationship has no significant effect on credit interest rate. In Korea, Philippine and Thailand, relationship also has no significant effect on credit availability. So we conclude that if the bank and the enterprise are both in crisis, the enterprise cannot get financial saving. We then use our country’s data to conduct an empirical analysis of bank relationship’s influence on enterprises’ credit availability and international bank relationship. We find that bank relationship has significant positive effect on enterprises’ credit availability. When our country’s enterprises deal with international businesses, banks’ international businesses don’t follow enterprises’, so that at the historical point of enlarging overseas investment, our enterprises face the problem of lacking banks’ support. The sixth chapter conducts an institutional analysis of relationship financing. We first make a comparative analysis of foreign countries’ relationship financing system, analyzing in detail the development and transformation of American, Japanese and German relationship financing institutions. Then we elaborate the construction of Chinese relationship financing system. We first analyze our country’s experiment of main bank system, studying the achievements and problems of this experiment. Then we analyze the institutional background, institutional arrangement and institutional transition path of our country’s relationship financing system.更多还原